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Practical Strategies for Agent-Based Negotiation in Complex Environments
by Colin Richard Williams
Agent-based negotiation, whereby the negotiation is automated by software programs,
can be applied to many different negotiation situations, including negotiations between
friends, businesses or countries. A key benefit of agent-based negotiation over human
negotiation is that it can be used to negotiate effectively in complex negotiation envi-
ronments, which consist of multiple negotiation issues, time constraints, and multiple
unknown opponents. While automated negotiation has been an active area of research
in the past twenty years, existing work has a number of limitations. Specifically, most of
the existing literature has considered time constraints in terms of the number of rounds
of negotiation that take place. In contrast, in this work we consider time constraints
which are based on the amount of time that has elapsed. This requires a different ap-
proach, since the time spent computing the next action has an effect on the utility of the
outcome, whereas the actual number of offers exchanged does not. In addition to these
time constraints, in the complex negotiation environments which we consider, there are
multiple negotiation issues, and we assume that the opponents’ preferences over these
issues and the behaviour of those opponents are unknown. Finally, in our environment
there can be concurrent negotiations between many participants.
Against this background, in this thesis we present the design of a range of practical
negotiation strategies, the most advanced of which uses Gaussian process regression
to coordinate its concession against its various opponents, whilst considering the be-
haviour of those opponents and the time constraints. In more detail, the strategy uses
observations of the offers made by each opponent to predict the future concession of
that opponent. By considering the discounting factor, it predicts the future time which
maximises the utility of the offers, and we then use this in setting our rate of concession.
Furthermore, we evaluate the negotiation agents that we have developed, which use
our strategies, and show that, particularly in the more challenging scenarios, our most
advanced strategy outperforms other state-of-the-art agents from the Automated Nego-
tiating Agent Competition, which provides an international benchmark for this work.
In more detail, our results show that, in one-to-one negotiation, in the highly discounted
scenarios, our agent reaches outcomes which, on average, are 2.3% higher than those
of the next best agent. Furthermore, using empirical game theoretic analysis we show
the robustness of our strategy in a variety of tournament settings. This analysis shows
that, in the highly discounted scenarios, no agent can benefit by choosing a different
strategy (taken from the top four strategies in that setting) than ours. Finally, in the
many-to-many negotiations, we show how our strategy is particularly effective in highly
competitive scenarios, where it outperforms the state-of-the-art many-to-many negotia-
tion strategy by up to 45%.
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Introduction
Negotiation is a process in which a range of negotiating parties, with different desires,
aim to reach agreement on a common set of issues. It is a task that has many practical
applications. For example, a group of people may negotiate in an attempt to choose a
restaurant to eat at. A client and supplier may negotiate in the sale of goods or services
and negotiations also take place when forming employment contracts. Negotiations
may even take place at the global scale, in the case of diplomatic negotiations between
countries. However, despite the frequency with which humans take part in some form
of negotiation, it is not an easy task for them to complete. It is often a time consuming
process, and it is difficult for humans to find efficient agreements (Bosse and Jonker,
2005), especially when they have little negotiation experience (Raiffa, 1982; Lin and
Kraus, 2010). Here, an efficient agreement is one where there is no other potential
agreement that would increase the benefit to one party without decreasing the benefit of
the other party. Therefore, there is considerable interest in automating the negotiation
process, by using software agents to assist in the negotiation. In this context, an agent
is a piece of software that acts on behalf of one of the negotiating parties and is able
to interact autonomously with other agents (or humans) in order to reach an agreement
(Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995). To this end, we provide the following motivating
scenario:
It is Thursday afternoon, and Bob is starting a new job on Monday. His job involves a
lot of travel, so he urgently needs to buy a car and is keen that the agreement to buy this
car should be made as soon as possible. He informs his automated buying agent that he
needs a small car which costs approximately £6,000. He is keen to limit his impact on
the environment, but drives long distances, so he desires a battery-powered car with a
high capacity battery. The colour of the car is not very important to Bob, but he prefers
dark coloured cars, with his favourite colour being blue. Since he will be using the car for
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work purposes, it is important that the car is in a good condition. The buying agent is
notified of these additional preferences, and also of the time constraints for completing
the deal.
The buying agent then contacts the selling agents of all of the local dealers, in order to
negotiate with them. As he lives in a large city, there are around 20 different dealers,
all competing for Bob’s business. During interactions with the selling agents, hundreds
of different offers may be made. In addition, Bob’s friend has offered his car for sale,
though it’s a rather inefficient car that Bob isn’t too keen on. After a short while, Bob’s
agent agrees to buy a small blue car from Alpha Cars, at a price of £4,950. The car
is in a good condition, but its battery capacity isn’t great. This is the best deal that the
agent has found, and negotiations don’t seem to be progressing any further. Bob will be
very pleased with this car at this price, and therefore the agent pays a non-refundable
deposit of £200 to secure the deal.
Just minutes later, the agent from Beta Motors makes a slightly better offer: a car which
is also in good condition, but this time in yellow and with a better battery capacity, at a
price of £5,050. The buying agent knows that Bob will prefer this car over the one that
he has placed a deposit on, but decides that it isn’t worth losing the deposit for.
A new agent, representing Delta Vehicles then enters the market, and Bob starts to ne-
gotiate with this new agent, whilst continuing negotiations with the other dealers’ agents.
Throughout the negotiations, other buying agents, each with their own requirements enter
and leave the market.
Following further negotiations, the Beta Motors agent proposes another car, similar to
the previous one, but this time in black, and at just £5,000. Even though the deposit
on the first car will be lost if the agent decides to change to this offer, the buying agent
makes the decision, on behalf of Bob, that it is worth it. The price difference of £50
plus the £200 deposit that has already been paid to Alpha Cars, along with a slightly less
preferred colour is far outweighed by the value that Bob places on securing a car with
such a good battery capacity.
The buying agent therefore reaches an agreement to purchase the black car from Beta
Motors. The deal is completed well within the time limits imposed by Bob’s situation,
and both parties are confident that they have got a good deal.
In addition to the retail application that we provide in our scenario, automated negoti-
ation can also be applied to areas as diverse as electricity markets (Brazier et al., 1998),
transportation scheduling (Fischer et al., 1995), and the trading of financial derivatives
(Bichler, 2000).
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In most negotiations similar to the one above (but without the use of automated agents),
human negotiators may expect to reach an agreement following a relatively small number
of interactions with their opponent. If the negotiation appears to be taking too long,
it is likely that one of the participants will simply walk away. Each interaction would
be likely to take many seconds or even minutes (Bosse and Jonker, 2005). In addition,
it is unlikely that a human negotiator could simultaneously negotiate with so many
opponents.
To overcome some of the limitations of human negotiation, we can use software agents.
These autonomous agents are usually self-interested, and their aim is to maximise the
value of the agreement from the point of view of the party that they represent. The
value of an agreement for a given participant is known as its utility. For any agreement,
this utility can be calculated according to the agent’s utility function, which is based
on the preferences of the participant. In an automated negotiation, it is possible for the
agents to exchange tens of thousands of offers with each other before reaching an agree-
ment. In addition, it is possible for them to use more complicated algorithms than a
human would use, since the agents have less restrictive memory and computational con-
straints (although, to remain practical, the agents must not require unlimited memory
or computational power).
For example, in a simple negotiation between two individuals, there may only be a single
issue that they are trying to agree the value of (such as a price). In a more complex
setting such as the one in our scenario, there are a range of different issues that are
being negotiated over (the price, the battery capacity, the condition and the colour).
This makes the negotiation much more difficult, as the seller is unlikely to know which
features the buyer is most interested in. Similarly, the buyer will be unlikely to know
which type of car the dealer would prefer to sell. By identifying the issues that are
important to each party, it is possible to reach a better agreement. Some of the issues,
such as price, have an ordering which is common to all negotiating parties. In contrast,
other issues, such as colour, do not have a known, common order. For example, one
party may prefer bright colours, whereas another may prefer warm colours. Although
the agent’s primary goal is to maximise the value of its agreements, in order to maximise
the chance of such agreements occurring, it should attempt to make offers that are
efficient. Such offers increase the probability of high value agreements being reached,
since, of all of the possible outcomes with a given value to one party, they are more likely
to be accepted by the other negotiating party. For example, in the car sales domain,
the dealer may consider the colour of the car to be of little importance compared to
the price, whereas for the buyer, the colour is much more important. Therefore, when
choosing between two cars, one in a colour that the buyer dislikes, and the other in the
buyer’s preferred colour, but at a slightly higher price, the dealer may well be better
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off offering the more expensive car. As a result, the dealer increases their utility (by
increasing the price) and at the same time, the buyer’s utility is also increased (as the
car is in the colour they prefer).
In addition to uncertainty regarding the preferences of the other party, each party is also
uncertain about the behaviour of the other. The dealer may be keen to make the sale to
one particular buyer, and will therefore be willing to offer a deal at a fairly low utility.
On the other hand, the dealer may have many other potential buyers, and is therefore
keen to reach an agreement with one of them, at a high value. Furthermore, in order to
find a suitable agreement, the seller may make offers in decreasing order of preference,
or he may simply make a variety of offers which he considers to be acceptable, but in
no particular order. The same can be said about the behaviour of the buyer.
As seen in our scenario, the negotiation is further complicated in a realistic environment
where there are more participants than just a single dealer and a single buyer. In such an
environment, each buyer is able to negotiate with a number of dealers, and each dealer
may have a number of customers. All of the parties can negotiate concurrently, but for
humans this would be highly challenging, as they would need to simultaneously manage
negotiations with a range of opponents. The dealer may find that, for a particular car,
one of the buyers (A) is willing to pay more than another buyer (B), and it would
therefore be wasteful to reach an agreement to sell this particular car to B.
Against this background, in this work, we consider an environment to be complex if it
contains at least two of the following features:
• The negotiation domain contains many issues, resulting in a large outcome
space.
• Each agent has uncertainty about many aspects of the other participants. This
includes uncertainty about their utility functions, how concessive they will be, and
even whether or not their behaviour will be rational.
• The environment imposes time constraints which affect the value of any agree-
ment that is reached. Moreover, these time constraints may be based on the
amount of real time that has elapsed.
• The environment allows concurrent negotiation between more than a single
pair of agents.
In more detail, in Chapters 3 and 4 we focus on negotiation scenarios which contain un-
certainty and time constraints, and in many cases, large outcome spaces. In Chapters 5
and 6, we consider negotiation scenarios which contain all of the above features.
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In the remainder of this chapter, we provide a summary of the automated negotiation
challenges that exist in the scenario that we introduced in this section. We then detail
the objectives of our work before briefly describing our contributions. We conclude this
chapter with an outline of the rest of this thesis.
1.1 Research Challenges of Complex Environments
In complex automated negotiations there are a number of challenges that need to be
solved. Specifically, we consider the following to be the key challenges which we aim to
address in our work:
1.1.1 Domains with a Large Outcome Space
Domains in which there are a large number of possible outcomes that could be agreed
upon are said to have a large outcome space. In negotiations over such domains, finding
a package that is acceptable to both parties becomes more of a challenge than in a
smaller domain, where it may be possible to propose a large proportion of the packages
during the negotiation. Domains which contain multiple issues, such as the one in our
scenario, contain a possible outcome for each combination that can be formed from the
values of each issue. Consequently, such domains may have a large outcome space. In
the car sales domain, the issues are the price, the colour, the battery capacity and the
car’s condition. If we assume that there are 10 possible colours, that price is discretised
into multiples of £50 in the range £4,500 to £5,500 (21 possible prices), and that there
are 5 possible values for both the battery capacity and the car’s condition, we obtain a
domain with 10 ∗ 21 ∗ 5 ∗ 5 = 5250 possible outcomes.
1.1.2 Uncertainty about the Opponents
Due to the competitive nature of automated negotiation, the negotiating parties will
typically be unwilling to disclose information about their preferences. Therefore, it is
often required for an agreement to be reached in an environment where there is uncer-
tainty about the preferences of the other parties and where there may be uncertainty
about any time constraints (see Section 1.1.3 for more details of the time constraints).
In more detail, in negotiations with multiple issues, there is the opportunity to reach
more efficient agreements by finding mutually agreeable trade-offs between issues, in or-
der to reach ‘win-win’ agreements. However, in a negotiation where there is uncertainty
about the preferences of the opponent, it is impossible for either party to know which
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agreements are more efficient. Therefore, a common approach is to approximate the
opponent’s preferences and constraints, thereby allowing the agent to estimate which
agreements are more efficient. In our scenario, there are multiple issues, and the car
dealers’ agents do not know how much the customer values each issue (such as the
battery capacity or price of the car). Now, if the dealers’ agents could estimate the
importance of each issue to the buyer, they would consider the battery capacity to be
more significant than the car’s price. This would allow them to make offers with a better
battery capacity but at a higher price, therefore increasing the value of the agreement
for both parties.
Even when considering just one of the negotiation issues, there may or may not be
a known, common ordering over the values of that issue. In the car sales domain,
an example of an issue with a common ordering is the car’s condition, for which both
agents consider the values to have the ordering: ‘excellent’, ‘very good’, ‘average’, ‘poor’,
‘bad’. Each agent’s utility function for the issue assigns similar utilities to nearby values.
Therefore, both agents are aware that a car which is in ‘excellent’ condition will have
a similar utility to one in ‘very good’ condition but quite different to one in a ‘bad’
condition. In contrast, colour is an example of an issue without a common ordering.
That is, one party may consider red and pink to be similar to each other, therefore
having similar utilities, whilst the other party may consider those two colours to be very
different to each other, and therefore have highly different utilities.
Furthermore, since any approximation of the opponent’s preferences only provides an
estimate of the true preferences, it is important that an agent does not rely entirely on
that estimate, as there is a chance that it may be incorrect. If the agent bases its offers
too heavily on a poor estimate of the opponent’s true preferences, it is possible that
many good potential offers would not be considered, therefore leading to a less efficient
agreement. Since there are many real-world domains in which there is uncertainty about
the opponent’s preferences and behaviour, the problem of dealing with uncertainty has
become a popular topic of research in automated negotiation, and we will review work
related to it in Chapter 2.
1.1.3 Time Constraints
When performing negotiation, it is often important that the negotiation is completed
within a limited amount of time. For example, in the car sales scenario, the buyer needs
to complete his purchase before a specific date. In order to encourage agreements to be
reached in a timely manner, time constraints are used.
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There are two key approaches to time constraints that are generally considered. These
different time constraints are known as a discounting factor and a deadline. The former
is a cost that is applied based on the duration of the negotiation. It has the effect that
any particular agreement that is reached at a given time is of higher value than that
same agreement at a later time. This causes agents that are slow to reach agreement to
be punished, as the value of the agreement will be reduced due to the time delay. The
deadline is a point in time before which an agreement needs to be made for it to be of
any value. A deadline imposes a limit on the maximum duration of negotiation, as there
is no value in an agent continuing to negotiate beyond the deadline.
In our work, we consider both of these types of time constraint, as both are relevant to
our scenario. The discounting factor represents the value that the buyer (or the dealer)
places on reaching an agreement sooner rather than later. The deadline exists as the
buyer needs to buy the car before starting his new job, and therefore their agreement
must be made before this time.
Due to the existence of these time constraints, it is necessary for the agent to negotiate
at an appropriate rate. That is, it is important that the agent does not ‘give in’ too
quickly to its opponent, unless the opponent is willing to make a similar compromise.
However, it is also important that the agent does not take an approach that is too tough,
as this could delay the negotiation unnecessarily, causing the value of an agreement to
be decreased. Furthermore, in domains with a deadline, an increased delay increases the
likelihood that the agents will fail to reach an agreement. It is therefore a challenge to
develop a negotiation strategy that will maximise the agent’s gains.
In order to simplify the negotiation protocol and strategy, time constraints can be applied
based on the discrete number of offers that are made during the negotiation (regardless
of the amount of elapsed time), and this approximation has been widely researched (Lai
et al., 2006; Yoshikawa et al., 2008; Yasumura et al., 2009; Fatima et al., 2001, 2002,
2004, 2006, 2007). Alternatively, the constraints can be applied based on the amount
of physical elapsed time rather than the number of interactions (Soh and Tsatsoulis,
2005). We consider that constraints based on elapsed time are more appropriate for
automated negotiation in the real world, as the cost of each interaction is likely to be
minimal compared to the cost of delaying the time of agreement.
Now, using constraints based on the amount of elapsed time makes it more difficult to
predict the utility of an offer that an agent might make in the future (other than during
the current step). This is due to the fact that the time at which any future offer will be
made by an agent depends on the time that its opponent spends in making its offers. For
the same reason, it is also impossible to know how many interactions will occur before
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the deadline is reached. Therefore, another party is able to influence an agent’s utility
by delaying the negotiation.
1.1.4 Concurrent Negotiations
In situations in which there are more than two parties, which is likely to be the case in
many real-world scenarios, such as in an extension of the scenario we provided where
there could be multiple customers negotiating concurrently with a number of car dealers,
there are significant additional challenges.
In order to reach efficient agreements in concurrent negotiations, it is necessary to con-
sider not only whether the outcome is efficient for a specific pair of agents, but also
whether a more efficient agreement can be formed with a different opponent. The most
efficient agreements that can be reached are those which are between pairs of agents
which have similar preferences.
Furthermore, in concurrent negotiations, since each opponent may be negotiating with
other parties, it is possible that an opponent will leave the negotiation before the dead-
line, since it has reached an agreement with one of the other parties. Therefore, the
negotiating agent cannot be sure how long an opponent will remain in the negotiation,
and the number of opponents can vary throughout the negotiation.
Additionally, the environment may allow either party to breach an agreement. This
decommitment represents a further challenge that is associated with concurrent negoti-
ation, since it requires the agent to consider when it is appropriate to breach an agree-
ment. It has been shown that, by allowing decommitment, more efficient agreements
can be reached, and therefore an environment which allows decommitment is desirable
(Andersson and Sandholm, 2001; Sandholm and Lesser, 2001; ’t Hoen and Poutre´, 2004).
However, it is also important that a penalty is applied when an agent breaches an agree-
ment, otherwise unnecessary decommitment can occur, which damages the efficiency of
the agents (Ponka, 2009). This further adds to the challenge, since, depending on the
negotiation protocol, it may be necessary for the agent to set the penalties as part of
the negotiation process.
1.2 Research Requirements
Based on the challenges given in Section 1.1, the objectives of this research are to design
an autonomous agent that:
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1. works in a decentralised manner: The agent should not require a central en-
tity, which acts as a mediator, to assist with the negotiation. Each agent should
communicate directly with the other agents it is negotiating with.
2. is able to reach efficient agreements: Any agreement that is reached should be
efficient, in that it should ensure that little or no utility is wasted. In more detail,
an efficient agreement is one where it is not possible for one agent to increase its
utility without reducing the utility of any opponents.
3. is able to negotiate against unknown opponents: The agent should be designed
to perform well without knowledge of the preferences or behaviour of any other
party. It should be able to negotiate in a one-off negotiation with the opponent,
without needing to learn the opponent’s behaviour over a series of negotiations.
Furthermore, the agent should perform well if the opponent is using a similar (or
the same) behaviour to itself.
4. is able to negotiate over multiple issues: The agent should be able to negotiate
in domains with many issues, which may have hundreds of thousands of potential
outcomes.
5. is able to negotiate over discrete issues with an unknown ordering: The agent
should not require the issues to have a known, common ordering.
6. supports real-time constraints: Any time constraints will be based on the
amount of time taken to produce an offer rather than the number of negotia-
tion steps. In automated negotiation, the amount of time that has elapsed is more
important than the number of steps, and therefore, the number of steps is not
considered in this work.
7. uses a computationally tractable approach: The agent needs to use an approach
which is computationally tractable, in order to be able to propose each offer within
a limited finite time, in the order of a few seconds, using finite computational
resources.
8. is able to effectively coordinate multiple concurrent negotiations: The agent
should be designed to coordinate multiple concurrent negotiations with a range of
opponents in order to reach effective outcomes.
9. takes advantage of decommitment by optimising when to decommit: The agent
should decommit from agreements when it is beneficial for it to do so in order to
improve its utility, considering the benefit of the new agreement over the decom-
mitment penalty.
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1.3 Research Contributions
Against the requirements set out in Section 1.2, we have developed a range of negotiating
strategies and have implemented negotiating agents which use these strategies.
Specifically, our contributions to the state-of-the-art are as follows:
• We develop a novel strategy, which uses both a Gaussian process prediction and
the certainty of that prediction, to calculate the concession an agent should make
over time. This strategy is able to negotiate directly (Requirement 1) with an
unknown opponent (Requirement 3) and uses a principled approach, by firstly
predicting the opponent’s future behaviour and then adapting to the agent’s offers
in order to maximise the expected utility of agreement. Furthermore, the pro-
posed strategy is the first practical (Requirement 7) concession strategy which has
been designed to deal with real-time constraints (Requirement 6) in multi-issue
negotiation (Requirement 4). It reaches efficient agreements (Requirement 2) in
scenarios where the issues have an unknown ordering (Requirement 5).
• We extend our strategy to support the coordination of multiple, concurrent negoti-
ations (Requirement 8) in which each participant aims to reach a single agreement,
and decommitment of agreements is allowed, through payment of a penalty (Re-
quirement 9). Our strategy coordinates the concession rates for each opponent by
considering the observed behaviour of all of the opponents. We show that it out-
performs an existing state-of-the-art strategy for coordinating multiple negotiation
threads (Nguyen and Jennings, 2005), in a range of scenarios.
• We empirically evaluate our strategies against those of a number of other state-
of-the-art agents, developed for the international Automated Negotiating Agents
Competition. We thereby show that, in a negotiation tournament consisting of a
range of scenarios with significant discounting factors (Requirement 6), if all agents
use our strategy, there is no incentive for any single agent to deviate to a different
strategy used by one of the set of other state-of-the-art agents we consider.
The work that has been completed as part of this thesis has resulted in the develop-
ment of a number of different negotiating strategies, along with the implementation of
negotiation agents which use these strategies.
The first such agent, now known as IAMhaggler2010, finished in fourth place in the
first Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC 2010) which was held at the
9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS
2010). A paper describing this strategy was published as:
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• Williams, C. R., Robu, V., Gerding, E. H. and Jennings, N. R. (2010) IAMhaggler:
A Negotiation Agent for Complex Environments. In: New Trends in Agent-based
Complex Automated Negotiations, Series of Studies in Computational Intelligence,
Springer-Verlag 383 151-158.
Section 3.2.1 and Appendix B are based on the above paper.
We have also created a further negotiating agent, known as IAMhaggler2011, which
finished in third place in the second Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC
2011) which was held at the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011). Papers describing this strategy were published as:
• Williams, C. R., Robu, V., Gerding, E. H. and Jennings, N. R. (2012) IAMhag-
gler2011: A Gaussian Process Regression based Negotiation Agent. In: Complex
Automated Negotiations: Theories, Models, and Software Competitions, Series of
Studies in Computational Intelligence, Springer-Verlag 435 209-212.
• Williams, C. R., Robu, V., Gerding, E. H. and Jennings, N. R. (2011) Using
Gaussian Processes to Optimise Concession in Complex Negotiations against Un-
known Opponents. In: Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, AAAI Press 1 432-438.
Sections 3.2.2 and 4.7 are based on the above papers.
Furthermore, we have created a negotiation strategy for many-to-many negotiation. The
agent which uses this strategy is referred to as IAMconcurrentHaggler, and was presented
in:
• Williams, C. R., Robu, V., Gerding, E. H. and Jennings, N. R. (2012) Negotiating
Concurrently with Unknown Opponents in Complex, Real-Time Domains. In:
20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence pp. 834-839.
Chapter 6 is based on the above paper.
Finally, parts of our empirical evaluation have been published in:
• Baarslag, T., Fujita, K., Gerding, E. H., Hindriks, K., Ito, T., Jennings, N. R.,
Jonker, C., Kraus, S., Lin, R., Robu, V. and Williams, C. R. (2012) Evaluat-
ing Practical Negotiating Agents: Results and Analysis of the 2011 International
Competition. In: Artificial Intelligence (in press).
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The work in Section 4.7 is an updated version of part of the above paper.
Although parts of the thesis are based on the above papers, the work presented in the
evaluation chapters (Chapters 4 and 6) has been updated by testing the performance
of our strategies against other recently developed state-of-the-art strategies for complex
real-time negotiation environments.
1.4 Report Outline
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we review the related literature, considering both single-issue and
multi-issue negotiation. Additionally, we consider the literature relating to con-
current negotiation.
• In Chapter 3, we present the theory behind the strategy that we have developed for
one-to-one negotiation. This is split into two key parts, our strategy for negotiating
efficiently under uncertainty and our concession strategy.
• In Chapter 4, we evaluate our one-to-one negotiation strategy, using the domains
and strategies developed for the Automated Negotiating Agents Competition. We
show its performance in both a tournament and in self-play.
• In Chapter 5, we extend our one-to-one negotiation to develop a strategy for many-
to-many negotiations.
• In Chapter 6, we evaluate our many-to-many negotiation strategy, comparing it
with an existing state-of-the-art strategy for many-to-many negotiation, using the
strategies developed for the Automated Negotiating Agents Competition as oppo-
nents.
• In Chapter 7, we conclude, and present our ideas for future work.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter we discuss previous work on automated negotiation. The chapter begins
with definitions of the basic terminology used in this field (see Section 2.1). In the
subsequent section (2.2), we consider the evaluation criteria and methodologies that are
used to evaluate solutions to negotiation problems. The chapter then reviews different
negotiation strategies, considering game theoretic approaches, heuristic approaches and
argumentation based negotiation (see Section 2.3). The chapter concludes with a review
of negotiation techniques when there are more than two parties (see Section 2.4). The
chapter is summarised in Section 2.5.
2.1 Terminology
2.1.1 Bi-Lateral Negotiation
Bi-lateral negotiation (bargaining) is a form of interaction in which two self-interested
parties aim to reach a mutual agreement in order to fulfil their goal. The two parties
negotiate over a set of issues (see Section 2.1.2), with their aim being to maximise their
utility (see Section 2.1.3) by reaching an agreement that suits their preferences. Fur-
thermore, there may be time constraints imposed in order to encourage an agreement
to be reached quickly (see Section 2.1.4). In many negotiations, the negotiation parties
may have incomplete information about various aspects of the opponent, including their
preferences (see Section 2.1.6). During the negotiation, each party must use a common
protocol (see Section 2.1.7), but they are able to choose their own strategy (see Sec-
tion 2.1.8). In some cases, the agent’s goal may not be to maximise their utility, but
instead, they aim to achieve a utility that is higher than that of their opponent (see
Section 2.1.9).
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2.1.2 Negotiation Issues
In a negotiation, the issues are the aspects that the parties need to reach agreement
on. For example, in the scenario given in Chapter 1, the issues are the price, battery
capacity, condition and colour of the car. Some simple negotiations may involve only
one issue (we refer to these as single-issue negotiations). If there is more than one issue
that is being negotiated over (such as in our scenario), we refer to this as multi-issue
negotiation.
A multi-issue negotiation takes place over a set of n issues, i ∈ I. We define an offer, o,
as a set of values, vi, one for each issue i in the domain. Formally:
o = 〈vi〉i∈{1..n} (2.1)
where vi ∈ Vi,∀i ∈ {1..n} and n is the number of issues. Vi is the set of values that issue
i can take.
Each issue can be classified as being either continuous or discrete, with discrete issues
being further classified by whether or not they have a common ordering.
• Continuous Issue: A continuous issue is one which can take any value in a
particular range. For example, the battery capacity may be defined to be a real
value which ranges between 5 and 20 kWh.
• Discrete Issue: A discrete issue can take a value which belongs to a finite set.
They may or may not have a known, common ordering.
– With a known, common ordering: For issues that have a common or-
dering, both negotiating parties are aware that for two nearby values, the
evaluation will be similar. As an example, quality may be defined as taking
values that belong to the set {excellent, very good, good, average, poor}. A
quality of excellent is similar to a quality of very good. Therefore, for each
agent, the evaluation of excellent will be closer to very good than any other
label. Issues which take an integer value can also be considered in the same
way. Even for an issue where the ordering is known, the direction of any op-
ponents’ preferences will be unknown. For example, it would not be known
whether an opponent’s evaluation of very good would be greater or smaller
than for good.
– Without a common ordering: In contrast, for an issue such as ‘colour’,
which may be defined as taking values that belong to the set {black, white,
silver, red, orange, yellow, green, blue, purple} there may not be a common
Chapter 2 Background and Related Work 15
ordering. That is, one party may consider red and orange to be similar to
each other, therefore having similar evaluations, whilst the other party may
consider those two colours to be very different to each other, and therefore
have highly different evaluations.
In a negotiation against unknown opponents, the lack of a common ordering for some
issues adds significant uncertainty to the negotiation, as it makes it difficult to identify
which offers are similar to one another. Such uncertainty is common in many negotia-
tions, such as the one introduced in our scenario in Chapter 1. Therefore, in this work,
we focus on this type of issue.
For any set of possible negotiation outcomes, each party will prefer some of those out-
comes over others. Their preferences can be defined formally using a utility function.
2.1.3 Utility Functions
A utility function describes an agent’s preferences, which allows negotiation outcomes
to be evaluated and compared. Utility functions may be cardinal or ordinal:
Cardinal utility: Cardinal utility functions map each possible outcome to a real
number. For example, outcome A could be valued at 0.5, outcome B at 0.6 and outcome
C at 0.7.
Ordinal utility: In contrast, ordinal utility functions provide only an ordering on
the negotiation outcomes. For example, an ordinal utility function could simply state
that outcome A is preferred over outcome B, and also that outcome C is preferred over
outcome B. This differs from cardinal utility in two ways. First, there is no measure
of how much outcome A is preferred over outcome B. Second, the ordering can be
incomplete. For example, it does not have to state which outcome is preferred between
outcome A and outcome C. Ordinal utility functions are considered to be important
in situations where a cardinal utility function is difficult to determine. Moreover, it is
often easier for humans to express ordinal functions, as it simply involves an ordering
over the values, rather than assigning a cardinal value to each one. However, it may be
difficult for them to provide a full ordering over all possible outcomes, and therefore in
some cases, an incomplete ordering is produced.
Despite the benefits to using ordinal utility functions, we take an approach that is
common in the negotiation literature, which is to use cardinal utility functions. The
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advantage to this is that cardinal utility functions make it possible to measure not only
whether or not outcome A is preferable to outcome B, but also by how much. In the
multi-issue case, this makes it much easier to identify a set of outcomes that have an
equal utility, allowing trade-offs to be made.
The formalisation of a cardinal utility function depends on whether or not the negotiation
issues are considered to be independent of each other, as we will now discuss.
Interdependent issues: In some negotiations, there may be issues that are interde-
pendent. Examples include issues that are complements or substitutes of each other. If
two issues take values (v1 and v2) which are complementary then:
Up(〈v1, v2〉) ≥ wp,1 · Up(〈v1,∅〉) + wp,2 · Up(〈∅, v2〉) (2.2)
where wp,i is the weight of issue i to agent p and Up is the utility function of agent p.
For example, in a car sales scenario, complementary issues include the quality of the car
stereo and the quality of the speakers. To a buyer who enjoys listening to music, the
utility for a car with both a good stereo and good speakers will be higher than the sum
of the utilities of the good stereo and the good speakers. On their own, the good stereo
or good speakers do not give much utility.
Alternatively, if two issues take values (v1 and v2) which are substitutes then:
Up(〈v1, v2〉) ≤ wp,1 · Up(〈v1,∅〉) + wp,2 · Up(〈∅, v2〉) (2.3)
where wp,i is the weight of issue i to agent p and Up is the utility function of agent p.
Using again the car sales scenario as an example, substitutes would be whether or not
the car has air conditioning and whether or not the car is a convertible. To a buyer who
likes to keep cool in the summer, the utility provided by those two issues will be lower
for a car which has both of them than the sum of the utilities of the air conditioning
and the convertible. Having both of these features gives little more utility than having
just one of them.
Independent issues: In contrast, if the issues are independent, the overall utility of
the offer is equal to the weighted sum of the utilities of the issues. We refer to such
utility functions as being additive, and they can be defined formally as:
Up(o) =
n∑
i=1
wp,i · Up,i(vi) (2.4)
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where n is the number of negotiation issues, wp,i is the weight of issue i to agent p and
Up,i(vi) is the utility to agent p of issue i for the value of vi. Utility functions that
contain interdependent issues cannot be expressed in this form.
The utility functions are typically normalised such that all possible outcomes have a
utility in the range [0, 1] and furthermore, for each party, there is an outcome with a
utility of 1. Formally:
∀o ∈ O,∀p ∈ P,Up(o) ∈ [0, 1] (2.5)
∃o ∈ O,∀p ∈ P,Up(o) = 1 (2.6)
In our work, in common with much of the negotiation literature, we consider only utility
functions that are additive, and normalised as described above.
So far in this section, we have discussed different ways to determine the utility of an
agreement. In any negotiation, there is a further outcome that is possible, which is the
lack of agreement. We refer to such lack of agreement as a conflict, which may offer a
utility to the participants.
Utility of conflict: In some negotiations, participants may obtain a utility from ne-
gotiations that do not result in agreement, which we refer to as the utility of conflict. In
the scenario presented in Chapter 1, Bob is able to buy his friend’s car, so the utility of
conflict would be the utility that he places on this outcome. If the utility of conflict is
non-zero, then there may be some agreements that are unfavourable, as the participants
can obtain a higher utility by refusing to accept an offer that is worth less than the
utility of conflict.
So far in this section, utility has been considered simply as a function of the outcome of
the negotiation. However, in some negotiations, the utility can also be affected by time
constraints. For example, if two parties negotiate over the sale of a perishable item, its
value is likely to decrease over time. Therefore, we now discuss a number of different
types of time constraint.
2.1.4 Time Constraints
Negotiation can be affected by time in a number of ways, as discussed by Livne (1979).
The effects of time that are commonly considered in the literature are:
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Deadlines represent a point in time by when the negotiation must be completed. When
the deadline is reached, the negotiation terminates, resulting in disagreement, with
each player achieving the utility of conflict.
Discounting represents the impatience of the participants. The more impatient the
player, the higher the discounting factor. It has the effect that an agreement that
is reached immediately will be preferred over a future agreement that offers the
same benefits. Formally, this is modelled using a discounting factor δ ≤ 1, where
the discounted utility is given by the formula:
D(u, t) = u · δt (2.7)
where u is the original (undiscounted) utility, and t is the time of agreement. (δt
is the discounting factor δ raised to the power t.) Note that if δ = 1, there is no
discounting and time has no effect on the utility.
Bargaining Costs represent the costs of negotiation itself. A bargaining cost is a fixed
cost of making an offer. An example would be a communication cost to each offer
that is made. The model that is used is:
D(u, t) = u− c · t (2.8)
where u is the original (undiscounted) utility, c is the cost of each offer and t is
the time of agreement.
In our work, we consider both deadlines and discounting factors (of the form given in
Equation 2.7). Without loss of generality, we scale the values of t such that, during the
negotiation, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, and therefore in all negotiations, the deadline occurs at time 1.
In most of the existing literature, time is measured as the number of interactions that
have occurred (Coehoorn and Jennings, 2004; Fatima et al., 2001, 2006; Lai et al.,
2006; Nguyen and Jennings, 2003; Rubinstein, 1982; Yasumura et al., 2009; Yoshikawa
et al., 2008). Another way to consider time is to measure the amount of real time that
has elapsed, regardless of how many negotiation steps were made. Since automated
negotiation allows many offers to be made in a short period of time, the actual number
of offers that are made should not have a significant impact on the value of the result.
Consequently, the bargaining cost, c, is negligible. What is more significant is the amount
of real time that has elapsed, as this has an impact on the parties that the negotiating
agents represent. In our scenario, Bob is keen that an agreement is reached in a short
time, but it does not matter to him how many offers are exchanged. For this reason,
in our work, we choose to consider real-time constraints as these are more realistic
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and appropriate for real world automated negotiation. Furthermore, such constraints
represent an additional challenge for the design of a negotiating strategy, as the number
of negotiation steps is no longer fixed, and is dependent on the behaviour of both parties.
Additionally, there has been only limited research into this aspect of negotiation. For
example, Sandholm and Vulkan (1999) consider negotiation with real-time constraints,
but unlike in this work, they only consider single-issue negotiation.
2.1.5 Scenarios and Preference Profiles
Each participant in a negotiation has its own preference profile, Ξp, which is formed
from the participant’s utility function, Up, their discounting factor, δp and their utility
of conflict, Uα,p. It can be used by the participant to calculate the utility of an offer,
at any time during the negotiation. In the negotiations we consider, where any player’s
utility function can be written as an additive utility function (see Equation 2.4), their
preference profile can be defined as:
Ξp = 〈{Up,i}i∈{1..n}, {wp,i}i∈{1..n}, δp, Uα,p〉 (2.9)
where Up,i is player p’s utility function for issue i, wp,i is the weight of issue i to player
p, δp is player p’s discounting factor and Uα,p is player p’s utility of conflict. We will
discuss the forms that Up,i can take in Section 2.2.1.
Furthermore, a scenario, Ξ, consists of a preference profile for each participant in the
negotiation, formally defined as:
Ξ = {Ξp}p∈P (2.10)
2.1.6 Incomplete Information
In many negotiations, there may be information about the opponent which is unknown.
Specifically, the opponent’s utility function, negotiation strategy and time constraints
may be unknown, as the opponent may not be willing to reveal this information. In
contrast, in a negotiation where each agent has complete information about its opponent,
it is possible for either agent to determine which outcomes are high performing for
both parties (see Section 2.2 for more on performance criteria). Therefore it is easier
for the agents to find a good solution. By contrast, in a negotiation with incomplete
information, it is impossible for one agent to know exactly how its actions affect the
opponent, as this would depend on information that is unknown. In our work, we
consider negotiations where the opponent is unknown (Requirement 3) and therefore,
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the strategy that we develop needs to be able to negotiate without knowledge of the
opponent’s utility function or strategy.
2.1.7 Negotiation Protocol
The protocol defines the rules of the negotiation, including the types of participants,
the negotiation states, the actions that cause the negotiation state to change and the
actions that the participants can make in each state (Jennings et al., 2001).
Examples of common negotiation protocols are the simultaneous offers, monotonic con-
cession, ultimatum game, and alternating offers protocols. We discuss these in turn.
Simultaneous Offers: Using a simultaneous offers protocol, both parties make their
offers at the same time. The Nash demand game (Nash, 1953) is an example of a single-
shot simultaneous game, where the two parties simultaneously make a single offer. For
example, consider a negotiation in which the two parties negotiate over how to share
a single pie. Players p and q make a single offer each, op ∈ [0, 1] and oq ∈ [0, 1],
specifying how much of the pie they wish to take. If their offers are compatible, in this
case meaning that the total amount of pie the players specified in their offers did not
exceed one (op + oq ≤ 1) then an agreement is reached. However, it is possible that
such an agreement is not efficient, if some of the pie remains unallocated (op + oq < 1).
Otherwise, if the offers are incompatible (op + oq > 1), no agreement is reached, and the
negotiation ends in conflict. We discuss efficiency in more detail in Section 2.2.3.
Monotonic Concession Protocol: The monotonic concession protocol, as defined
by Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994), is another example of a simultaneous offers protocol.
It differs from the Nash demand game in that if the pair of offers are not compatible,
the negotiations continue to another round. Agents are not allowed to make an offer
which provides a lower utility to the opponent than the utility of previous offers. That
is,
Uq(op,r+1) ≥ Uq(op,r) (2.11)
where Uq(op,r+1) is the utility to the opponent (player q) of the offer our agent (player
p) made at round r+ 1 and Uq(op,r) is the utility to the opponent of the offer our agent
made at round r.
In addition, if, in a particular round, neither agent concedes, the negotiation ends in
conflict. This ensures that the process is guaranteed to terminate, either by repeated
concession until an agreement is made, or through a conflict due to lack of concession by
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both parties. We will look at some of the problems with this approach when we discuss
concession strategies in Section 2.3.2.1.
In addition to negotiation protocols that involve the two parties making their offers
simultaneously, there are protocols which involve sequential actions, which we will now
introduce.
Ultimatum Game: The ultimatum game is a very simple negotiation protocol, in
which one party makes an offer and the other chooses to either accept or reject it. In
Section 2.3.1.2 we will discuss the limitations of such a simple protocol. A more complex
protocol which involves multiple negotiation rounds is the alternating offers protocol.
Alternating Offers: Under the alternating offers protocol, the parties take it in turns
to make offers and counter-offers. This continues until one of the parties accepts the
opponent’s offer or, alternatively, one of the parties chooses to end the negotiation
without agreement, or the negotiation deadline is reached. Compared to the ultimatum
game, the alternating offers protocol can allow more fair agreements to be reached, since
an agent can learn about its opponent’s behaviour through the repeated interaction
with it. Compared to the simultaneous offers protocol, the alternating offers protocol is
more appropriate for many automated negotiation situations, particularly where there is
incomplete information. This is since, using a simultaneous protocol, it would be difficult
to enforce that the offers of the two parties are compatible and Pareto-efficient without a
coordination signal. This coordination signal can be seen as a form of centralised control.
Therefore, in our work, we develop an agent which negotiates using the alternating offers
protocol.
2.1.8 Negotiation Strategy
A negotiation strategy dictates the approach to negotiation that should be taken by a
single agent. Specifically, it specifies the procedure that the agent should use in order
to decide what offers to make. This procedure may be based on a number of criteria,
including the set of issues being negotiated over, the agent’s utility function, the amount
of time that has elapsed and the observed behaviour of the opponent. We will discuss
specific negotiation strategies in more detail in Section 2.3. The aim of this work is to
develop a negotiation strategy that meets the requirements given in Section 1.2.
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2.1.9 Spiteful Behaviour
Commonly, the aim of a negotiation is to maximise the utility achieved. However, in
some situations, the aim may be to ‘win’ a negotiation, by achieving a higher utility
than its opponent. In such a situation, there is a risk involved in reaching lower utility
agreements, as they are more likely to result in other participants achieving a higher
utility than our own. As a result, an agent that aims to win a negotiation will need to
take a more spiteful approach.
In work on spiteful bidding in auctions (Brandt et al., 2007), the spiteful utility, Sp, of
agent p is given by:
Sp = (1− αp) · Up − αp ·
∑
q∈P, q 6=p
Uq (2.12)
where Up is the utility of agent p, Uq is the utility of opponent q, and αp ∈ [0, 1] is the
spitefulness coefficient, which affects the spitefulness of the strategy. If the spitefulness
coefficient, αp is 0, the agent will be self-interested, with its aim being to maximise the
raw utility. At the other extreme, if αp = 1, the agent’s goal will be to minimise the
opponent’s scores, regardless of the effect that has on their own score.
By introducing a spitefulness function, and designing an agent which maximises this
adjusted utility, it is possible to change the behaviour of the agent by adjusting the
spitefulness function. A more spiteful strategy would result in slower concession, as the
agent will regard lower utilities to be of even lower value than their true value.
2.2 Evaluation Criteria and Methodologies
Having introduced the basic notions that are used in this work, we now introduce the
methodologies that we use in our evaluation (in Chapters 4 and 6) in order to test our
negotiation strategies and the outcomes reached. We first introduce the Genius ne-
gotiation environment, which we use as a platform on which to evaluate our strategies
(Section 2.2.1), and the Automated Negotiating Agent Competition, which we use as a
source of other state-of-the-art negotiating strategies which our strategies can be com-
pared to (Section 2.2.2). We then introduce Pareto optimality (see Section 2.2.3) which
we use as a measure of efficiency (Requirement 2). Finally, we introduce the technique of
empirical game theory, which we use as a further evaluation method to demonstrate the
stability of our strategies in a wide variety of tournaments containing different mixtures
of strategies (Section 2.2.4).
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2.2.1 Genius Negotiation Environment
In this section, we briefly describe the Generic Environment for Negotiation with Intelli-
gent multi-purpose Usage Simulation (Genius) (Hindriks et al., 2009a), which provides
a framework for the development of negotiating agents. It facilitates the running of ne-
gotiation sessions, under different scenarios and protocols, with a variety of participating
agents. Under the alternating offers protocol (as described in Section 2.1.7) provided by
the framework, each negotiation session consists of a negotiation between two agents,
over a single scenario, which consists of a domain and a corresponding set of preferences.
In this context, a domain specifies the number and types of issues that are negotiated
over by the agents. The environment provides support for scenarios containing con-
tinuous issues and discrete issues, with and without a known, common ordering (see
Section 2.1.2).
In Section 2.1.5, we introduced the concept of a preference profile, Ξp, of the form:
Ξp = 〈{Up,i}i∈{1..n}, {wp,i}i∈{1..n}, δp, Uα,p〉 (2.13)
where Up,i is player p’s utility function for issue i, wp,i is the weight of issue i to player p,
δp is player p’s discounting factor and Uα,p is player p’s utility of conflict. In the Genius
environment, the types of utility functions for each individual issue (denoted Up,i) can
be classified as one of the following:
• Linear: The utility function is linear, and can either be increasing or decreasing
as the value of the issue increases. For increasing utility functions, the utility at
the lower limit is 0, and is 1 at the upper limit (see Figure 2.1(a)). For decreasing
utility functions, the utility at the lower limit is 1, and is 0 at the upper limit (see
Figure 2.1(b)).
• Triangular: The utility function is triangular, having a single peak. The function
is maximised at a particular value of the issue. At this maxima, the utility is 1.
On either side of the maxima, the utility decreases linearly to 0 at the upper and
lower limits (see Figure 2.1(c) for an example with a peak at 0.3).
• Discrete: For a discrete issue, the utility function is a mapping from each possible
value of the issue to a utility value. The utility value for each possible value is
normalised such that it lies in the range [0, 1] and there is value which gives a
utility value of 1.
The negotiation protocol that is used in the Genius environment is the alternating
offers protocol (as described in Section 2.1.7), with each offer representing a complete
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Figure 2.1: Utility functions used for continuous issues.
package, in that it specifies the values for all issues in the domain. For each session,
a deadline is imposed, which consists of a limit of three minutes of negotiation time.
In version 3.0 of the Genius environment, this was measured independently, per agent,
allowing each agent up to three minutes of time. From version 3.1 onwards, this is a
single limit, shared by the two agents. Our strategy is designed for use with a single,
shared limit, as this type of constraint is more common in negotiation, including in the
scenario we introduced in Chapter 1, where the two parties aim to reach agreement by
a specific point in time. In either case, if the agents reach their deadline without having
formed an agreement, the session ends and the agents receive their utility of conflict.
The environment does not impose a limit to the number of negotiation rounds that can
take place during the three minute negotiation period.
In addition to the three minute deadline, in order to encourage the agents to reach an
agreement in a timely fashion, a discounting factor is applied to the utility generated
by an outcome (see Section 2.1.4). The discounted utility, D(·, ·), used in the Genius
environment is given by:
D(up, tα) = up · δtαp (2.14)
where up is the original (undiscounted) utility of the outcome for agent p, tα is the
time at which the outcome was reached and δp is the discounting factor for agent p, as
specified by the preference profile.
In our work, we use Genius as an environment in which to test our agent, since the
framework it provides is suitable for the agent we have developed, in that it supports
negotiation sessions where the opponent’s behaviour and utility function are unknown,
and where the sessions have real-time constraints. Furthermore, by using a standard
framework, our agents can easily be compared against a range of other state-of-the-
art negotiation agents that have been implemented using the same framework. We
Chapter 2 Background and Related Work 25
now introduce the Automated Negotiating Agent Competition, which uses the Genius
negotiation environment and has therefore encouraged the development of such agents.
2.2.2 Automated Negotiating Agent Competition
The Automated Negotiating Agent Competition (ANAC)(Baarslag et al., 2010), was
initially set up jointly by the Delft University of Technology and Bar-Ilan University to
facilitate research into bilateral multi-issue closed negotiation. The competition was held
for the first time, as ANAC 2010 at the 9th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems. As a result of the competition, a collection of state-of-
the-art negotiating agents, negotiation domains, and preference profiles has been made
available to the research community. These form a valuable resource in that they have
been developed independently, and represent a varied set of negotiation opponents and
settings, making them ideal for benchmarking our strategies against. ANAC 2010 used
version 3.0 of the Genius platform as its negotiation environment. In 2011, the compe-
tition ran again (as ANAC 2011), this time hosted by Nagoya Institute of Technology,
using version 3.1 of the Genius platform, which differs slightly from the earlier version,
as described in Section 2.2.1. In 2012, we were responsible for running the competi-
tion (as ANAC 2012), using version 3.2 of the Genius platform, and for the first time,
included non-zero utilities of conflict.
For the first competition, ANAC 2010, the organisers developed three negotiation sce-
narios. For the 2011 and 2012 competitions, further scenarios were developed. After
ANAC 2010, it was decided that, for ANAC 2011 and ANAC 2012, the scenarios would
be developed by the participants, with each participant entering both an agent, and
a scenario into the competition. In ANAC 2011, 18 scenarios were submitted to the
qualifying round, with only those belonging to the 8 finalists being used in the final. Of
all the competitions, ANAC 2012 used the most extensive set of scenarios. 17 scenarios
were submitted by the participants, which were combined with all (non-duplicate) sce-
narios from ANAC 2010 and ANAC 2011 (final round), to create a total of 24 scenarios.
The full set of scenarios were used in both the qualifying and final rounds. The utility
functions and outcome spaces of all 24 scenarios are presented in Appendix A.
In all three editions of the competition, for each scenario, a tournament was held, where
each agent negotiated against all other agents. The tournament score for an agent was
then calculated by taking the average utility that agent achieved in all of the negotiations
it took part in, across all scenarios. In each competition, the winning agent was the one
which achieved the highest tournament score.
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2.2.3 Pareto Optimality
In any negotiation, there are many different outcomes that can be reached. An outcome
is considered to be Pareto optimal (or Pareto efficient) if there is no other outcome
that would increase the utility of one participant without reducing the utility of another
participant (Raiffa, 1982). Such an outcome is efficient as no utility is ‘wasted’. Formally,
an outcome, o, is Pareto optimal if the following holds:
@o∗ ∈ O, (Up(o∗) ≥ Up(o) & Uq(o∗) > Uq(o)) ‖ (Up(o∗) > Up(o) & Uq(o∗) ≥ Uq(o))
(2.15)
Alternatively, a Pareto optimal outcome can be seen as one for which there is no other
outcome that a single participant could select without another participant objecting
(Wooldridge, 2009).
In a single issue game, an outcome is considered to be Pareto optimal if it results in all of
the resource being allocated. For example, in a game where two participants negotiate
over the splitting of a pie of fixed size (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990), the outcome is
Pareto optimal if and only if the whole pie is allocated (that is, if the sum of the shares
of the pie is equal to one).
We illustrate the concept of Pareto optimality in bilateral negotiation in Figure 2.2. The
axes represent the utilities of each participant. The dots represent the set of all possible
outcomes in a given scenario (which consists only of discrete values). The line is the
Pareto frontier, which connects all of the Pareto optimal agreements.
As part of our evaluation (in Section 4.5), in order to check that our strategies reach
efficient agreements (Requirement 2), we will measure the average distance from each
agreement point to the Pareto frontier.
2.2.4 Empirical Game Theoretic Analysis
A strategy which achieves a high tournament score is likely to be good at reaching
reasonable agreements with a wide range of other strategies. However, this does not
mean that the strategy is the best one to use in all tournaments. It is possible that
there is another strategy in the tournament, which achieved a lower tournament score,
but which would have performed much better in a tournament where the players used
a different mix of strategies.
Therefore, we now consider an analysis technique, known as empirical game theoretic
analysis, which can be used to evaluate large games (Reeves, 2005). The idea behind the
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Figure 2.2: The outcome space and Pareto frontier from the Itex vs Cypress scenario
(detailed in Section A.45). The dots represent the outcome space, and the line rep-
resents the Pareto frontier, which connects the Pareto optimal outcomes. The Pareto
frontier is not smooth as this is a discrete domain.
technique is to use empirical results to search for equilibria strategy profiles, in which
there is no incentive for any player to change its strategy.
Jordan et al. (2007) use this technique to analyse the results of the Trading Agent
Competition (TAC). They consider pure-strategy profiles, in which each agent chooses
a single strategy, which that agent uses in all negotiations. In a symmetric game with
N players and S strategies, there are
(
N+S−1
N
)
such profiles. In the case of the TAC
Supply Chain Management (SCM) competition, where N = 6 (and in Jordan et al.’s
analysis, S = 6), the total number of profiles is quite large (462). Therefore, they choose
to reduce the game, considering only 3 players. By considering all possible profiles in
this reduced game, they present a deviation analysis, which identifies where there is
an incentive for one agent to change strategy, and also shows the profiles which are in
equilibria. Furthermore, Shi et al. (2012) use a similar technique to search for equilibria
in double auction marketplaces. In our work (Section 4.7), we perform an empirical
game theoretic analysis of the results of a range of negotiation tournaments.
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2.3 Negotiation Strategies
Negotiation strategies can be broadly classified into game theoretic, heuristic and ar-
gumentation based approaches (Jennings et al., 2001). In this section we will discuss
each of these in detail, considering the appropriateness of various strategies against the
requirements we outlined in Section 1.2.
2.3.1 Game Theoretic Approaches
Game theory studies behaviour in strategic situations. It defines a game by its players,
actions and payoffs. Specifically, bi-lateral negotiation can be considered to be a game,
played by two parties. The actions are the offers that can be made (the exact detail of
what an offer consists of depends on the protocol in use). The payoffs are given by each
party’s utility function.
In addition, game theory defines the extensive-form of a game as a tree, in which the
nodes are the points at which decisions can be made (decision points), and the edges
indicate the decisions that can be made.
Furthermore, there are two game theoretic approaches to negotiation. These are coop-
erative and non-cooperative game theory.
2.3.1.1 Cooperative Game Theory
Cooperative game theory considers games in which it is possible for participants to form
coalitions, in order to achieve a greater joint utility than they would if they played the
game alone. It considers whether such coalitions are stable, in that there is no incentive
for a member of the coalition to leave. It also deals with how the profit from an outcome
should be distributed, if the game allows it. In this work, we consider that participants
cannot form coalitions, as this adds further complexity to the negotiating environment.
However, even in a negotiation environment where it is not possible to form coalitions,
it is possible to use cooperative game theory to characterise the solution space of negoti-
ation problems. We have already discussed Pareto optimality (see Section 2.2.3) which
was initially developed in the context of cooperative game theory approach, in order to
measure efficiency in such settings. In addition to considering the Pareto optimality of
an agreement, cooperative game theory also considers which outcomes are considered to
be fair ones. Fairness solution concepts include the utilitarian (Myerson, 1981), Nash
Chapter 2 Background and Related Work 29
bargaining (Nash, 1950a), Kalai-Smorodinsky (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) and egali-
tarian (Kalai, 1977) ones. As part of our evaluation, we compare the self-play outcomes
with the utilitarian solution as a measure of efficiency (Section 4.4).
2.3.1.2 Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Non-cooperative game theory considers the strategies that can be used by the negotiation
participants (Binmore, 1992). It also considers the protocols that are used in negotiation,
such as simultaneous offers, the ultimatum game and the alternating offers protocol (see
Section 2.1.7). In addition, it defines solution concepts such as the Nash equilibrium and
the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Nash Equilibrium: A outcome is considered to be a Nash equilibrium, if neither
participant can benefit by choosing an alternative action, given that all other participants
do not change their action (Nash, 1950b).
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: A subgame is a subset of a game (in extensive-form,
see Section 2.3.1) which starts with a single decision node and contains every successor
to this node. Another way to consider a subgame is that it is the part of the game that
remains at a given point in the game. Now, an outcome is said to be in subgame perfect
equilibrium if the outcome is a Nash equilibrium in all subgames of the game. This
equilibrium is a refinement of the standard Nash equilibrium, and is a stronger concept
(i.e. all subgame perfect equilibria are also Nash equilibria) (Binmore, 1992).
For example, in single-issue negotiation using the ultimatum game (see Section 2.1.7), a
subgame perfect equilibrium can be found by reasoning backwards, as follows. Player 2
has a choice of accepting or rejecting player 1’s offer. Assuming that the utility gained
from conflict is zero, player 2 will accept any offer which results in a utility greater
than zero. Therefore, player 1 can make an offer which gives player 2 a utility slightly
greater than zero, and player 2 should accept that offer. This game gives player 1 more
bargaining power, and therefore the outcome is not fair.
As another example, Rubinstein (1982) studied a game where two players negotiate over
the division of a pie of fixed size using the alternating offers protocol (see Section 2.1.7).
This is approached with two variations, the first with a fixed bargaining cost, the second
with a fixed discounting factor. In both cases, it is assumed that there is no deadline to
the negotiation. Rubinstein shows that, with a fixed bargaining cost, the solution which
is a subgame perfect equilibrium depends on the bargaining costs of the two players
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(Russell and Norvig, 2003). Specifically, if the bargaining cost for player p is cp, the
subgame perfect equilibrium is where player 1 (who makes the first offer) takes:
c2 if c1 > c2
x, c1 ≤ x ≤ 1 if c1 = c2
1 if c1 < c2
(2.16)
Player 2 takes the remainder of the pie.
In an environment where there is a discounting factor (of δp for player p) rather than a
bargaining cost, the subgame perfect equilibrium is where player 1 takes (1 − δ2)/(1 −
δ1 · δ2). Again, player 2 takes the remainder of the pie.
However, this model uses a time constraint which is based on the number of interactions
rather than the real-time duration of the negotiation, and it therefore does not meet
Requirement 6 (continuous time constraints).
In the work discussed so far in this section, only single-issue negotiation has been con-
sidered. When negotiating over multiple issues, there is additional complexity due to
the different procedures that can be used.
Procedures for Multi-Issue Negotiation: There are a range of negotiation pro-
cedures that define how the single-issue alternating offers protocol can be extended to
cover multi-issue negotiation. The procedures that are considered by Fatima et al. (2006)
are the package deal approach, the simultaneous approach and the sequential approach.
Using the package deal approach, all of the issues are negotiated in a single bundle.
With the simultaneous approach, all of the issues are settled simultaneously, but in-
dependently of one another. Finally, the sequential approach allows the issues to be
negotiated one at a time. It has been shown by Fatima et al. (2006) that, in a less com-
plex setting, in which time constraints are based on the number of interactions, of these
three approaches, only the package deal guarantees that equilibrium offers are Pareto
optimal. We use the package deal approach in our work, not only due to its Pareto op-
timality, but also since it is a commonly used approach (Hindriks and Tykhonov, 2008;
Lai et al., 2006; Nguyen and Jennings, 2003; Yasumura et al., 2009; Yoshikawa et al.,
2008).
Incomplete Information: Harsanyi and Selten (1972) introduce a bargaining model
in which there is incomplete information. In their work, uncertainty is modelled by
assuming that each participant is of a particular type. The type of the participant
represents its utility function, the resources available to it, the amount of information
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it has, and its beliefs. Each participant knows its own type but not that of its oppo-
nent. Rather, its opponent’s type is uncertain and given by a probability distribution.
Although this approach meets our efficiency requirement (Requirement 2), it does not
meet our requirement of being able to negotiate against unknown opponents (Require-
ment 3), since it requires the a priori probability distribution over the different types to
be known.
A further limitation of game theoretic approaches is that they tend to assume full ratio-
nality. One of the features of full rationality is that each party has the ability to make
whatever calculations are needed to discover the optimal action, however complicated
those calculations may be (Rubinstein, 1998). In the negotiation setting that we con-
sider, game theory is a useful tool. However, it is not sufficient in itself because, due
to this full rationality assumption, it would require unlimited computational power and
therefore would not be considered to be computationally tractable (Requirement 7). We
consider game theory to be important in the evaluation of the outcomes of negotiation,
and therefore we use Pareto optimality in our evaluation in Chapters 4 and 6. How-
ever, in order to find a strategy for which meets all of our requirements (specifically,
Requirements 3 (unknown opponents) and 7 (computational tractability)), we consider
heuristic approaches.
2.3.2 Heuristic Approaches
In this section we review heuristic approaches to negotiation. Heuristic approaches are
based on more realistic assumptions than game theoretic approaches. For example,
heuristic approaches do not make the assumption that the opponent is rational. This is
an important feature, since our work concerns opponents whose behaviour is unknown
(and may therefore be irrational). The aim of heuristic approaches is to produce good,
rather than optimal solutions. As such, they are particularly appropriate in complex
environments where fully optimal approaches may not be able to provide computable
solutions.
We discuss heuristic approaches that can be used to select the desired utility level in
Section 2.3.2.1 and then consider methods for learning the opponent’s preferences and
for predicting future behaviour in Section 2.3.2.2. In Section 2.3.2.3 we discuss methods
for making trade-offs between issues without learning the opponent’s preferences.
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2.3.2.1 Concession Strategies
When there are two agents which aim to divide a resource (consider the split the pie
game mentioned in Section 2.2.3), using a protocol that allows for repeated offers to be
made (such as the alternating offers protocol described in Section 2.3.1.2), the agents
need to choose the rate at which they move away from their preferred offer, towards one
which is preferred by their opponent. We refer to this movement as concession. In order
for the agents to reach an agreement within the required time frame, it is necessary
for them to find an appropriate concession strategy. The concession strategy should
ensure that each agent does not concede too quickly, as this results in them giving away
too much utility to their opponent. However, if neither agent concedes, they cannot
reach an agreement and so this behaviour is also undesirable. We now look at a number
of concession strategies that have been proposed in the literature, namely the Zeuthen
concession strategy, time dependent strategies and tit-for-tat strategies.
Zeuthen Concession Strategy: When negotiating under the monotonic concession
protocol (see Section 2.1.7), the agents need to take care not to stand still (where
neither agent concedes at a particular step), as this can result in a conflict even when
there exist agreements that are more efficient than conflict. On the other hand, it is
unstable for an agent to concede at every step. If it were the case that agent A conceded
at every step, and agent B was aware of this, agent B would simply stand still at every
step (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994). Consequently, an approach in which both agents
concede cannot be a Nash equilibrium, as one of the parties can improve their value of
the outcome by changing their strategy.
Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) therefore propose the Zeuthen Concession Strategy as
an approach which can be used for negotiating using the monotonic concession protocol.
It uses the risk evaluation criteria proposed by Zeuthen (1930) to decide which party
should concede. In Zeuthen’s work, the risk to player p at time t is defined as:
Ktp =

U(op,t)− U(oq,t)
U(op,t)
if U(op,t) 6= 0
1 otherwise
(2.17)
where U(op,t) is the utility of the offer op,t made by player p at time t. U(oq,t) is similarly
defined for player q.
The agent that should concede is the one which stands to lose the most from conflict,
and is therefore the one that is least willing to risk conflict (and has the lowest value
of Ktp). A possible limitation of this approach is that it requires complete information
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about the opponent’s utility function, in order to determine which agent has the lowest
value of Ktp. If an estimate is used, there is a chance that the agents could both consider
their value of Ktp to be the highest, and therefore neither agent would concede, resulting
in a conflict.
We therefore consider other approaches which do not require the opponent’s utility
function to be known.
Time Dependent Concession Strategy: Using time dependent concession (Faratin
et al., 1998), the utility level is calculated as a function of time. Commonly, this function
is either polynomial, or exponential.
Using a polynomial function, which is a standard choice made in much of the negotiation
literature (Faratin et al., 1998; Fatima et al., 2001), the desired utility level U(t) at time
t is given by:
U(t) = U0 − (Umin − U0) · t1/β (2.18)
where U0 is the initial utility, Umin is the reservation utility (which the agent will not
concede beyond) and β is the parameter that affects the rate of concession. We can
partition the β value into three types:
• Boulware or Tough: (β < 1) Initially the agent concedes very little, but increases
the rate of concession as the game progresses.
• Linear: (β = 1) The agent concedes at a constant rate throughout the duration
of the negotiation, reaching its reservation utility at the deadline.
• Conceder or Weak: (β > 1) The agent concedes quickly at the start of the
negotiation, with the rate of concession slowing as the game progresses.
Figure 2.3 shows the utility levels U over time t for three different values of β, where
U0 = 0.95 and Umin = 0.5.
Using such a strategy, it is necessary to choose the value of β in order to concede at an
appropriate rate. Additionally, we need to find a way to set Umin. Alternatively, we can
use a tit-for-tat approach, which aims to concede at a similar rate to the opponent.
Tit-for-tat Concession Strategy: Under the tit-for-tat concession strategy, the
agent chooses its concession based on that of its opponent in the previous round (or
rounds). In this context, Faratin et al. (1998) propose a number of variations of a
tit-for-tat based approach.
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Figure 2.3: Utility levels according to various concession rates (β = {0.1, 1, 10}) with
initial utility U0 = 0.95 and reservation utility Umin = 0.5 (shown as a dashed line).
Using relative tit-for-tat, the agent concedes by the same percentage as its opponent
made σ rounds ago. In random absolute tit-for-tat, the agent concedes by the same
amount as its opponent made σ rounds ago (plus or minus a random amount in the
interval [0,M ]). The random behaviour is introduced to allow the agents to escape
from local minima. In averaged tit-for-tat, the agent uses the average concession of the
opponent’s σ previous offers to select its concession amount.
All of these tit-for-tat approaches consider the offers that have been made at a partic-
ular round (or set of rounds). Due to our requirement for continuous time constraints
(Requirement 6), the number of rounds that have elapsed should not be considered to
have an impact on the negotiation, as they do not affect the outcome. Therefore, if we
were to use any of these approaches, it would be necessary to adapt them for use with
continuous time.
None of the concession strategies that we have discussed take any discounting factor
into consideration. In our work, we use a concession strategy that is based on the time
dependent strategy, but in common with the tit-for-tat strategy, we consider our oppo-
nent’s offers. The aim is to reach an efficient agreement (Requirement 2) by optimising
our rate of concession as a best response, based on observations of the opponent’s offers,
and considering the discounting factor. In more detail, if our concession is too slow,
it will take longer to reach an agreement, and utility will be wasted due to the effect
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of discounting. Alternatively, if our concession is too fast, we will easily reach a quick
agreement, but with low utility.
2.3.2.2 Learning Techniques
In a negotiation where there is uncertainty about the behaviour or the preferences of
the opponents, it is often necessary to use a learning technique in order to estimate how
the opponent will behave in future and/or to estimate the preferences of the opponent.
There are a number of different techniques that can be used for this learning. Many of the
heuristic approaches to negotiation which we discuss in Section 2.3.2 use the techniques
which we introduce here. In this section, we briefly introduce the techniques of Bayesian
updating, kernel density estimation, least squares regression, Gaussian process regression
and reinforcement learning, giving examples of their use in automated negotiation.
Bayesian Updating Bayesian updating is the process of using Bayes’ theorem in
order to update the likelihood of a set of beliefs. Bayes’ rule is defined as follows:
P (A|B) = P (B|A) · P (A)
P (B)
(2.19)
where P (A|B) is the posterior probability of A given B, P (B|A) is the likelihood (or
the conditional probability of B given A), P (A) is the prior probability of A and P (B)
is the prior probability of B.
In the context of automated negotiation, Bayesian updating has been proposed as a
suitable method to classify the type of behaviour of an agent, or its utility function
(Zeng and Sycara, 1998; Lin et al., 2006; Hindriks et al., 2009b). For example, Lin
et al. (2006) have developed an agent which uses Bayesian updating in order to learn
the type of the opponent during a single negotiation. To use Bayesian updating, the
agent must first choose the prior probability of each type. Specifically, they consider the
prior probability P (τ) of each type τ to be equal, that is ∀τ ∈ T, P (τ) = 1/|T | where T
is the set of possible types, and |T | is the size of that set. By Bayesian updating, the
posterior probability P (τ |ot) can be found as follows:
P (τ |ot) = P (ot|τ) · P (τ)
P (ot)
(2.20)
where P (ot|τ) is the probability of offer ot given that the opponent is of type τ , P (τ) is
the prior probability of type τ and P (ot) is the probability of offer ot.
A limitation of this approach is it requires the agent to update the probabilities of a
large number of hypotheses (one for each possible type, and the number of possible types
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can be very large). As a result, it does not scale well in negotiation domains with a large
number of issues. In a negotiation consisting of n issues, each issue has one of m weights
and one of l possible evaluation functions, the number of types |T | would be (l ·m)n.
Bayesian Updating, Scalable in the Number of Issues In an attempt to produce
an approach which scales better in the number of issues, Hindriks and Tykhonov (2008)
develop an agent which is based on the work of Lin et al.. Rather than learning the
weights of each issue, they learn an ordering over the weights (as this reduces the number
of hypotheses compared to trying to learn the weights themselves), which they refer to
as the issue priorities. In addition, their approach treats the utility function for each
issue (Ui(vi)) and the issue priorities (wi) as being independent. Therefore the number
of hypotheses that need their probabilities updating is significantly reduced, making
their solution more computable in larger domains.
In order to estimate the weight of each issue, based on the issue priorities that have
been learnt, their agent considers all possible orderings of the issues as a set of weight
hypotheses Hw. From each ranking, the weight is calculated as follows:
whi = 2 ·
rhi
n · (n+ 1) (2.21)
where rhi is the rank of issue i in hypothesis h ∈ Hw and n is the number of issues. The
set of weight hypotheses for a single issue i can then be denoted by hwi,z ∈ Hwi .
In terms of the utility functions for each issue, it is assumed that these can be modelled
by taking a weighted average over a set of functions, with each function being linear
increasing, linear decreasing or triangular, as defined in Section 2.2.1. Consequently,
each of these functions are considered as a hypothesis, and the agent therefore considers
a set of hypotheses hei,z ∈ Hei for each issue i.
Their agent initially assumes that the probability distributions over each set of hypothe-
ses Hwi and H
e
i are uniform (unless it has some additional knowledge). As part of the
strategies that we have developed, where necessary, we use this scalable approach to
Bayesian updating in order to learn our opponent’s utility function.
Kernel Density Estimation Kernel density estimation (KDE) is the process of es-
timating the distribution of a value, using an estimator of the form:
P (x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
K(x, xi) (2.22)
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Figure 2.4: Kernel Density Estimation for four data points. The data points are
marked as crosses, the kernels as dashed lines and the overall estimation as a solid line.
where K(·, ·) is the kernel function, which has an integral of 1. Commonly this kernel
function is a Gaussian distribution. The aim of kernel density estimation is to build a
probability distribution over a set of values. This requires the kernel function’s parameter
to be chosen appropriately. For a Gaussian distribution kernel function, this is done by
adjusting the variance of the distribution. Figure 2.4 shows an example of kernel density
estimation performed on a set of data points, for a single variance.
Coehoorn and Jennings (2004) use the KDE approach in order to learn the opponent’s
preferences. This uses the negotiation history of the agent in a particular scenario, in
an attempt to learn the weights associated with each issue. During the negotiation, the
process for estimating these weights is a Fourier transform which can be performed in
O(n log n) time (with n being the sampling rate). However, their approach requires
the agent to use information from previous interactions, which we consider not to be
available as part of Requirement 3 (unknown opponents).
Least Squares Regression Least squares regression is the process of finding a curve
which best fits through a given set of points. The curve has a particular function which
takes a number of parameters. The quality of the fit is measured by the sum of the
squares of the offsets between the points and the solution curve. The solution curve is
therefore the one which minimises the squares of the offsets (Weisstein, 1999).
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Figure 2.5: Example regression techniques.
Figure 2.5(a) illustrates least squares regression over a set of data points, using first,
second and third degree polynomials. These polynomial functions are given by: y =
ax + b, y = ax2 + bx + c and y = ax3 + bx2 + cx + d respectively. As can be seen
in the figure, the prediction varies greatly according to the degree of the polynomial,
particularly for values of x that are far outside the range of x in the input data.
Gaussian Process Regression Gaussian process regression is more advanced than
least squares regression. The process is defined by the mean function and the covariance
function (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006). The mean function describes the expected
output, when no relevant input information is available, whilst the covariance function
describes how the output varies compared to nearby points.
For example, Figure 2.5(b) shows the Gaussian process regression over a set of data
points. The mean function in use is:
y = 0.5 (2.23)
whilst the covariance function is defined by a matrix.
A benefit of using a Gaussian process regression compared to a linear one is that the
output of the Gaussian process is both a mean prediction and measure of the confidence
in that prediction. Figure 2.5(b) shows how the confidence in the prediction is greater
at points close to the input data. The confidence information is particularly useful for
a spiteful strategy, which aims to make high utility agreements in order to get a higher
Chapter 2 Background and Related Work 39
score than its opponent, as it affects the expected spiteful utility. Specifically, an agent
using a spiteful strategy will prefer to wait for a later agreement with a similar mean
but a larger variance, as the larger variance indicates that the agent may achieve a very
high spiteful utility. We make use of Gaussian process regression in one of our strategies,
and we use the confidence information in its calculation of a best response to the learnt
concession of the opponent. This is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.2.
When using Gaussian process regression techniques, it is necessary to choose an ap-
propriate covariance function. Examples include the Mate´rn and squared exponential
covariance functions (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006). Both of these functions are sta-
tionary, in that they are based only on the distance between two points. Specifically,
the Mate´rn covariance function is:
C(d) =
21−v
Γ(v)
(
2
√
vd
l
)v
Kv
(
2
√
vd
l
)
(2.24)
where d is the distance between the points, Γ(·) is the Gamma function (an extension
of the factorial function), v and l are parameters of the covariance function and Kv is
a modified Bessel function (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006). Furthermore, the squared
exponential function is:
C(d) = e−d
2/v (2.25)
where d is the distance between the points and v is a parameter of the covariance
function (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006). The squared exponential covariance function
is a special case of the Mate´rn covariance function and therefore we use the more flexible
Mate´rn covariance function in our work.
Reinforcement Learning Using reinforcement learning, the agent learns based on
the rewards it receives from performing a task. Yoshikawa et al. (2008) and Yasumura
et al. (2009) use a reinforcement learning approach in order to choose an appropriate
concession strategy. However, in order to perform this effectively, the agents are required
to conclude many prior negotiations with an opponent in order to learn the opponent’s
behaviour. Consequently their approach, and reinforcement learning in general, is not
appropriate for one-off negotiation with an unknown opponent (Requirement 3).
2.3.2.3 Making Trade-Offs
The approaches discussed above involve opponent modelling, however, it is not always
necessary to know the utility function of the opponent in order to make trade-offs.
Instead, the similarity between a pair of offers can be measured and used to determine
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the trade-offs that should be made. By this, we mean that the closeness between the
values of the offers are considered, regardless of the utility functions of any party. To
this end, there are a few different approaches that can be used by an agent to make
trade-offs between different issues without learning the preferences of the opponent.
Faratin et al. (2002) were the first to propose an algorithm for negotiating over multiple
issues which makes use of similarity-based reasoning, that is, it tries to find offers that
are similar to the opponent’s previous offer. They use a fuzzy similarity approach to
consider the closeness of offers. Their algorithm for trade-offs works as follows: The
process starts at the offer, oq,r−1, that was previously made by the opponent and by
altering the values of that offer, generates N new ‘child’ offers which each have a utility
E greater than the utility U(oq,r−1) of the opponent’s previous offer. Of these child
offers, the one which is most similar to oq,r−1 is selected to be the new parent. This
process is then repeated a number of times, until the utility of the selected offer matches
our desired utility. The number of times is chosen by setting E to be some fraction
(1/z, z ∈ Z) of the difference between U(oq,r−1) and our desired utility. Their approach
is designed for discrete issues.
The limitation of their approach is that it requires the criteria functions and the weights
of each criteria function for any issues that are used in the negotiation scenario to be
known. Due to Requirement 5 (unknown ordering), we require an approach which can
be used for issues which do not have a known, common ordering, and therefore where
such knowledge is unavailable.
To address this, Somefun et al. (2006) take a similar approach to the work of Faratin
et al., although they consider trade-offs between continuous issues. Specifically, they
present an algorithm for Pareto-search in an environment where there is no prior knowl-
edge of the opponent’s preferences, and they show that the algorithm reaches an agree-
ment that is approximately Pareto efficient. Their algorithm works as follows:
1. The agent first chooses the desired utility level, by referring to its concession
strategy.
2. The agent then builds a surface which represents all of the points with the desired
utility. We refer to this as an iso-utility surface.
3. The agent finds the point on that surface that is closest to the previous offer of
the opponent in terms of the Euclidean distance.
4. The agent makes the counter-offer that is represented by that point.
Figure 2.6 shows this process graphically in a scenario with two continuous issues which
are represented by the two axes. Here, the two curved lines are iso-utility curves of
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two agents, at a particular utility level, U({v1, v2}) = 0.82. Agent A has a preference
for low values of both issues (shown by the curve in the bottom left), and agent B
has a preference for high values of both issues (shown by the curve in the top right).
Furthermore, agent A considers issue 2 to be more important, whilst agent B considers
issue 1 to be more important. Specifically, agent A’s utility function is:
U({v1, v2}) = 1
3
v21 +
2
3
v22 (2.26)
whilst agent B’s utility function is:
U({v1, v2}) = 2
3
(1− v1)2 + 1
3
(1− v2)2 (2.27)
Figure 2.6 shows the offers that are exchanged by two agents that both use the orthogonal
search method. Agent A proposes offer 1 ({2, 4}), and agent B observes this offer. Agent
B finds the point on its iso-utility curve which is closest to that offer, and proposes the
counter-offer that is represented by that point, shown as offer 2 ({6.6, 6.41}). This
process is then repeated by agent A. As the agents concede, they will perform this
process with different iso-utility curves (since their desired utility level will change).
When both agents use this strategy, once they have both conceded enough that the
iso-utility curves of the two agents intersect each other, the offer will be made at the
intersection, and the other agent should accept the offer.
We base one of our strategies on this technique, since it meets our requirements for
use against unknown opponents (Requirement 3) and it is a computationally tractable
approach (Requirement 7). Its limitation is that it does not meet Requirement 5, since
it requires the discrete issues to have a known, common ordering. Therefore we extend
it to cover such issues.
So far, this section has considered both game theoretic and heuristic approaches to
negotiation. There remains a further approach to negotiation, known as argumentation,
which we briefly discuss below, for completeness, although it is not directly relevant to
the setting considered in this thesis.
2.3.3 Argumentation
In negotiation by argumentation, participants are able to communicate additional infor-
mation to the other participants. In addition to the offers and counter offers that are used
in the alternating offers protocol, critiques and explanations can also be sent. Critiques
are comments on which parts of the proposal the agent likes or dislikes. Explanations
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Figure 2.6: Demonstration of the Pareto-search algorithm, showing the iso-utility
curves of two agents. Agent A proposes offer 1 at {2, 4}. Agent B finds the point on
his curve that is closest to offer 1, and proposes the counter-offer represented by that
point, shown as offer 2 at {6.6, 6.41}. The process is then repeated by each agent in
turn.
are a way that agents can support their proposals, and may take the form of threats,
rewards or appeals (Parsons and Jennings, 1996; Jennings et al., 2001). The arguments
that are exchanged take the form of propositional logic statements, and each agent uses
logical proof to evaluate the set of arguments that it has received (Wooldridge, 2009).
Argumentation based negotiation has the benefit that it can achieve agreements that
other approaches could not, by using arguments to change the preferences of the oppo-
nent. However this is at the expense of significant overheads, due to the reasoning that
the agent needs to perform in order to evaluate the arguments. It is possible for agents to
make arguments that are not truthful, which further complicates the negotiation, since
the agent needs to evaluate each argument’s credibility (Jennings et al., 2001). Since
it would be difficult to evaluate the performance of an agent in an environment where
the preferences can be changed, we choose to focus on negotiation where each party’s
preferences are fixed. Therefore we do not consider negotiation by argumentation in the
remainder of this thesis.
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2.4 Negotiation with Many Parties
All of the literature that has been reviewed in this section has been focused on negotiation
between two parties, and therefore does not meet our requirement for coordination of
negotiation with a number of participants (Requirement 8).
To this end, in this section, we review negotiation involving more than two participants.
In some environments, the number of participants may not be fixed. For example,
in the scenario we gave in Chapter 1, buyers can enter and leave the negotiation at
any time. We begin this section by discussing the issues surrounding concurrent bi-
lateral negotiation in Section 2.4.1. Then, in Section 2.4.2 we discuss an additional
feature of some concurrent negotiation environments, including the one we consider
(Requirement 9), known as decommitment.
There are two ways in which negotiation with many parties can be carried out. In
sequential negotiation, each agent negotiates with one opponent at a time, taking it in
turns to negotiate with each opponent. In concurrent bi-lateral negotiation, the agents
negotiate concurrently with a number of opponents. The offers that are made are still
bi-lateral in that each offer is made by one party to another. Therefore, all offers and
agreements are made between exactly two negotiation partners. In time constrained
scenarios such as the one in our scenario, concurrent bi-lateral negotiation is considered
to be more appropriate than sequential negotiation, as sequential negotiation can lead
to ‘lengthy negotiation encounters’ (Nguyen and Jennings, 2003). Therefore the next
section focuses on concurrent bi-lateral negotiation.
2.4.1 Concurrent Bi-lateral Negotiation
One of the earlier approaches to task allocation amongst a large number of parties
is the contract net, proposed by Smith (1980). Here, the process begins with a task
announcement which specifies the requirements that a requester needs any bidders to
satisfy, along with a brief description of the task, and a specification of the information
that is required in a bid. In addition, the requester specifies a deadline by which bids
must be received. Upon receipt of a task announcement, each bidder evaluates the
requirements and the specification of the task, in order to decide whether or not to bid
on the task. When a bidder decides that it should work on a particular task, it sends a
bid for that task. The requester evaluates the bids that have been received, and if it has
one which it considers to be satisfactory, the bid is accepted and the task is awarded to
the bidder. A limitation of this approach is that when there are multiple requesters, the
bidders need to decide the order in which to bid on tasks, since they may not be able to
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complete some combinations of tasks, and therefore they may need wait to see if a bid
is accepted before making another bid.
In an extension to Smith’s work, Aknine et al. (2004) propose two phases of proposal
and allocation to allow an agent to concurrently manage several negotiation processes.
Specifically, the process is as follows: the requester makes an announcement (as before),
the bidders then respond with pre-bid messages. The requester can then send a pre-
accept message in response to one of the pre-bid messages in order to temporarily accept
the pre-bid. The requester sends pre-reject messages to all of the other bidders. At this
point, the bidder who received the pre-accept message is able to send a definitive-bid
which the requester is able to definitive-accept or definitive-reject. The bidders that were
sent pre-reject messages are able to send further pre-bid messages. Until the requester
has sent a definitive-accept or definitive-reject message, it is able to send further pre-
accept and pre-reject messages if it receives more favourable pre-bids. The benefit of this
approach over the earlier work of Smith is that it allows for more efficient negotiation in
a many to many case, for example, where there are multiple buyers and multiple sellers.
The alternating offers protocol used for two participants has also been extended to allow
participants to negotiate with more than one opponent at a time. To this end, Dang
and Huhns (2005) propose an alternating offers protocol which is based on the work of
Aknine et al. and has two-phase commitment and rejection. It differs from the contract
net approach by Aknine et al. (2004) in that the process begins with the alternating offers
protocol in which agents exchange offers and counter-offers with each other, rather than
a single task announcement being sent.
In another line of work, Nguyen and Jennings (2003) design an agent for concurrent
bi-lateral negotiation. In order to concurrently manage a number of negotiations, their
approach uses a coordinator, which manages a number of individual negotiation threads.
Each negotiation thread handles bi-lateral negotiation with a single opponent. The
coordinator is responsible for coordinating the negotiation threads and choosing their
strategies. Specifically, in terms of choosing a strategy, the agent attempts to learn
whether the opponent is a conceder or a non-conceder. If the opponent is believed to
be a conceder, the agent uses a tough strategy with probability P ct . On the other hand,
if the opponent is believed to be a non-conceder, the agent uses a conciliatory strategy
with probability Pnc . In addition, the classification of opponents into conceder or non-
conceder classes depends on concession by the opponent at every negotiation round. In
an environment where there are multiple issues and where our agent’s utility function
is unknown to the opponent, such perfect behaviour is unlikely to occur, as it relies on
the opponent being able to identify the Pareto-efficient offers. Therefore, their approach
would need to be considerably extended in order to meet our requirements for a strategy
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which works against unknown opponents (Requirement 3) and multiple issues. We use
their approach, with some fixed parameters, as a benchmark in the evaluation of our
many-to-many negotiation strategy in Chapter 6.
2.4.2 Decommitment
One of the additional features of concurrent negotiation environments, including the
ones considered in this work (Requirement 9), is the concept of decommitment. In a
concurrent negotiation, one of the parties may make an agreement with an opponent,
before finding an opportunity for a better agreement with another opponent. Decom-
mitment allows one of the parties to cancel an agreement that it has made, allowing it
to select the alternative agreement and therefore achieve it a greater utility. By allowing
decommitment, the strategies can be more flexible, allowing agreements with a higher
utility to be reached. However, due to the costs of preparing to perform a contract, any
unnecessary decommitment (where a party decommits in order to commit to another
contract which is only slightly better) could lead to a ‘decrease in the sum of utilities of
the parties’ (Ponka, 2009). It is therefore important that there is some form of penalty
for decommitment, in order to discourage unnecessary decommitment. In this section,
we consider two approaches to decommitment, namely contingency contracts and leveled
commitment contracts.
Contingency Contracts: Contingency contracts are contracts in which the existence
of the contract is tied to future events (Raiffa, 1982). A limitation of this approach is that
it requires all possible future events that can affect the contract need to be considered.
This may be an unrealistic assumption, as in automated negotiation it would require
the participants to express all such future events to the agent. In addition, if there are a
large number of possible events, it may not be possible to monitor all of them (Sandholm
and Lesser, 2001).
Leveled Commitment Contracts: The leveled commitment contract approach (Sand-
holm and Lesser, 2001) allows a party to decommit through the payment of a decom-
mitment fee. According to work by Andersson and Sandholm (2001), decommitment
fees used in this approach can be:
1. A fixed value which is decided prior to the negotiation.
2. A percentage of the contract price, with the percentage being decided prior
to the negotiation.
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3. A value decided at the time of contracting, as a percentage of the contract
price, with the percentage increasing as the time of contracting increases.
4. A value decided at the time of decommitment, as a percentage of the con-
tract price, with the percentage increasing as the time of the decommitment in-
creases.
Using the leveled commitment contract approach, Nguyen and Jennings (2005) develop
a strategy for use in an environment which allows decommitment through the payment
of a penalty. In their model, the decommitment fee ρ(t) at time t is calculated using the
fourth of the methods given by Andersson and Sandholm (2001), specifically:
ρ(t) = U(α, tα) · (ρ0 + t− tα
1− tα · (ρmax − ρ0)) (2.28)
where U(α, tα) is the utility of the agreement at time the contract was made tα, ρ0
is the penalty at contract time, ρmax is the penalty at the deadline. Their strategy is
designed for one-to-many negotiations with uncertainty about the opponents. However,
it only considers discrete time, makes strong assumptions about the opponents, and
requires considerable prior knowledge about these opponents. In particular, they assume
that there is a small number of different opponent types, all using a simple time-based
concession strategy. Furthermore, they assume that the probabilities of each type are
known, as well as the payoff that will be obtained when negotiating against each type. In
contrast, we consider an environment in which the agents do not have such knowledge.
We will use this form of decommitment fee in our concurrent negotiation environment
as, in many scenarios, it is the one which most closely represents the costs involved in
decommitment. Specifically, as time progresses from the point of agreement, the costs
incurred in fulfilling a contract are likely to increase. Furthermore, the opportunity
to find an alternative contract before a deadline (and the utility from it) decreases
(Andersson and Sandholm, 2001).
Finally, An et al. (2008; 2011) and An (2011) have developed an agent which negoti-
ates in an environment which contains concurrent negotiation with decommitment. In
common with much of the other negotiation literature, their work considers time con-
straints to be based on the number of negotiation rounds rather than the amount of
elapsed time. However, the environment they consider is multi-resource rather than
multi-issue. In such an environment, each resource can be negotiated independently,
creating a complete package by reaching agreement on each resource with a different
opponent. Furthermore, each opponent may offer only a subset of the resources. Their
strategy uses time-dependent concession to concede at a different rate for each resource,
depending on the relative scarcity of that resource. A related approach is taken by Shi
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and Sim (2008), who have also developed a further strategy for concurrent multi-resource
negotiation with decommitment. In contrast, in our work, the individual issues cannot
be split amongst negotiation partners. For example, when a buyer negotiates over the
sale of a car, it is not possible to reach agreement by negotiating a good price with one
seller whilst agreeing the colour with another.
For these reasons, the strategies developed by Shi and Sim and An et al. are not
suitable for the negotiation environment we consider due to the way in which each issue
(or resource) can be negotiated separately. Therefore we will use the strategy developed
by Nguyen and Jennings as a benchmark which we can compare our strategies against.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter we began by introducing the key notions within the automated negotia-
tion literature. In addition, we introduced a number of evaluation criteria and method-
ologies that can be used to measure the performance of a negotiation strategy. In doing
so, we introduced the efficiency concepts which form Requirement 2. Specifically, in our
evaluation in Chapters 4 and 6, we will use Genius as our test environment, and will
compare our strategies against those produced for the Automated Negotiating Agent
Competition. Furthermore, we will use empirical game theoretic techniques in our eval-
uation, in order to evaluate the performance of our strategy in tournaments where more
than one opponent uses a single strategy.
Subsequently, we reviewed the literature relating to negotiation strategies, considering
game theoretic, heuristic and argumentation based approaches. Furthermore, we high-
lighted the problems involved in using purely game theoretic approaches to meet our
requirements, and therefore demonstrated the need to use heuristic strategies for our
purpose, since they tend to be more computationally tractable (Requirement 7) even in
complex negotiations where the behaviour and preferences of the opponents are unknown
(Requirement 3) and multiple issues are present (Requirement 4). Finally, in order to
address our requirement for a solution that can coordinate multiple concurrent nego-
tiations (Requirement 8), we discussed existing work relating to negotiation situations
where there are more than two participants.
In Chapters 3 and 5, we will develop our own negotiation strategies, which build upon
some of the existing work that has been discussed in this chapter. Specifically, our
negotiation strategies use time dependent concession to set their desired utility at a
given time. As part of this concession strategy, they adapt their rate of concession as a
best response to the expected future behaviour of the opponent. Furthermore, in order
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to predict this future behaviour, they use either a simple least squares regression over
the observations of the opponent’s offers or a more advanced Gaussian process regression
technique which provides a measure of the confidence of the prediction, which can be
used to improve the choice of concession rate.
Chapter 3
Design of One-to-One Negotiation
Agents
In this chapter, we present the negotiation agents that we have developed for one-to-one
negotiation, and the strategies that are used by our agents. The purpose of developing
a range of strategies, rather than a single one, is to enable us to consider the benefits of
different approaches. Our overall aim is to use a suitable combination of these approaches
in order to develop a negotiation strategy which meets all of the requirements outlined
in Section 1.2.
In the remainder of this chapter, we provide an overview of our one-to-one negotiation
strategies (Section 3.1), before describing in detail each part of the strategies, in turn
(Sections 3.2 to 3.6). We then explain how our agents are formed from these strategies,
including implementation details (Section 3.7). We summarise the chapter in Section 3.8.
3.1 Overview
Our strategies are designed to participate in multi-issue, bi-lateral negotiation, in which
two parties negotiate over multiple issues in order to reach an agreement. The negotia-
tion protocol that is used is based on the alternating offers protocol, which we introduced
in Section 2.1.8. In more detail, each offer, o, represents a complete package, in that it
specifies a value for all issues. Formally, o = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉, where vi is the value for is-
sue i and n is the number of issues. The possible actions under this protocol are Offer,
Accept and End. The negotiation begins with the agents exchanging Offer messages.
Sending an Offer message in response to an Offer from the opponent constitutes a
counteroffer and an implicit rejection of the previous offer. If an agent is satisfied with
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Figure 3.1: State diagram showing the negotiation protocol, from the perspective of
a single agent, p.
the most recent Offer it received, it can send an Accept message in order to form
an agreement, α ∈ O. If an agreement is formed before the deadline, each player, p
receives the utility of that agreement, according to their utility function, Up, the time of
agreement, t, and the discounting parameter, δp. Conversely, if no agreement is reached
by the negotiation deadline (or if the agent terminated the negotiation by sending an
End message at any time), the negotiation ends in conflict, with each player receiving
a utility calculated according to the utility of conflict, uα, the time of disagreement, t,
and the discounting parameter. Figure 3.1 is a state diagram from the perspective of a
single agent, showing the messages exchanged and the various states of the agent.
Each agent, p, is provided with its own utility function, Up(·, ·), which, at time t ∈ T
(where T is the range of time during which the negotiation takes place, from the start
to the deadline) maps all possible outcomes, ω in the outcome space O∪{α}, to a value
in the range [0, 1]. Formally:
Up : (O ∪ {α})× T → [0, 1] (3.1)
As is common in the literature, this utility function is modelled by separate components:
the function Up(·), which calculates the undiscounted utility of an outcome, and another,
D(·, ·), which discounts that utility depending on the time that the outcome was reached
and the discounting parameter. Formally:
Up(ω, t) = D(Up(ω), t) (3.2)
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Furthermore, the undiscounted utility of an outcome depends on whether the outcome
is an agreement, α, or conflict, α. In the case of agreements, we define the function Up(·)
as being additive over all of the negotiation issues. Therefore, the undiscounted utility
of agreement α ∈ O is given by:
Up(α) =
n∑
i=1
wp,i · Up,i(vi) (3.3)
where wp,i is the weight of issue i to agent p and Up,i(vi) is the utility to agent p of value
vi for issue i. Furthermore, without loss of generality, Up is normalised such that the
agent’s best outcome has a utility of 1. Formally:
∃α ∈ O,Up(α) = 1 (3.4)
On the other hand, the undiscounted utility of conflict is a constant, denoted Up(α),
which for convenience we denote as uα.
Having considered how undiscounted utility is calculated, we now formalise the second
component of our overall utility function, which considers time discounting. The time
constraints considered in this work are based on the amount of real-time which has
elapsed. For example, we consider negotiations which last 180 seconds (3 minutes).
We normalise our representation of time, such that t = 0 represents the start of the
negotiation and t = 1 represents the deadline at 180 seconds (which is the latest possible
time at which an agreement can be reached). The discounted utility of an outcome
(either agreement or conflict) with utility u at time t is then given by:
D(u, t) = δtp · u (3.5)
where δp is the discounting factor of agent p.
Having discussed the negotiation protocol and utility function used in the negotiations we
consider, we now introduce the strategies that we have developed. The overall procedure
used by all of the strategies discussed in this chapter can be described at a high level by
Algorithm 1. Here, the approach is split into two main parts, to reduce the complexity
of the task. The first is to develop a concession strategy to select the level of utility,
uτ , at which we generate offers at the current time, tc. This is represented by the
SetAspirationLevel function and we describe this part of the algorithm in more
detail in Section 3.2. In order to maximise the utility achieved, the aspiration level
must be set in a way that balances taking a tough strategy which may take a long time
to reach agreement and might even result in no agreement, and conceding too quickly,
giving the opponent an advantage.
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Furthermore, in a multi-issue negotiation, there may be a number of different offers
which have the same utility for a given agent but which offer a range of different utilities
to the other agent. Specifically, for a given level of our own utility, if several offers achieve
that utility, the one which maximises the utility for the opponent should be selected,
as it has the highest chance of acceptance. Such an agreement is also considered to
be more efficient, since neither party can unilaterally increase their utility by a large
amount. This part of our strategy is represented by the GenerateOffer function,
which selects one of the offers at our aspiration level, uτ . We discuss our approach to
this part of the problem in Section 3.3.
In addition to these two major components, some of the other functions in Algorithm 1
also form part of the agents’ strategies. Specifically, the ConflictBest function deter-
mines when it is appropriate for the agent to end a negotiation before the deadline, and
we discuss this aspect in Section 3.4. Furthermore, the AdjustUtilityPareto and
AdjustUtilityConflict functions are how the agent can impose a spiteful behaviour,
and we discuss these functions further in Section 3.5.
The rest of the functions included in Algorithm 1 are defined by the negotiation proto-
col (SendMessage, ReceiveMessage and GetOffer) or the agent’s utility function
(GetUtility). Specifically, the GetUtility function is equivalent to Up(oopp), as de-
fined in Equation 3.3, theAdjustUtilityPareto function is equivalent toD(S(uopp), tc),
as defined in Equations 3.5 and 3.24 and the AdjustUtilityConflict function is
equivalent to D(S(uα, uα), tc), as defined in Equations 3.5 and 3.22.
3.2 Setting the Aspiration Level
This section describes the novel concession strategy we have developed for setting our
aspiration level. This is defined as the utility level at which offers are generated at a
certain point in the negotiation. Furthermore, offers received from the opponent which
have a utility greater than this value will be accepted. Our approach for choosing this
level is to first learn the opponent’s concession strategy, and then use this information to
set our level as a best response to the opponent’s behaviour (by adjusting our behaviour
to maximise our utility given that the opponent’s behaviour is fixed).
In more detail, we need to try to predict how the utility (to our agent) of the opponent’s
offers will vary over the duration of the negotiation. Our agent can then use this predic-
tion to determine the best concession rate and therefore select a utility level at which
to propose offers at the current time.
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The general approach used in this phase of our strategies is given in Algorithm 2. Fol-
lowing each offer, oopp, received from the opponent, the algorithm records relevant in-
formation about the offer. Then, if the input to the regression process has changed,
the regression is repeated, in order to update our estimate of the future concession of
the opponent. Finally, a target utility is calculated, as a best response to the learnt
information.
In the remainder of this section, we consider two different approaches to predicting the
opponent’s behaviour. The first is to use a relatively simple, least squares regression
approach, which is very fast and can therefore be repeated regularly as new offers from
the opponent are observed, as we will discuss in Section 3.2.1. However, it assumes that
the opponent’s concession function can be fitted to a power law curve and it provides
only a prediction of the opponent’s future concession, without a measure of confidence
in that prediction. The alternative, more advanced approach, which removes these
disadvantages, is to use Gaussian process regression (described in Section 3.2.2), since
this provides a confidence measure as part of its prediction. We now consider each of
our approaches in turn.
3.2.1 Using Least Squares Regression
We now describe, in detail, the way in which our strategy sets its aspiration level using
a least squares regression approach in order to predict the future concession of the
opponent. We do this by defining the functions used in Algorithm 2.
RecordOffer: We assume that the function we are trying to predict, which rep-
resents the utility of the opponent’s offers, according to our utility function, is non-
decreasing. The rationale for this assumption is as follows. We assume that our oppo-
nent is likely to accept any offer that it has previously made, if we were to propose that
offer again (since we know that any such offer gives a utility to the opponent which is
high enough, otherwise it would not have proposed it initially). Due to this assumption,
we record, after each offer, the current time, and the highest utility for our opponent
that has been observed until that point in the negotiation. The effect of this is that, if
the opponent makes an offer that is worse than an offer we have received before, this will
be viewed as a lack of concession, rather than an attempt by the opponent to decrease
the utility it offers to us.
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RegressionRequired: Since the least squares regression can be performed in con-
stant time, and it is also a fast approach, it is able to be repeated frequently. Therefore,
we repeat the regression each time we receive a new observation.
PerformRegression: In order to approximate the opponent’s concession at any fu-
ture point in time during the game, we use least squares regression and in doing so
assume that the observed points will roughly fit to a curve which is non-decreasing (due
to the assumption that we introduced as part of the RecordOffer function), passes
through the point (0, Up(oq,0)) (representing the initial offer made by the opponent),
and does not exceed Up(t) = 1 in the range t ∈ [0, 1] (since, according to Definition 3.1,
utility must be in the range [0, 1]). Furthermore, due to the approximate concavity of
the Pareto frontier in negotiations where additive utility functions are used (as in most
of the scenarios we consider), we expect the utility offered to increase more rapidly to-
wards the start of the negotiation. Therefore, we choose the power law curve, which
meets many of these requirements. Formally:
Up,opp(t) = Up(oq,0) + e
a · tb (3.6)
where Up(oq,0) is the utility, to our agent, p, of the offer made by the opponent, q, at
time 0. The constants a and b are to be found by our regression approach, as discussed
below.
In order to prevent the function from exceeding U(t) = 1 in the range t ∈ [0, 1] (which
would be unrealistic, since the utility cannot exceed 1), we use a simple heuristic to
help to improve the prediction. Specifically, for each observation, we add an additional
point at (1, 0.95). The utility value (0.95) is close to, but below 1, in order to reduce
the likelihood that the function will exceed 1.
A common approach for finding the constants a and b (in Equation 3.6), which we use
as part of our strategy, is the least-squares curve fitting algorithm. The aim of this
algorithm is to minimise the sum of the squared offsets between the data points and the
fitted curve. In more detail, we find the coefficients a and b as follows (based on the
equations in Weisstein (1999)):
b =
n ·∑ni=1 (ln(ti) · ln(Ui − U(oq,0)))−∑ni=1 (ln(ti)) ·∑ni=1 (ln(Ui − U(oq,0)))
n ·∑ni=1 (ln(ti)2)−∑ni=1 (ln(ti))2
(3.7)
a =
∑n
i=1
(
ln(Ui − u0)
)− b ·∑ni=1 (ln(ti))
n
(3.8)
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Figure 3.2: Estimated opponent concession. The points represent the best offers made
by the opponent at that point in the negotiation, and the additional fitting points at
[1, 0.95]. The curve is fitted through those points by minimising the sum of the squared
offsets (offsets are shown as vertical lines).
where n is the number of observations of the opponent’s offers, with Ui and ti being
the utility (to our agent) and time of the offer, respectively. Furthermore, U(oq,0) is the
utility of the offer received at time 0.
As an example, Figure 3.2 shows a number of observed points, and in addition shows the
fitted curve (in the form of Equation 3.6), with a and b being found by Equations 3.7
and 3.8 respectively.
Once the regression coefficients, a and b, have been found, we can use Equation 3.6 to
estimate the utility of the opponent’s offers at any time during the negotiation session.
We then have an approximation of our opponent’s concession in terms of our own utility
and can use this information to set our own rate of concession as a best response to this
approximation.
We perform this by firstly applying our discounting function (Equation 3.5) to our model
of the opponent’s concession function (Equation 3.6), to create a function which gives
us the discounted utility that we can expect from our opponent’s offers at any point in
the negotiation session. The discounted utility function is given by:
EUrec(t) = D (Up,opp(t), t) (3.9)
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GetTarget: In order to set our aspiration level as a best response to our opponent’s
concession, our aim is to obtain the highest discounted utility offered by the opponent
(in terms of our utility). To do this, we find the maximum on the discounted opponent
concession curve (given by Equation 3.9) within the time period when an agreement can
be reached. By this, we mean that we ignore the parts of the curve that represent times
in the past, or times which are beyond the negotiation deadline. Therefore, the next
step is to solve:
t∗ = arg max
tc≤t≤1
EUrec(t) (3.10)
where tc is the current time.
By solving Equation 3.10, our agent has identified the time t∗ at which the discounted
utility to our agent of our opponent’s offers is likely to be maximised. The aspiration
level, u∗ at that time that matches the estimated utility of the opponent’s offer (without
any discounting) can then be found as follows:
u∗ = Up,opp(t∗) (3.11)
We now have a point in time, t∗, at which we expect to reach agreement, and an
aspiration level, u∗, that we should use at that time. Our strategy does not simply delay
until t∗ before conceding. Instead, it uses the intervening time to try and get an even
better offer by setting the utility level above u∗, and then conceding towards u∗. Our
approach to this is to use a function which passes through [0, 1] (since the value of our
offer at time 0 is 1), and passes through the solution to Equation 3.10 (at [t∗, u∗]). For
an agent which aims to beat its opponent (by reaching an agreement in which it achieves
a higher utility than the opponent), it is important not to reach an agreement with a low
utility, as discussed in Section 2.1.9. In an attempt to avoid such agreements, we set a
lower limit to the concession function, which we refer to as our reservation utility, Umin.
We discuss how we set Umin in Section 3.6. Furthermore, the function should be non-
increasing. Consequently, we use Faratin et al.’s time dependent concession function,
which is a common approach (see Section 2.3.2.1) to finding a target utility, uτ at time
tc, defined formally as:
uτ = 1− (1− Umin) · t1/βc (3.12)
where Umin is our reservation utility and β is the concession parameter which we choose
such that the concession curve meets these constraints. Formally, β is calculated as
follows:
β =
log(t∗)
log
(
1− u∗
1− Umin
) (3.13)
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Figure 3.3: Example of setting our concession rate. The crosses represent the best
offers made by the opponent. The dashed blue line shows the estimated future con-
cession of the opponent (undiscounted). The dot-dashed green line shows the future
discounted concession. The solid red curve is our concession curve.
Figure 3.3 shows a graphical representation of this approach. The crosses represent the
best offers made by the opponent. The dashed line is a curve that is fitted through
those points in order to estimate the future concession of the opponent. By applying
time discounting, the dot-dashed line is produced. The maximum on the dot-dashed line
is indicated by the vertical line, which represents the time, t∗ at which the maximum
expected discounted utility of the opponent’s offers is expected to be reached. The
horizontal line represents the utility, u∗, we expect from the opponent’s offers at that
time. The solid curve is then our curve, which passes through [t∗, u∗].
Since we repeat this process following each offer, the value of β changes over time, unlike
in Faratin et al.’s work where β is a fixed value. However, a possible disadvantage of
this approach is that, at the beginning of the session, the curve fitting is performed
through a small number of points, and therefore the curve may not accurately reflect
the future concession of the opponent. If our agent learns a curve that is inaccurate, it
may set its concession parameter to be too extreme, resulting in either very concessive
or very tough behaviour. There are two ways in which we limit this problem. We use
β′ to denote the actual concession parameter that we use in selecting our target, uτ .
Firstly, we set upper and lower bounds on our actual concession parameter (β′) so that
the agent does not use a concession strategy that is too extreme, either by conceding
too quickly at the beginning of the session, therefore reaching agreement at a low utility
level, or by playing too tough and therefore conceding too late. Secondly, at the start
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of the game (0 ≤ tc < 0.1), whilst the number of observed offers is low, we use linear
concession. Following this (0.1 ≤ tc < 0.2) we gradually increase the effect of our learnt
β′, and beyond this time (0.2 ≤ tc < 1), we use the learnt value entirely. By combining
these two adjustments, our time dependent concession function becomes:
β′ = max (βmin,min (βmax, β)) (3.14)
uτ = U0 − (Umin − U0) ·

tc if 0 ≤ tc < 0.1(
tc(tc − 0.1) + t1/β
′
c (0.2− tc)
0.1
)
if 0.1 ≤ tc < 0.2
t
1/β′
c otherwise
(3.15)
where tc is the current time, βmin is the minimum value for β
′ and βmax is the maximum
value for β′. In our agent, we set βmin = 0.01 and βmax = 2.0. The choice of these
particular values were somewhat arbitrary, although we wanted to ensure that they
were far enough apart to allow our strategy to be reasonably flexible, whilst avoiding the
extreme behaviour discussed above. We did not attempt to optimise these parameters.
3.2.2 Using Gaussian Process Regression
In this section, we describe a more sophisticated concession process, which uses Gaussian
process regression to estimate the future concession of our opponent. We use this regres-
sion technique as it provides both a prediction (of the opponent’s future behaviour) and
a measure of the level of confidence in that prediction. Our strategy uses this confidence
measure in calculating the expected utility of future offers from the opponent, and of the
offers made by our agent. If the confidence is low, it may be necessary for our strategy to
concede more in order for its offers to have a reasonably high probability of acceptance.
Again, we consider this approach in terms of the functions used in Algorithm 2.
RecordOffer: As input to the Gaussian process, we use the maximum value offered
by the opponent in a particular time window of duration twindow, and the time of that
window. The reason for using this windowed approach is twofold. Firstly, it reduces the
effect of noise on the Gaussian process. Since we measure the utility of the opponent’s
offers in terms of our agent’s utility function, it is possible that this value may vary
significantly in a given window. This is due to the offers consisting of multiple issues,
with the negotiation partners having different utility functions. In such an environment,
it is possible that a small change in utility for the opponent can be observed as a large
change by our agent. We use the maximum value in each time window, rather than
the average, as the maximum represents the best offer that we have observed, and can
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therefore expect to reach agreement at. Secondly, it reduces the amount of input data
for the Gaussian process. If all of the observed offers were used, there could be thousands
of data points, which could significantly slow down the regression process and therefore
delay the negotiation.
RegressionRequired: Since the input to the regression only changes at the end of
each time window, there is no benefit to repeating the regression within a single time
window. Therefore, using this strategy, the regression is only performed if the current
time window is different to that when the previous regression was performed.
PerformRegression: Our agent uses a Mate´rn covariance function and a linear mean
function (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006). The Mate´rn covariance function is a station-
ary function. That is, it is based only on the distance between two points. Furthermore
it is a decreasing function, such that the covariance between two points decreases as the
distance between them increases. Given that we have little other information about the
expected behaviour of the opponent, we consider the Mate´rn covariance function to be
the most appropriate for our work.1 We selected a linear mean function as we expect the
offers of the opponent to increase over time. Whilst this increase may be non-linear, the
linear mean is a simple approximation, which is much more appropriate than a constant
mean. Furthermore, by using a Mate´rn covariance function and a linear mean function,
the regression is fast enough to be computed in real time during the negotiation.
The output of the Gaussian process is a Gaussian probability density function, for each
time t, of the form:
f(u;µt, σt) =
1√
2piσ2t
e
−
u− µt
2σ2t (3.16)
where µt and σt are the mean and standard deviation, respectively. The mean, µt, gives
an indication of the expected value for u at time t, whilst the standard deviation, σt, is
an indication of how accurate the prediction of µt is likely to be.
We note that alternative regression techniques can be used in place of a Gaussian process,
such as Bayesian linear regression, providing their output contains both mean and stan-
dard deviation measures. However, in this work, we have only evaluated our approach
using a Gaussian process.
Figure 3.4 shows an example of the input to and output from the Gaussian process
performed at time tc = 0.25 during a negotiation with Agent K in the Itex vs Cypress
scenario (see Section 4.3 for more regarding the scenarios and opponents).
1Alternative stationary covariance functions include the exponential and squared exponential covari-
ance functions, both of which are special cases of the Mate´rn covariance function.
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Figure 3.4: Demonstration of the Gaussian process used in a negotiation with Agent
K in the Itex vs Cypress scenario (taken from ANAC2010, see Section 4.3 for further
details), at time tc = 0.25. The plus signs are the input data, based on the observed
offers. The crosses are based on future offers. The mean of the Gaussian output is
shown as a solid line, with the shaded area representing the 95% confidence interval.
As given by Definition 3.1, we assume that the utility of the opponent’s offers must lie
in the range [0, 1]. Therefore, we adjust the output of the Gaussian process, to create a
truncated normal distribution, constrained to fit in the utility range [0, 1], as follows:
p[0,1](u;µt, σt) =
p(u;µt, σt)
P (1;µt, σt)− P (0;µt, σt) (3.17)
where the mean, µt, and variance, σt, are those given by the Gaussian process, p(u;µt, σt)
is as given in Equation 3.16 and P (u;µt, σt) is the cumulative distribution for p(u;µt, σt).
That is:
P (u;µt, σt) =
∫ u
0
p(x;µt, σt)dx (3.18)
Based on the prediction of the opponent’s future concession which was generated using
the regression technique, our strategy then aims to set its concession by optimising the
expected utility given that prediction.
GetTarget: Having introduced our use of Gaussian processes in predicting the future
concession of the opponent, we now discuss the main contribution of this work to the
literature, which is to show how the output of a Gaussian process can be used in setting
the concession rate. Specifically, our approach is the first practical concession strategy
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for multi-issue negotiation with real-time constraints to use both the mean, µ, and
standard deviation, σ, output by the Gaussian process in setting an optimal concession
rate. The aim of this stage of our strategy is to calculate the best time, t∗, and utility
value, u∗, at which to reach agreement. To reduce the complexity of this part of the
problem, we use a heuristic which first finds t∗ and then uses it to calculate u∗. We
therefore consider the best time, t∗, to be the point in future time (t ∈ [tc, 1]) at which
the expected utility of the opponent’s offers is maximised, using:
t∗ = arg max
t∈[tc,1]
EUrec(t) (3.19)
where tc is the current time and EUrec(t) is the expected utility, adjusted by the agent’s
spitefulness (which we introduced in Section 2.1.9) and discounting, of reaching an agree-
ment at time t, given by:
EUrec(t) =
∫ 1
0
p[0,1](u;µt, σt)D (S(u), t) du (3.20)
where D(·, ·) is the discounting function, given by Equation 3.5, S(·) is the spitefulness
function (which we will discuss in Section 3.5), and p[0,1](·) is the probability distribution
over the values of u, as determined by our regression process.
Having selected the time, t∗, at which the expected utility of the opponent’s offers is
maximised, our agent needs to choose a utility, u∗, to offer at that time. The approach
that our strategy takes here is to maximise the expected utility of making an offer of
utility u. We assume that an offer of utility u will be accepted at time t∗ if u ≤ ut∗ . Since
we have a probability distribution over ut∗ , we can calculate the probability that u ≤ ut∗
using the truncated cumulative distribution P[0,1](u;µt, σt). Therefore, the utility, u
∗,
which should be offered at time t∗, is given by:
u∗ = arg max
u∈[0,1]
P[0,1](u;µt∗ , σt∗)D (S(u), t
∗) (3.21)
whereD(·, ·) and S(·) are as before, and P[0,1](·) is the cumulative distribution for p[0,1](·).
Finally, having determined u∗ as the utility to offer at time t∗, our agent needs to choose
a utility to offer at the current time, tc. The approach used here is the same as in
Section 3.2.1 (Equations 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15).
Having shown our concession strategy, which considers the opponent’s concession, the
discounting factor, the deadline and our reservation utility, we now discuss the other
major aspect to our agent, which is the strategy it uses for choosing the value of each
individual issue.
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Figure 3.5: Outcome space for an example scenario. The set of offers which give
agent q a utility of 0.8± 0.025 are displayed in black. The Pareto frontier is displayed
as a solid line, and the Pareto-efficient offer with a utility to agent q of 0.78 is marked
with a cross.
3.3 Negotiating over Multiple Issues
In the previous section we showed how our agent can choose its aspiration level at any
point during the negotiation session. However, in a multi-issue negotiation, there are
likely to be a number of different offers at any given utility level. Our agent is indifferent
between this set of offers, since they all result in the same utility from its perspective.
However, the opponent is unlikely to be indifferent between the offers, since its utility
function is likely to be different to ours. Our aim and basis of our negotiation strategy
is to select the offer (from the set of offers over which our agent is indifferent) which
maximises the utility of the opponent. The reason for doing so is that the opponent
is more likely to accept offers with a higher utility. In addition, from a performance
perspective, such outcomes are closer to Pareto-efficient. To illustrate, Figure 3.5 shows
an outcome space in grey, with the set of offers with a utility for our agent of 0.8 displayed
in black. The Pareto frontier is displayed as a solid line, and the Pareto-efficient offer
with a utility to our agent of 0.8 is marked with a cross.
In the remainder of this section, we present our approach to selecting an offer at a given
utility level. Firstly, we discuss the basic random selection approach (Section 3.3.1),
before presenting an additional technique which can be used in conjunction with this
approach in order to enhance the opportunity for an agreement (Section 3.3.2).
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3.3.1 Random Selection
With software agents (which have fast reaction times in the order of milliseconds), under
real-time constraints, the goal is to reach an agreement within a short time period, but
not necessarily to limit the number of offers made. Therefore, if our agent can generate
an offer quickly (even if it does so at random), it can explore more of the outcome space
in the available time. A fast method for selecting a package is to do so at random.
Therefore, we begin by considering such an approach.
Ideally, the aim of our random selection strategy (and the other selection strategies
we discuss in this Section) is to select an offer with utility uτ . However, it may be
difficult, or in a discrete domain, impossible to find such an offer. Consequently, our
random selection strategy chooses an offer which has a utility close to the target, uτ ,
by generating a random offer with a utility in the range [uτ − 0.025, uτ + 0.025]. If
an offer cannot be found within this range, the range is expanded, until a solution is
found. To avoid selecting an offer that is lower than our initial lower limit where there
are potential offers that lie above our initial upper limit, the search range is firstly
incrementally expanded upwards, continuing to exclude offers with utilities lower than
uτ − 0.025. If an offer still cannot be found once the upper search limit has reached 1,
the range is then incrementally expanded downwards. While this approach to selecting
an offer is a simple one it has produced very good results. In particular, when combined
with a good regression method, the results are often better than for more advanced
approaches, as we will show in Chapter 4. Furthermore, random selection is a very good
benchmark strategy, which can be used to compare against more advanced strategies.2
3.3.2 Re-proposal of Best Offer
Using the random approach that we have just introduced, our strategy can propose a
large number of offers in a limited time period. However, in certain circumstances, there
may be an easily identified offer at a given utility level which is expected to be accepted
by the opponent. Therefore we now discuss an additional feature that can be used in
conjunction with this approach in order to improve the likelihood that our offers are
accepted, without reducing our aspiration level.
This feature works as follows. If the aspiration level, uτ (as determined by one of
the strategies introduced in Section 3.2) drops below the highest utility offered by the
opponent so far during the negotiation, instead of proposing a random offer according
2A variant of this approach is weighted random selection, in which a range of possible offers are
generated, and evaluated according to an estimate of the opponent’s utility function. An offer is then
selected at random from this set, weighted by this estimate.
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to the strategy discussed earlier in the section, we propose the best offer (according to
our utility) that we have received from the opponent. The reason for proposing this
offer is as follows. Its utility is at least uτ , so from our agent’s perspective, it is no
worse than any other offer with utility uτ . If the opponent is using a non-increasing
time-dependent concession function (such as the one we introduce in Equation 3.12),
then the offer it proposed at time t will be accepted at any later time, t′ > t. Therefore,
assuming that the opponent is using such a concession function, we can be sure that the
offer will be accepted, whereas any other offer with utility uτ may not be. If the offer is
not accepted, we continue to make offers according to the approaches introduced earlier
in this section, (until the best offer has changed, when we will again consider proposing
it using this feature).
3.4 Handling Non-Zero Utility of Conflict
In negotiations where the utility of conflict is non-zero, it is necessary to consider the
possibility that the conflict outcome may be more desirable than some agreements. A
simple approach to address such situations is to avoid making or accepting offers which
have a utility lower than the utility of conflict. However, in a negotiation where time
discounting is also present, such an approach may not be sufficient. In more detail, time
discounting is applied according to the time at which the outcome (either agreement or
conflict) is reached. Therefore, there may be a benefit to ending a negotiation early, in
order to avoid the discounting factor having a significant effect.
The approach taken by our strategy is to compare the value of conflict (uα) at the
current time (tc), with the value of the best offer (u
∗) expected to be available in the
future, at that time (t∗). If uα · δtc > u∗ · δt∗ , the agent will terminate the negotiation
(obtaining a utility of uα · δtc), otherwise, negotiations will continue.
In scenarios where there is no discounting (δ = 1) or where the utility of conflict is zero
(uα), the value of conflict at the deadline is equal to the value of conflict at any other
time during the negotiation. Therefore, in such scenarios, there is no benefit to breaking
off a negotiation prior to the deadline (note that if no agreement is reached by that time,
the default outcome is conflict).
3.5 Spitefulness
In some settings, such as in a tournament, the goal may not be for an agent to maximise
its own utility but, rather, to beat any opponents. That is, to obtain a utility higher than
Chapter 3 Design of One-to-One Negotiation Agents 65
the opponent’s. In such a setting, the agent can no longer take a purely self-interested
approach, as it may be able to benefit from harming the performance of its opponent.
We refer to such behaviour as spitefulness, and we now discuss the spitefulness function,
S(u), in more detail. The aim of the spitefulness function is to encourage our strategy
to reach agreements in which our player, p, achieves a higher score than that of its
opponent, q.
We define a generic spitefulness function of the form
S(up, uq) = s+ (1− s) · up − s · uq (3.22)
where up and uq are the utilities of our player and its opponent, and 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 is
the spitefulness parameter. However, since the utility, uq, of our opponent cannot be
observed, we require a spitefulness function which does not depend on it.
To generate such a spitefulness function, we assume that an increase in our utility, up, is
likely to lead to a decrease in our opponent’s utility, uq. In a multi-issue negotiation with
an additive utility function (as in the negotiations we consider), the Pareto frontier is
convex. As a result, with the assumption that the offers being made are Pareto efficient,
a small decrease in up, for high values of up, results in a large increase in uq. At lower
values of up, a small decrease in Up has little effect on uq. We can therefore assume
that, at high values of up, the adjusted utility for a spiteful strategy should be higher,
but change more rapidly than for low values of up.
In order to estimate uq given up, we assume that the Pareto frontier can be approximated
by a curve, of the form:
ukp + u
k
q = 1 (3.23)
where k ≥ 1 is the competitiveness coefficient.
In order to estimate k, we first assume that the opponent concedes at the same rate as
our strategy. Under this assumption, the opponent’s utility, uq, of the offer made by the
opponent at a given time is equal to our utility, up, of the offer our strategy makes at
the same time. We then find the minimum value that k can take, such that all offers
made so far lie beneath the approximated Pareto frontier.
If we then consider the effect of concession, assuming that all offers made are Pareto
efficient, we find the spitefulness function, S(·) to be given by:
S(up) = s+ (1− s) · up − s · (1− ukp)1/k (3.24)
where k ≥ 1 is the competitiveness coefficient and 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 is the spitefulness parame-
ter.
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A spite level of zero (s = 0) represents non-spiteful behaviour, that is, the agent is only
interested in maximising its utility (and in this case, S(up) = up). In contrast, for spite
levels greater than zero (s > 0), the agent regards lower utility agreements with much
lower value than their true utility.
When combined with our Gaussian process regression, spitefulness has an important
effect on our strategy’s calculation of expected utility. In more detail, the effect of
the standard deviation, σt (in Equation 3.20) on a spiteful agent is as follows. If,
at two points in time, t1 and t2, the mean values are the same (µt1 = µt2), but the
standard deviation differs such that σt1 < σt2 , then a spiteful agent will consider the
expectation at time t2 to be greater than at time t1. That is, the spiteful agent is
prepared to wait for the less certain offer at time t2, as there is a higher chance that the
utility may significantly differ from the value of µt2 , than it would for µt1 . Of course,
that difference may be positive or negative, but, for a spiteful agent (where s > 0),
S(µ+x) +S(µ−x) > S(µ) +S(µ) (where x > 0 is the difference from the mean, µ). In
contrast, non-spiteful agents are indifferent between the two solutions (since, if s = 0,
S(µ+ x) + S(µ− x) = S(µ) + S(µ)).
3.6 Reservation Utility
In order to prevent the strategy from conceding too much, perhaps against a non-
concessive opponent, a reservation utility can be used. The reservation utility is the
minimum utility level that our strategy will concede to. Since our utility function is
normalised such that all outcomes have a utility in the range [0, 1], a simple approach
is to use a static reservation utility, with a value of Umin = 0.5.
A more advanced approach is to determine the reservation value as a function of the
scenario. The aim is to choose a value which is large enough that it reduces the risk of
our agent being exploited by a tough, non-concessive opponent, but at the same time is
small enough that it allows agreements to be reached. Our approach is to choose a value,
given the set of outcomes, O and our utility function Up. If we assume that opponent
q’s preferences are strictly opposed to those of our agent, p (that is, ∀o, o′ ∈ O,Up(o) >
Up(o
′)⇔ Uq(o) ≤ Uq(o′)) and that the opponent chooses its reservation value using the
same approach, then the highest reservation value which we can choose is equal to the
median value of Up(o). If either party chooses a higher value, it is possible that there
are no outcomes that are mutually acceptable.
In order to determine this median value, it is first necessary to calculate Up(o) for all
outcomes, o ∈ O. In a scenario with a large outcome space, this may require significant
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time and memory. Therefore, in practice we use an approximation of the median, by
taking a random sample of Up(o), gathering the utilities of as many outcomes as possible
within a short time period (2 seconds in our case) and taking the median of this value.
3.7 Our One-to-One Negotiation Agents
Having described the different parts of our strategies, we now introduce the agents that
we have developed, which use various combinations of these strategies. All of our agents
are implemented using the Java programming language, under the framework provided
by the Genius environment (introduced in Section 2.2.1). Through the use of a common
framework, our agents can be compared with each other and, furthermore, with other
agents developed under the same framework. We do this in the evaluations we carried
out as part of Chapter 4. Where appropriate, we have used library implementations of
common functions.
3.7.1 IAMhaggler2010
IAMhaggler2010 was one of our early agents, developed for the first Automated Nego-
tiating Agents Competition (ANAC 2010). (Note that it was initially submitted under
the name ‘IAMhaggler’.) It uses the least squares regression approach (described in
Section 3.2.1), with a fixed reservation utility, Umin = 0.5, combined with the Pareto-
search method. (The Pareto-search method is designed for negotiation over continuous
issues. We do not consider such issues in this thesis, but for completeness, the method
is described in Appendix B.) Furthermore, it uses the first approach to re-proposing the
opponent’s best offer (described in Section 3.3.2).
3.7.2 IAMhaggler2011
Following ANAC 2010, we found that by using the random selection method (described
in Section 3.3.1), our agent could make thousands of offers during a 3 minute negoti-
ation, and was therefore able to search a large outcome space and achieve high utility
agreements, without modelling the opponent’s preferences. We therefore chose to fo-
cus on improving our approach to learning the opponent’s concession, as this aspect
showed more scope for improvement. In doing so, IAMhaggler2011 was developed and
submitted to the second Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC 2011). It
uses the Gaussian process regression approach (described in 3.2.2), with a fixed reser-
vation utility, Umin = 0.5, combined with the random selection method (described in
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Section 3.3.1). The strategy’s behaviour was adjusted using a spitefulness function,
which was less sophisticated than the one described in Section 3.5. In more detail, the
function S(u) = us was used, with s = 1 (non-spiteful) in the qualifying round of the
competition, and s = 3 (spiteful) for the final round.3 Furthermore, it uses the second
approach to re-proposing the opponent’s best offer (described in Section 3.3.2).
This agent makes use of Commons-Math: The Apache Commons Mathematics Library4,
JAMA, A Java Matrix Package5 and the Gaussian Process Regression for Java library6.
3.7.3 IAMhaggler2012
To prepare for ANAC 2012, IAMhaggler2011 was developed further into IAMhaggler2012.
ANAC 2012 introduced non-zero utility of conflict, so in order to handle this, we used
the approach described in Section 3.4. Furthermore, the approach to spitefulness was
improved, using the approach described in Section 3.5. Following the competition, we
made some further improvements, and we now set our reservation utility, Umin depending
on the scenario, using the approach described in Section 3.6.
3.7.4 IAMcrazyHaggler
Whilst considering the design of agents which adapt to their opponent’s behaviour (such
as the IAMhaggler agents), we decided to investigate whether a simple but tough strat-
egy was capable of achieving high utility agreements against agents which are highly
adaptive to the behaviour of their opponents. Such a strategy can be considered to be
an interesting benchmark strategy against more complex opponents. Specifically, we
developed the IAMcrazyHaggler series of agents, which use a very simple strategy that
makes random offers which have a utility over a fixed offer threshold and accepts offers
made by the opponent if their utility is greater than a further fixed acceptance threshold.
The different versions of IAMcrazyHaggler differ only in their thresholds, as we will now
discuss:
3Note that spitefulness was referred to as risk aversion in the resulting publication, which appears in
the Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
4http://commons.apache.org/math/
5http://math.nist.gov/javanumerics/jama/
6https://forge.ecs.soton.ac.uk/projects/gp4j/
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IAMcrazyHaggler2010 Our first version, now known as IAMcrazyHaggler20107,
uses a very high offer threshold (Up(op,t) > 0.95) and a slightly lower acceptance thresh-
old (Up(oq,t) > 0.90). If the scenario contains a discounting factor, the offer and ac-
ceptance thresholds are each reduced by 0.05 in an attempt to reach agreement more
quickly, and therefore reduce the loss due to discounting.
IAMcrazyHaggler2011 We found that, at ANAC 2010, IAMcrazyHaggler2010 failed
to reach agreement in many negotiation sessions, due to its extremely high thresh-
old. Therefore, for ANAC 2011 we developed IAMcrazyHaggler2011. It works in the
same way as IAMcrazyHaggler2010, but with much lower thresholds (Up(op,t) > 0.70,
Up(oq,t) > 0.65). Due to these lower thresholds, IAMcrazyHaggler2011 is able to propose
and accept offers from a much larger part of the outcome space. This should lead to
more agreements, although individually, they are likely to achieve a lower utility for the
agent. In contrast to IAMcrazyHaggler2010, this agent does not adjust its behaviour in
discounted scenarios, as its threshold is already rather low.
IAMcrazyHaggler2012 At ANAC 2011, IAMcrazyHaggler2011 reached agreement
in most negotiation sessions, due to it having a relatively low threshold. The scenarios
chosen for ANAC 2011 tended to be much less competitive than those included in ANAC
2010, in that it was often possible for agents to reach agreements which offered high
utility for both parties. As a result, IAMcrazyHaggler2011 reached agreements that were
considerably lower in value than the agreements formed by many of the more advanced
strategies. Therefore, for ANAC 2012, we created IAMcrazyHaggler2012 as a further
variant of the IAMcrazyHaggler series of agents, this time increasing the thresholds to
(Up(op,t) > 0.8, Up(oq,t) > 0.8).
As we will show in the evaluation of our one-to-one strategies (Chapter 4), the per-
formance of an agent with fixed thresholds is highly dependent on the value of those
thresholds.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have described the negotiating agents that we have designed. We
detailed the two key parts of our strategies: the processes that our agents use to set their
aspiration levels, and the ways in which they select an offer with a given utility. In doing
so, we have combined and extended several existing approaches from the literature, and
designed two new adaptive strategies.
7The agent was entered into ANAC 2010, under the name IAMcrazyHaggler.
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Specifically, we have contributed the following to the literature on automated negotia-
tion:
• We have developed a novel strategy, which uses both a Gaussian process prediction
and the certainty of that prediction, to calculate the concession an agent should
make over time. This strategy is able to negotiate directly with an unknown
opponent and uses a principled approach, by firstly predicting the opponent’s
future behaviour and then adapting to the agent’s offers in order to maximise the
expected utility of agreement. Furthermore, the proposed strategy is designed to
deal with real-time constraints in multi-issue negotiation where the issues have an
unknown ordering.
Furthermore, against the requirements set out in Section 1.2, we have designed six agents
which:
• work in a decentralised manner, communicating directly with the other negotiating
agents (Requirement 1),
• are able to negotiate in an environment without knowledge of the preferences or
behaviour of any other party (Requirement 3),
• have been designed to negotiate in domains with multiple issues (Requirement 4),
• are able to negotiate over discrete issues without a known, common ordering (Re-
quirement 5), and
• support real-time constraints (Requirement 6).
However, none of these strategies are designed to coordinate concurrent negotiation
with more than two parties (Requirement 8) and therefore they also do not consider
decommitment (Requirement 9). We consider this aspect in Chapter 5.
In the following chapter, we will evaluate the performance of our agents, checking them
against the remaining two requirements of efficiency (Requirement 2) and computational
tractability (Requirement 7).
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Algorithm 1 Overview of our general negotiation process, which is common to all of
our strategies. Let uα represent the utility of conflict and let tc represent the current
time.
while tc ∈ [0, 1] do
m⇐ ReceiveMessage()
if m is not an Offer then
return
end if
oopp ⇐ GetOffer(m)
uτ ⇐ SetAspirationLevel(oopp, tc)
uopp ⇐ GetUtility(oopp)
u1 ⇐ AdjustUtilityConflict(uα, tc)
u2 ⇐ AdjustUtilityPareto(uopp, tc)
u3 ⇐ AdjustUtilityPareto(uτ , tc)
if ConflictBest(u1) then
SendMessage(End)
return
else if u2 ≥ u3 then
SendMessage(Accept(oopp))
return
else
oown ⇐ GenerateOffer(uτ )
SendMessage(Offer(oown))
end if
end while
Algorithm 2 Overview of our function for setting the aspiration level, following an
offer, oopp, from the opponent, at time tc.
Function SetAspirationLevel(oopp, tc)
Require: oopp, tc
RecordOffer(oopp, tc)
if RegressionRequired(tc) then
PerformRegression()
end if
return GetTarget(tc)

Chapter 4
Evaluation of One-to-One
Negotiation Agents
This chapter evaluates the performance of our one-to-one negotiation agents, using
the techniques and against the performance criteria that we discussed in Section 2.2.
Throughout this chapter, we analyse the results of negotiations from a variety of scenar-
ios. Each scenario consists of a domain and, for each player, an associated preference
profile. The domain specifies the set of issues that are being negotiated over, and the
range of values that each issue can take, and therefore determines the set of outcomes
that are possible. The preference profiles define each agent’s utility function. Formal
definitions of domains and preference profiles can be found in Section 2.2.1.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We begin by introducing the sce-
narios that we use in our evaluation (Section 4.1) before finding a suitable spitefulness
parameter for use in tournament settings (Section 4.2). We then provide a summary
of the performance of the agents in the Automated Negotiating Agents Competitions
(Section 4.3), before analysing the performance of each of the agents in self play (Sec-
tion 4.4). Next, we carry out a more extensive evaluation of their performance in tourna-
ments (Section 4.5) and we also evaluate the tractability of our strategies by considering
the offer rates achieved by all of the strategies (Section 4.6). Subsequently, we consider
tournaments in which more than one player uses a particular strategy, by performing
an empirical game theoretic analysis of the results (Section 4.7). We conclude with a
summary of the chapter (Section 4.8).
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4.1 Evaluation Scenarios
In this evaluation, we use the scenarios of the most recent Automated Negotiating Agents
Competition (ANAC 2012). The scenarios used in ANAC 2012 came from three sources,
as follows. Each of the 17 participants of ANAC 2012 submitted a scenario. To this, the
organisers added the scenarios of the ANAC 2011 final (excluding any that had been
resubmitted by the 2012 participants) and the scenarios of ANAC 2010 (excluding any
that had been resubmitted by the 2011 or 2012 participants) to produce a total of 24
scenarios. Appendix A provides full details of the utility functions used, along with plots
of the outcome spaces, for each of these scenarios.
In order to evaluate the performance of the agents in different types of scenario, we clas-
sify them according to a number of characteristics. Firstly, they are classified according
to the size of the outcome space of their domain, |O|. We partition the scenarios into
three size classes, with an equal number of scenarios in each class, as follows: small
(|O| < 200), medium (200 ≤ |O| < 3500) and large (3500 ≤ |O|).
Secondly, they are classified according to their competitiveness, C(O), defined as the
minimum distance from a point in the outcome space to the point which represents
complete satisfaction (that is, the point at which each agent achieves a utility of 1).1
We partition our scenarios into three competitiveness classes, with an equal number of
scenarios in each class, as follows: low (C(O) ≤ 0.22), medium (0.22 < C(O) ≤ 0.30),
high (0.30 < C(O)).
The domain sizes and competitiveness of the scenarios can be seen in Table 4.1. The
scenario with the smallest domain, NiceOrDie, has a single issue with just 3 possible
outcomes, whereas the one with the largest, Energy, has 8 issues and a total of 390625
possible outcomes. The least competitive scenario, ADG, has a competitive value of
0.092, whereas the most competitive, NiceOrDie, has a competitiveness value of 0.840.
The 2012 edition of the competition was the first to include non-zero utilities of conflict.
In order to evaluate the agents using a range of discounting factors and utilities of
conflict, we take the following approach: Three discounting factor parameters (δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}) and three utility of conflict parameters (uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}) are
chosen. Each of the 24 scenarios are tested with each value of δ and uα. Therefore, once
1Note that the definition of competitiveness introduced here differs from that used in the context of
auctions. In an auction, if there are more agents competing for the same resources, the competitiveness
increases (typically leading to higher prices). In contrast, this thesis considers competitiveness between
each pair of agents, which results from incompatibilities between their respective preferences. More
compatible preference profiles enable more satisfying (i.e. closer to a utility of 1 for both agents)
outcomes, and therefore a less competitive scenario.
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Name Year Domain Size Size Class
Competitiveness
Value Class
NiceOrDie 2011 3 small 0.840 high
Fifty fifty 2012 11 small 0.707 high
Laptop 2011 27 small 0.160 low
Flight Booking 2012 36 small 0.281 medium
Rental House 2012 60 small 0.327 high
Barter 2012 80 small 0.492 high
Outfit 2012 128 small 0.198 low
Itex vs Cypress 2010 180 small 0.431 high
Housekeeping 2012 384 medium 0.272 medium
IS BT Acquisition 2012 384 medium 0.117 low
Airport Site Selection 2012 420 medium 0.285 medium
England vs Zimbabwe 2012 576 medium 0.272 medium
Barbecue 2012 1440 medium 0.238 medium
Grocery 2011 1600 medium 0.191 low
Phone 2012 1600 medium 0.188 low
Amsterdam Party 2011 3024 medium 0.223 medium
Fitness 2012 3520 large 0.275 medium
Camera 2012 3600 large 0.218 low
Music Collection 2012 4320 large 0.150 low
ADG 2011 15625 large 0.092 low
Energy (small) 2012 15625 large 0.430 high
Supermarket 2012 98784 large 0.347 high
Travel 2010 188160 large 0.230 medium
Energy 2012 390625 large 0.525 high
Table 4.1: Scenario characteristics.
these parameters were considered to be part of the scenario, a total of 3 ∗ 3 ∗ 24 = 216
scenarios are used.
4.2 Spitefulness
We begin by carrying out experiments to determine the most suitable value for the
spitefulness parameter, s. For these experiments, in order to avoid tuning our strategy
to the scenarios used in the rest of our evaluation (presented in Section 4.1) we used a
different set of scenarios. As opponents, we used the agents from ANAC 2012.
Specifically, we created a set of variants of the IAMhaggler2012 agent, each with a
different value of s ∈ {0, 18 , 17 , 16 , 15 , 14 , 13}. For each of these variants, we ran negotiations
against all 7 opponents, in all scenarios and we calculated the tournament scores for
each agent.
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Figure 4.1: Average utilities achieved in 8-player tournaments, for different spiteful-
ness values, s. Meta-Agent is omitted from this plot as its utility was considerably lower
than that of the other agents, but showed a similar, decreasing trend to those of the
opponents.
Figure 4.1 shows these tournament scores. The results reveal that, as s increases (and so
our agent becomes more spiteful), the average utility of each of the opponents decreases.
However, the average utility of our agent also decreases, and at a much greater rate.
This is because, by being more spiteful, our agent achieves better agreements, but less
often, and each time it fails to reach an agreement, a significant loss of utility is incurred
by both negotiating parties. Our agent can obviously only affect the utility achieved
in negotiations that it participates in. In any tournament, our agent is obviously able
to have a huge effect on its score, but in a tournament setting with n players, it only
participates in 1n−1 of the negotiations which affect any of its n − 1 opponents, and
therefore can only affect 1n−1 of any individual opponent’s score. Therefore, by taking a
more spiteful approach and failing to reach as many agreements, our agent significantly
decreases its score whilst having relatively little effect on each opponent.
To confirm this, we consider the smallest possible ‘tournament’, with just 2 players.
In such a tournament, our agent participates in all negotiations, and is therefore able
to equally affect its score and that of its opponent. We create an opponent which
represents all 7 ANAC 2012 opponents by averaging over the scores of all of those agents
in negotiations against IAMhaggler2012. Figure 4.2 shows the result in this setting. In
common with the larger tournament, we see the utilities of both agents being reduced
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Figure 4.2: Average utilities achieved in 2-player tournaments, for different spiteful-
ness values, s.
by more spiteful agents. However, in contrast, we see that, in this 2 player tournament,
the utility of our opponent decreases more rapidly than for our agent. Therefore in this
setting, a more spiteful approach is more desirable as we attempt to maximise our score
relative to that of the opponents.
If we consider the scenarios with slight discounting (δ = 0.75) and a small utility of
conflict (uα = 0.25), we see that altering the spitefulness parameter can affect whether
or not our utility exceeds that of the opponent. In particular, Figure 4.3 shows that if
s < 14 our agent is slightly beaten by its opponent, but for s >
1
4 , our agent slightly
beats its opponent.
These results show that, against a single opponent, it is effective to take a spiteful ap-
proach in order to beat that opponent. However, in a tournament with many opponents,
it is detrimental to use such an approach. Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter
(where we consider negotiation tournaments with many players), we use a non-spiteful
version of our agent (with s = 0).
4.3 Results of the Automated Negotiating Agents Compe-
titions
In this section, we briefly present the results of the 2010 (Section 4.3.1), 2011 (Sec-
tion 4.3.2) and 2012 (Section 4.3.3) editions of the Automated Negotiating Agents Com-
petition, which the agents we developed participated in.
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Figure 4.3: Average utilities achieved in 2-player tournaments (with δ = 0.75 and
uα = 0.25), for different spitefulness values, s.
4.3.1 ANAC 2010
The first Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC 2010) was held at the
9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS
2010, Toronto, Canada). The competition consisted of a tournament between 7 agents
from 5 institutions (as listed in Table 4.2). The strategy described in Section 3.7.1
was entered under the name ‘IAMhaggler’, whilst the IAMcrazyHaggler2010 strategy
described in Section 3.7.4 was entered under the name ‘IAMcrazyHaggler’.
During the competition, negotiation sessions were run using the Genius environment
(see Section 2.2.1). These sessions were run between all two-party combinations of the 7
agents, excluding self-play. Each pair of agents negotiated using each preference profile
in the scenario, resulting in a total of 42 sessions per scenario.
Agent Name(s) Affiliation
Agent K
Nagoya Institute of Technology, Japan
Nozomi
Yushu University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA
IAMhaggler
University of Southampton, UK
IAMcrazyHaggler
FSEGA Babes Bolyai University, Romania
AgentSmith Delft University of Technology, Netherlands
Table 4.2: Participants in the Automated Negotiating Agents Competition 2010.
Source: Baarslag et al. (2010)
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Rank Agent Itex - Cypress England - Zimbabwe Travel Mean
1 Agent K 0.901 0.712 0.685 0.766
2 Yushu 0.662 1.000 0.250 0.637
3 Nozomi 0.929 0.351 0.516 0.599
4 IAMhaggler 0.668 0.551 0.500 0.573
5 FSEGA 0.722 0.406 0.000 0.376
6 IAMcrazyHaggler 0.097 0.397 0.431 0.308
7 Agent Smith 0.069 0.053 0.000 0.041
Table 4.3: Scores achieved in the Automated Negotiating Agents Competition 2010.
Source: Baarslag et al. (2010)
Table 4.3 shows the scores achieved by each agent that participated in the competi-
tion. The winner was Agent K, developed at the Nagoya Institute of Technology, which
achieved an average score of 0.766. Our agent, IAMhaggler2010, performed fairly con-
sistently across the scenarios, finishing in third place in the England vs Zimbabwe and
Travel scenarios, and in fourth place in the Itex vs Cypress scenario. Overall, it finished
in 4th place. Despite the simplicity of our additional agent, IAMcrazyHaggler2010, it
outperformed some of the other agents, particularly in the larger two scenarios, where
it finished in 4th and 5th place.
4.3.2 ANAC 2011
A total of 18 agents, from 7 institutions were entered into the second Automated Ne-
gotiating Agents Competition (ANAC 2011), which was held at the 10th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011, Taipei, Tai-
wan). Due to the large number of participants, the competition consisted of a qualifying
round, and a final containing the top 8 agents from the qualifying round. Our agent,
IAMhaggler2011, successfully reached the final and went on to finish in third place. Our
additional agent, IAMcrazyHaggler2011 did not qualify for the final, but finished in 16th
place. The results of the final round are given in Table 4.4. It should be noted that
there is little difference amongst the results of the agents which finished in 4th, 5th and
6th places.
4.3.3 ANAC 2012
A total of 17 agents, from 8 institutions were entered into the third Automated Ne-
gotiating Agents Competition (ANAC 2012), which was held at the 11th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012, Valencia,
Spain). In common with ANAC 2011, due to the large number of participants, the com-
petition again consisted of a qualifying round, and a final containing the top 8 agents
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Rank Agent Name Affiliation Score
1 HardHeaded TU Delft, Netherlands 0.743
2 Gahboninho Bar-Ilan University, Israel 0.728
3 IAMhaggler2011 University of Southampton, UK 0.683
4 BRAMAgent Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel 0.675
5 AgentK Nagoya Institute of Technology, Japan 0.672
6 TheNegotiator Delft University of Technology, Netherlands 0.671
7 Nice Tit for Tat Agent Delft University of Technology, Netherlands 0.665
8 ValueModelAgent Bar-Ilan University, Israel 0.607
Table 4.4: Scores achieved in the final round of the Automated Negotiating Agents
Competition 2011.
Rank Agent Name Affiliation Score
1 CUHKAgent Chinese University of Hong Kong 0.626±0.001
2 AgentLG Bar-Ilan University, Israel 0.622±0.001
3-4 OMACagent Maastricht University, Netherlands 0.618±0.001
3-4 TheNegotiator Reloaded Delft University of Technology, Netherlands 0.617±0.001
5 BRAMAgent2 Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel 0.593±0.001
6 Meta-Agent Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel 0.586±0.001
7 IAMhaggler2012 University of Southampton, UK 0.535±0.000
8 AgentMR Nagoya Institute of Technology, Japan 0.328±0.001
Table 4.5: Scores achieved in the final round of the Automated Negotiating Agents
Competition 2012, including 95% confidence intervals.
from the qualifying round. Our agent, IAMhaggler20122, successfully reached the final
and went on to finish in seventh place. Our additional agent, IAMcrazyHaggler2012
also qualified for the final (in a lower position than IAMhaggler2012), but we chose to
withdraw it from the final. The results of the final round are given in Table 4.5. The
statistical significance of the results was calculated using Welch’s t-test (Welch, 1947)
to test for the null hypothesis, given the mean, variance and number of results in our
sample. Welch’s t-test is an extension of Student’s t-test (Student, 1908) for comparing
samples in which the variance may differ, as in the results we consider. Using this test, it
was found that the agents which finished in 3rd and 4th places had scores that were not
statistically significantly different from each other. Therefore both agents were awarded
a prize for finishing in joint third place. Differences between all other positions were
found to be statistically significant.
Having discussed the results of recent international negotiating agent competitions, our
evaluation now focuses on the results of our own experiments, firstly considering the
performance of agents in self play.
2In the competition, a preliminary version of IAMhaggler2012 was used, which did not set the reser-
vation value depending on the scenario, as described in Section 3.6.
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4.4 Self Play
Whilst our strategies are designed for negotiations against an unknown opponent, since
that opponent may be using a similar, or even the same strategy as our agent, it is
important that our strategy performs well even in self-play. Therefore, we begin our
evaluation by considering the performance of our strategy in negotiations where the
opponent uses the same strategy as our agent. In such a setting, it may be possible that
a ‘tough’ strategy, which does not concede at all, would fail to reach agreement with a
similar agent, even though it may perform well if enough of the other strategies concede
far enough to reach agreement with it. As an example, IAMcrazyHaggler2010 proposes
offers which have a utility greater than 0.95, and accepts those with a utility greater than
0.90. In many of the domains we consider, there are no outcomes that give one agent
a utility of above 0.95 while the other achieves more than 0.9. Consequently, in these
domains, IAMcrazyHaggler2010 will be unable to reach an agreement. By evaluating
the agents in self-play, we show the co-operativeness of various strategies.
For each agent, we run a single negotiation for each scenario and the mean score of the
two agents is then taken. This is repeated 3 times in order to increase the confidence
of the results. Table 4.6 shows these results, for all agents, averaged across all 216
scenarios. The 95% confidence intervals are also given.
Of all of the agents tested in this part of the evaluation, it was our agent, IAMhag-
gler2012 which achieved the highest score. Specifically, it reached a utility 87.0% of
the maximum possible.3 By analysing this further, we find that the raw utility (before
discounting) of the outcomes reached by IAMhaggler2012 was 94.4% of the maximum
possible. Only AgentLG performed significantly better under this measure, achieving
95.6% of the maximum possible. Not only does it reach highly efficient agreements, it
also does so in reasonable time. Specifically, the average time of agreement (or conflict)
of our agent was 0.50 (i.e. half way to the negotiation deadline). Compared to the
other agents, only the IAMcrazyHaggler2012 agents reached earlier agreements on av-
erage, with AgentLG’s average time of agreement being 0.76. Overall, in self-play, both
instances of IAMhaggler2012 are trying to concede as a best response to their oppo-
nent, and this feedback loop results in relatively fast concession which leads to an early
agreement which is also quite efficient.
In this evaluation, we included three variants of IAMcrazyHaggler2012, each with a
different threshold value, Umin ∈ {0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. The agent makes offers that lie above
its threshold value and accepts those that lie no lower than 2% below the threshold
3The maximum possible self-play utility is found by taking the average utility of the two parties in
the utilitarian solution to each scenario (i.e. the solution which maximises the sum of the utilities),
averaged over all scenarios. In the scenarios we consider, this value is 0.79.
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Agent Self-play Score % of maximum
Maximum 0 .793 ±0 .000 100 .0 ±0 .0
IAMhaggler2012 0.690 ±0.002 87.0 ±0.2
TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.656 ±0.010 82.7 ±1.2
Meta-Agent 0.649 ±0.012 81.8 ±1.5
IAMcrazyHaggler20120.7 0.645 ±0.013 81.3 ±1.6
AgentLG 0.618 ±0.002 77.8 ±0.2
CUHKAgent 0.603 ±0.009 76.0 ±1.1
OMACagent 0.575 ±0.006 72.4 ±0.7
BRAMAgent2 0.573 ±0.006 72.2 ±0.7
IAMcrazyHaggler20120.8 0.539 ±0.009 67.9 ±1.2
AgentMR 0.263 ±0.001 33.2 ±0.1
IAMcrazyHaggler20120.9 0.249 ±0.001 31.3 ±0.1
Table 4.6: Self-play scores, across all 216 scenarios, with 95% confidence intervals.
value. We found that its results varied considerably according to this parameter. With
a higher threshold, the agent is guaranteed to reach a high valued agreement, if such an
agreement is possible. In contrast, with a lower threshold, the agent is more likely to
reach an agreement, but potentially with lower value.
In more detail, of the 24 base scenarios (as listed in Table 4.1), only 2 of them have
possible outcomes which can be reached by a pair of IAMcrazyHaggler2012 agents with
Umin = 0.9. A further 11 have possible outcomes which can be reached if both agents
have Umin = 0.8, while a further 6 have possible outcomes which can be reached if both
agents have Umin = 0.7. The remaining 5 scenarios do not have outcomes which can
be reached by IAMcrazyHaggler2012 agents with thresholds of at least Umin = 0.7 This
is reflected in the results of IAMcrazyHaggler2012, with the 0.9, 0.8 and 0.7 variants
reaching agreement in 2, 13 and 19 scenarios, respectively.
All variants of IAMcrazyHaggler2012 are able to reach agreements very quickly, on
average, just 1.5% into the negotiation (within 2.7 seconds). A limitation of using such
a fixed strategy as the one used by IAMcrazyHaggler2012 is that its performance depends
highly on the competitiveness of the scenario. In a more competitive scenario, where
there is no outcome for which both agents can achieve a utility above the agent’s fixed
threshold, the self-play score is zero. In contrast, if the scenario is less competitive, the
agreements that are made may not be very efficient, since much of the outcome space
could be accessible above the thresholds of both agents.
One of the requirements of our work was to produce an agent that can perform well in
an environment where the behaviour of the opponent is unknown (Requirement 3). So
far, this evaluation has only considered negotiations in which the strategy used by the
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AgentLG 0.618 0.340 0.650 0.593 0.694 0.593 0.694 0.706
AgentMR 0.309 0.263 0.296 0.288 0.294 0.294 0.350 0.394
CUHKAgent 0.579 0.351 0.603 0.625 0.640 0.620 0.691 0.716
OMACagent 0.600 0.333 0.614 0.575 0.682 0.638 0.676 0.688
IAMhaggler2012 0.633 0.339 0.619 0.576 0.690 0.636 0.643 0.664
BRAMAgent2 0.609 0.345 0.606 0.527 0.646 0.573 0.640 0.657
Meta-Agent 0.601 0.341 0.530 0.539 0.685 0.614 0.649 0.662
TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.646 0.341 0.596 0.589 0.704 0.636 0.663 0.656
Table 4.7: Scores achieved in our experiments, averaged over all scenarios.
opponent is the same as the one used by our agent. Therefore, we now consider the
results of negotiations in which the strategies of the two players differ.
4.5 Extended Evaluation against other ANAC 2012 Agents
Our aim in this section is to evaluate the performance of our strategy against unknown
opponents in a range of scenarios. Specifically, the set of agents that we use in this
evaluation consists of the seven agents submitted by other institutions to ANAC 2012
(as listed in Table 4.5), plus the latest version of our IAMhaggler2012 agent (as described
in Section 3.7.3). The agents have been independently developed and represent the state-
of-the-art in practical strategies for automated negotiation in multi-issue scenarios. The
scenarios that we use are also taken from ANAC 2012, as listed in Table 4.1. These
scenarios vary considerably, in terms of size, competitiveness, discounting factor and
utility of conflict, ensuring that our analysis covers a wide variety of scenarios.
To measure the performance of the various strategies, we first carried out negotia-
tion sessions between all pairs of strategies, in each scenario, using the University of
Southampton’s ‘Iridis’ computing cluster. Each negotiation session ran on a single core
of a 6-core, 2.2 GHz processor, with 2 GB of RAM being allocated to the negotiation
session. Furthermore, in order to reduce the significance of any random behaviour, and
in doing so, create statistically significant results, we repeated each negotiation 3 times.
Therefore, in our experiments, each agent carried out a total of 24 negotiations per pref-
erence profile. To complete the experiment, with 8 agents and 216 scenarios, a total of
8 ∗ 8 ∗ 216 ∗ 3 = 41, 472 negotiation sessions were carried out. We present the score for
each pairing of agents, averaged across all scenarios, in Table 4.7.
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Rank Agent Score
1 AgentLG 0.610 ±0.000
2-3 OMACagent 0.605 ±0.000
2-3 CUHKAgent 0.603 ±0.002
4 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.597 ±0.002
5 IAMhaggler2012 0.587 ±0.001
6 BRAMAgent2 0.576 ±0.002
7 Meta-Agent 0.567 ±0.003
8 AgentMR 0.318 ±0.001
Table 4.8: Scores across all scenarios, with 95% confidence intervals.
We can use these results to analyse the performance between any pair of agents. We
can also generate tournament results (using the same approach as using the ANAC
competitions) with any subset of the agents, in any individual scenario or set of scenarios.
Specifically, in a tournament, all players negotiate with all other players. Therefore, the
tournament score for player p is given by:∑
q∈P,p6=q U(p, q)
|P | − 1 (4.1)
where U(p, q) is the score that player p achieves when negotiating with player q, and |P |
is the number of players.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the aggregated results of negotiation sessions
in each of the scenarios we introduced at the start of this chapter. We consider the results
from a range of different tournament settings to demonstrate the aggregated performance
of each agent against a range of state-of-the-art opponents.
4.5.1 Average Results
Table 4.8 shows the average scores achieved by each of the agents, averaged across
all 216 scenarios. This table shows that AgentLG achieved the highest score, with
IAMhaggler2012 finishing in 5th place. The scores of most of the agents are very similar,
with the top 7 scores all being within 0.05 of each other. IAMhaggler2012’s score is only
0.023 less than that of the winner.
We now analyse the results in more detail by considering sub-tournaments which contain
only a subset of the scenarios. Specifically, we use the classifications introduced in
Section 4.1, which partition the scenarios according to their discounting factor, utility of
conflict, competitiveness and domain size. We now analyse each of these classifications
in turn in Sections 4.5.2 to 4.5.5.
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Agent
Score (Rank)
mean δ = 0.50 δ = 0.75 δ = 1.00
AgentLG 0.610 (1) 0.518 (3-4) 0.605 (1) 0.707 (2-3)
OMACagent 0.605 (2-3) 0.510 (5-6) 0.599 (2-3) 0.705 (2-3)
CUHKAgent 0.603 (2-3) 0.526 (2) 0.597 (2-3) 0.686 (4)
TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.597 (4) 0.513 (3-4) 0.550 (7) 0.726 (1)
IAMhaggler2012 0.587 (5) 0.538 (1) 0.569 (5) 0.655 (5-6)
BRAMAgent2 0.576 (6) 0.508 (5-6) 0.593 (4) 0.627 (7)
Meta-Agent 0.567 (7) 0.496 (7) 0.561 (6) 0.645 (5-6)
AgentMR 0.318 (8) 0.337 (8) 0.369 (8) 0.247 (8)
Table 4.9: Scores and ranks across all scenarios, grouped by discounting factor, with
winning scores marked in bold.
4.5.2 Effect of Discounting Factor
In this section, we isolate the effect of the discounting factor on the performance of the
agents by averaging over the results of the scenarios with the same discounting factor.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the scenarios use discount factors δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}.
Table 4.9 shows the results for each value of δ. A decrease in δ increases the effect of
the discounting and, therefore, the average score of each agent decreases as δ decreases
(except in the case of AgentMR). For all values of δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, AgentMR finishes
in 8th place, and therefore all other agents achieve a higher score. Furthermore, AgentLG
and CUHKAgent always achieve a higher score than Meta-Agent and BRAMAgent2.
Finally, OMACagent always achieves a higher score than Meta-Agent.
Our agent is the winner of the tournament with the most severe discounting factor (δ =
0.50), achieving a score 2.3% higher than that of the second place agent (CUHKAgent).
For larger (less severe) discounting factors, our agent is less successful, finishing in
5th or 6th place, with scores 6% and 10% below those of the winning agent. Three
different agents (AgentLG, TheNegotiator Reloaded and IAMhaggler2012) each win the
tournament for one of the discounting factor values used.
The reason for our strong performance in such scenarios is that, when discounting is
severe, there are considerable benefits to reaching an early agreement (or in cases where
the utility of conflict is high, early conflict). By considering the effect of discounting
on the value of future offers, IAMhaggler2012 generally concedes more quickly in highly
discounted scenarios, thereby reaching early agreements with a relatively high discounted
utility. On the other hand, in less severely discounted scenarios (including those with no
discounting), due to its adaptiveness to the behaviour of the opponents, IAMhaggler2012
takes an approach which is more concessive than necessary, therefore it is outperformed
by a number of other strategies.
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Agent
Score (Rank)
mean uα = 0.00 uα = 0.25 uα = 0.50
AgentLG 0.610 (1) 0.594 (1) 0.610 (1) 0.626 (1-3)
OMACagent 0.605 (2-3) 0.585 (2-3) 0.602 (2-3) 0.627 (1-3)
CUHKAgent 0.603 (2-3) 0.585 (2-3) 0.601 (2-3) 0.623 (1-4)
TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.597 (4) 0.575 (4-5) 0.595 (4) 0.620 (3-4)
IAMhaggler2012 0.587 (5) 0.575 (4-5) 0.578 (5-6) 0.609 (5)
BRAMAgent2 0.576 (6) 0.560 (6) 0.575 (5-6) 0.593 (7)
Meta-Agent 0.567 (7) 0.540 (7) 0.563 (7) 0.599 (6)
AgentMR 0.318 (8) 0.192 (8) 0.317 (8) 0.444 (8)
Table 4.10: Scores and ranks across all scenarios, grouped by utility of conflict, with
winning scores marked in bold.
4.5.3 Effect of Utility of Conflict
We now consider the effect of the utility of conflict on the agents, using the same tech-
nique as used for the discounting factor. Our scenarios have utility of conflict values
uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50} and the results for each of these values are shown in Table 4.10.
Unsurprisingly, the scores achieved by all agents tend to increase as the utility of conflict
increases.
For all values of uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}, our agent finished between 4th and 6th place,
with similar performance being observed regardless of the utility of conflict. The top
agent overall (AgentLG) won the tournament regardless of the utility of conflict value,
with the agents which finished in joint 2nd place overall (CUHKAgent and OMACagent)
also achieving joint first place in the tournament with the highest utility of conflict
(uα = 0.50).
In Table 4.11, we consider the proportion of negotiations which ended with a specific
agent sending an End message to terminate the negotiation before the deadline4. Only 5
of the 8 agents were observed to send Endmessages. Specifically these were OMACagent,
TheNegotiator Reloaded, IAMhaggler2012, BRAMAgent2 and Meta-Agent. As expected,
for each agent, the number of End messages did not decrease as uα increased and no
agents sent End messages (except as noted in footnote 4).
4.5.4 Effect of Competitiveness
Table 4.12 shows the results of the agents in scenarios from each competitiveness class.
As can be seen, more competitive domains result in lower average scores. Furthermore,
the top three agents overall (AgentLG, CUHKAgent and OMACagent) each win in at
4Note that here we only consider End messages which were sent at least 1 second before the deadline.
Some agents were found to send End messages in the final second when the discounting factor and utility
of conflict parameters made it irrational to do so.
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Agent
Percentage of scenarios ending
in conflict
uα = 0.00 uα = 0.25 uα = 0.50
AgentLG 0 0 0
OMACagent 0 0 1.2%
CUHKAgent 0 0 0
TheNegotiator Reloaded 0 0 5.2%
IAMhaggler2012 0 6.3% 26.5%
BRAMAgent2 0 0 2.4%
Meta-Agent 0 0.5% 6.6%
AgentMR 0 0 0
Table 4.11: End messages sent across all scenarios, grouped by utility of conflict.
Agent
Score (Rank)
mean C(O) ≤ 0.22 0.22 < C(O) 0.30 < C(O)
C(O) ≤ 0.30
AgentLG 0.610 (1) 0.723 (3) 0.631 (1-2) 0.476 (2)
OMACagent 0.605 (2-3) 0.708 (4-5) 0.621 (2-4) 0.484 (1)
CUHKAgent 0.603 (2-3) 0.735 (1) 0.626 (1-4) 0.449 (4)
TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.597 (4) 0.732 (2) 0.625 (2-4) 0.432 (6)
IAMhaggler2012 0.587 (5) 0.704 (4-5) 0.599 (5) 0.458 (3)
BRAMAgent2 0.576 (6) 0.696 (6-7) 0.589 (6-7) 0.443 (5)
Meta-Agent 0.567 (7) 0.695 (6-7) 0.588 (6-7) 0.419 (7)
AgentMR 0.318 (8) 0.416 (8) 0.290 (8) 0.246 (8)
Table 4.12: Scores and ranks across all scenarios, grouped by competitiveness, with
winning scores marked in bold.
least one competitiveness class. Our agent’s best performance is in the highly competi-
tive class, where it finishes in 3rd place. In highly competitive scenarios, it is essential
for the participants to concede enough in order to reach an agreement. Due to the adap-
tiveness of IAMhaggler2012 towards its opponent’s behaviour, it is very good at ensuring
that it concedes enough so as to reach an agreement. However, in less competitive sce-
narios it may concede too quickly, or too far than is necessary to reach an agreeement,
since it fails to consider the effect that its behaviour can have on an adaptive opponent.
Specifically, if the opponent is adaptive (as many of them are), IAMhaggler2012 could
benefit from taking a less concessive approach than it currently does. This benefit would
be particularly noticeable in less competitive scenarios.
4.5.5 Effect of Domain Size
We now consider the performance of the agents depending on the size of the scenario’s
outcome space. Table 4.13 shows the results of the agents in scenarios from each size
class. The top four agents overall (AgentLG, CUHKAgent, OMACagent and TheNego-
tiator Reloaded) each win in at least one size class. Our agent’s best performance is in
the scenarios with the smallest outcome spaces, where it finishes in joint 2nd place.
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Agent
Score (Rank)
mean |O| ≤ 200 200 < |O| 3500 < |0||O| ≤ 3500
AgentLG 0.610 (1) 0.534 (2-4) 0.668 (1-3) 0.627 (1)
OMACagent 0.605 (2-3) 0.547 (1) 0.659 (4) 0.608 (2-3)
CUHKAgent 0.603 (2-3) 0.538 (2-4) 0.670 (1-3) 0.602 (3-4)
TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.597 (4) 0.517 (6) 0.669 (1-3) 0.604 (2-4)
IAMhaggler2012 0.587 (5) 0.535 (2-4) 0.640 (5-6) 0.586 (5)
BRAMAgent2 0.576 (6) 0.526 (5) 0.632 (6-7) 0.570 (6)
Meta-Agent 0.567 (7) 0.512 (7) 0.634 (5-7) 0.556 (7)
AgentMR 0.318 (8) 0.326 (8) 0.338 (8) 0.289 (8)
Table 4.13: Scores and ranks across all scenarios, grouped by size, with winning scores
marked in bold.
By considering the performance of the agents in sub-tournaments consisting of various
classes of scenario, we observe that, due to the way in which it adapts to the discount-
ing factor and the behaviour of the opponents, our agent is particularly well suited to
scenarios which are significantly affected by time discounting, as well as those which are
highly competitive. These represent the more challenging scenario classes, since, in time
discounted domains, it is desirable to reach agreements without unnecessary delay, and
furthermore, in highly competitive domains there is a careful balance to be had between
not conceding enough, risking conflict and conceding too much, reaching an agreement
with low utility.
4.5.6 Pareto Efficiency of Agreements
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the strategies (Requirement 2), we consider the
Pareto efficiency of the agreements reached by the agents. This is determined by mea-
suring the shortest Euclidean distance from the agreement point to the Pareto frontier.
As described in Section 2.2.3, the Pareto frontier is a line connecting all Pareto efficient
outcomes. Table 4.14 shows that the average distance to the Pareto frontier for all
agents is quite similar, ranging from 0.015 to 0.022, with our agent’s agreements being,
on average, a Euclidean distance of 0.018 from the Pareto frontier. However, in terms of
the agreements that were furthest from the Pareto frontier, this measure varies amongst
the different agents. Specifically, all of the agents have least efficient agreements between
0.164 and 0.536 from the Pareto frontier, but in this respect, our agent was one of the
better performers, with its least efficient agreement being just 0.214 from the Pareto
frontier. Furthermore, in total, 14.1% of agreements were on the Pareto frontier and
for negotiations containing our agent, this figure was slightly higher at 14.9%. This
shows that, despite using a random approach to selecting offers at a given utility level
(rather than by modelling the opponent’s utility function) our agent is still able to reach
agreements that are of similar efficiency to those of the other agents.
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Agent Mean distance Worst distance Percentage at frontier
AgentLG 0.016 0.330 14.8%
OMACagent 0.017 0.223 17.0%
CUHKAgent 0.018 0.449 15.9%
TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.019 0.329 11.2%
IAMhaggler2012 0.017 0.214 14.9%
BRAMAgent2 0.022 0.203 15.0%
Meta-Agent 0.019 0.536 13.1%
AgentMR 0.015 0.164 10.8%
Table 4.14: Pareto efficiency of agreements.
In summary, our agent performs well in a wide variety of scenarios. It reaches agree-
ments which are generally close to Pareto efficient, and its average utility is 96% of that
of the overall winner, AgentLG. In contrast, the agent with the worst overall utility,
AgentMR only achieves an average utility which is 52% of that of the overall winner.
In a number of subtournaments, where the scenarios exhibit specific characteristics, our
agent outperforms many of its opponents. Specifically, this is the case when the sce-
nario is highly discounted (δ = 0.5), and, to a lesser extent, when the scenario is small
|O| < 200 or is highly competitive (C(O) > 0.30).
4.6 Offer Rate
In order to measure the tractability of our strategy (Requirement 7), we also consider
the number of offers made per second by each agent. This gives an indication of the
amount of time taken to compute an offer, and can be easily be compared across different
agents and domains. We calculate this value for negotiations where the opponent used
the same strategy, thereby ensuring that this measure is not biased by the offer rate of
the opponent.
In our experiments, we imposed a minimum amount of time between each offer. Specifi-
cally, we set this to 10ms, therefore limiting the number of offers per second to 100. The
reason for this restriction is twofold. Firstly, it attempts to bring the conditions of our
experiments more in line with those used in ANAC 2010 and ANAC 2011. Specifically,
during these earlier competitions, the Genius platform was used in a standard mode
which displays the negotiation trace of the agents as the negotiation progresses. The
updating of this graphical element caused a delay in the exchange of offers, which, in a
scenario with a deadline (as in all of the scenarios we consider) can have a significant
effect on the outcome. In contrast, during our experiments, to enable the negotiations
to be carried out on the computing cluster, we used a modified version of the Genius
platform, which lacked the graphical element, and therefore lacked this delay. Without
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Figure 4.4: Offer rates (in offers per second) achieved by each agent, for scenarios
with varying sizes of outcome spaces.
adding in the restriction, some of the agents are capable of making thousands of offers
per second. Secondly, having such a delay is a natural model for many practical settings
in which automated negotiation is likely to be used. For example, agents which negotiate
over the internet will be restricted by the communication delay between them.
In more detail, Figure 4.4 shows the offer rate of each agent depending on the size of
the scenario’s outcome space. It shows that our agent has a considerably lower offer
rate than that of the other agents. Specifically, the offer rate of our agent is between 14
and 49 offers per second, across all scenarios. In contrast, all of the other agents achieve
offer rates in excess of 80 offers per second across many of the scenarios, and particularly
those with smaller domains. Despite our agent being the slowest to produce offers, it is
still able to produce many offers per second, even in the largest of the scenarios that we
consider, thereby demonstrating that the approach it uses is computationally tractable.
4.7 Empirical Game Theoretic Analysis
A limitation of the tournament analysis that we performed as part of Section 4.5 is that
it only considers the performance in a fixed set of tournaments. To demonstrate the
stability of our strategies in a wide variety of tournaments, it is necessary to consider
further tournaments in which the mix of strategies is different. We can then evaluate
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A B C
A 0.9 0.3 0.5
B 0.1 0.2 0.3
C 0.2 0.4 0.5
Table 4.15: Payoff matrix in an example game. The rows represent the different
strategies an agent can take, whilst the columns represent the different strategies the
opponent can take.
whether our strategy wins in such tournaments, and also identify whether any of the
agents in those tournaments have an incentive to switch to a different strategy. To this
end, we perform an empirical game theoretic analysis of the tournament results, using
the technique introduced in Section 2.2.4. As already stated, empirical game theoretic
analysis uses techniques from game theory in order to analyse empirical games, i.e.
games in which the payoffs are determined by observations of the game (Wellman, 2006)
rather than being part of the definition of the game. In this section, we first describe
the methodology that we use in our empirical game theoretic analysis (Section 4.7.1),
before presenting the results of that analysis (Section 4.7.2).
4.7.1 Methodology
In common with the approach developed by Jordan et al. (2007), we consider single-
agent deviations, i.e. where there is an incentive for one agent to change its strategy,
assuming that all other agents maintain their current strategy. We use this technique
to search for Nash equilibria, which are defined as a combination of strategies such that
there is no incentive for any of the players to change their strategy, given the strategies
of the other players.
As an example, consider a tournament which consists of a two-player game between all
pairs of players, as in the standard setup used in the Automated Negotiating Agent
Competitions. Each player chooses the same strategy in all games in the tournament.
Suppose that there is a choice of three known strategies, labelled A, B and C. Fur-
thermore, suppose that the payoffs of a single game between two players is given by
Table 4.15. In practice, each cell in this table is computed according to the average over
the empirical outcomes of a number of negotiation sessions between a pair of agents
which use the strategies corresponding to that cell.
Using the example, in a tournament of 5 players, if all players adopt strategy B, they
will all achieve the score of 0.8 (0.2∗4). In contrast, if four of the players choose strategy
B, but one of them chooses strategy C, the one choosing C will achieve a score of 1.6
(0.4 ∗ 4), whilst those choosing B will achieve a score of 0.9 (0.2 ∗ 3 + 0.3 ∗ 1). This
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shows that there is an incentive, in a tournament where all players use strategy B, for
one of the players to switch to C. By repeating this process it is possible to identify all
single-player deviations, and consequently, Nash equilibria.
We present the deviations in our example game in Figure 4.5. Each node represents a
possible mixture of the three strategies in a tournament. The vertices of the triangle
represent strategy mixtures in which all agents play the same strategy. Furthermore,
each arrow indicates that if a single agent deviates from the source mixture to the
target mixture, then the additional payoff to that agent deviating will be positive, and
statistically significantly different from zero. From any source mixture we only show
the deviation (or deviations) which offer the highest such additional payoff. Therefore,
we refer to these deviations as statistically significant single-agent best deviations. To
measure the statistical significance of a deviation, we use Welch’s t-test. Furthermore,
the shaded strategy at each node represents the strategy which achieves the highest
score and the Nash equilibria are the nodes which have no outgoing arrow. Our example
in Figure 4.5 shows two Nash equilibria, in which all agents use strategy A or in which
all agents use strategy C.
As well as looking at the deviations between different combinations of strategies, we can
also consider the robustness of a Nash equilibrium by measuring the size of the basin
of attraction. By this, we mean the number of strategy combinations that have a path
of deviations leading to a specific Nash equilibrium. When doing so, it is necessary to
consider that the strategy mixtures in Figure 4.5 are unevenly represented. Specifically,
if all of the players were to choose a strategy at random (with equal probability), not all
of the combinations would occur with equal probability. For example, there is only one
way in which all six players could choose A, which we denote AAAAAA. In contrast,
there are six ways that one of them can choose B, with the remaining four choosing A,
which we could denote BAAAAA,ABAAAA, ..., AAAAAB. When calculating the size
of the basin of attraction, we take this unevenness into account. In general, the relative
measure of a node’s contribution to this size is given by n!a!b!c! where n is the number of
agents in the tournament and a, b and c are the number of agents which use strategies
A, B and C, respectively.
In the example given in Figure 4.5, 21 of the nodes have their only path of deviations
leading to the Nash equilibria at AAAAA. These 21 nodes represent 665 of the 729,
or 91% of the possible combinations. Therefore, the AAAAA equilibria has a basin of
attraction which is 91% of the total space. A further Nash equilibria exists, at CCCCC,
however this only represents 1 (or 0.13%) of the possible combinations. The remaining
63 (or 8.6%) of the possible combinations contain paths of deviation leading to both
Nash equilibria. Since the AAAAA equilibria has the larger basin of attraction, it is
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Figure 4.5: Deviation in example game, according to the payoff matrix in Table 4.15.
Each node represents a combination of strategies in use in a tournament. Each node is
a table, which displays, on the second row, the number of agents which use the strategy
indicated on the first row. Each arrow is a single-player deviation which improves the
score of the deviating player. The shaded strategies at each node indicate the strategy
that achieves the highest score in that tournament.
considered to be the stronger of the two equilibria, indicating that strategy A is a strong
choice. Furthermore, from Figure 4.5, we can also observe that if any player chooses
strategy A, all agents should choose this strategy.
4.7.2 Results
To highlight some interesting effects which occur for certain sub-tournaments, we now
perform a similar deviation analysis for the top three strategies, according to their
average score across all scenarios. Therefore, we consider AgentLG (L), OMACagent (O)
and CUHKAgent (C). Figure 4.6 shows the deviation analysis for this set of strategies.
It shows that, from every 8-player tournament in which each agent selects one of the top
three strategies, there exists a path of statistically significant deviations which lead to
a single Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is one in which all agents use the AgentLG
strategy.
We also perform a similar analysis for each of the sub-tournaments of scenarios classified
by discounting factor, utility of conflict, competitiveness and size, again considering the
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Figure 4.6: Deviation in the overall tournament (over all scenarios) for the strategies
of AgentLG (denoted L), OMACagent (denoted O) and CUHKAgent (denoted C). The
shaded strategies are the ones which achieve the highest scores.
top three agents in the respective sub-tournament. Our discussion focuses on the sub-
tournaments which show more interesting results under this analysis. Specifically, we
consider the sub-tournaments which contain scenarios with the following characteristics:
1. high discounting (δ = 0.50) (IAMhaggler2012, CUHKAgent, AgentLG/TheNegotiator
Reloaded)
2. low discounting (δ = 0.75) (AgentLG, OMACagent, CUHKAgent)
3. no discounting (δ = 1.00) (TheNegotiator Reloaded, AgentLG, OMACagent)
4. highly uncompetitive (C(O) ≤ 0.22)5 (CUHKAgent, TheNegotiator Reloaded, AgentLG)
5. highly competitive (0.3 < C(O)) (OMACagent, AgentLG, IAMhaggler2012)
Since the results in these sub-tournaments are generated as averages over a smaller
set of scenarios, the values have a greater variance. Consequently, it is likely that a
number of deviations will not provide a statistically significant change in utility for the
deviating player. To ensure that our analysis continues to identify equilibria in these
5C(O) is the competitiveness of the scenario, as defined in Section 4.1
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circumstances, we include these deviations, but identify them in our figures using a
dashed line rather than a solid one.
In scenarios with high discounting (δ = 0.50), there are two agents (AgentLG and
TheNegotiator Reloaded) which achieve joint 3rd place. Therefore, for each of these
strategies, we perform a separate analysis (Figures 4.7(a) and 4.7(b)). In each case we
find two Nash equilibria, in which all agents use the IAMhaggler2012 strategy, or in
which all agents use the CUHKAgent strategy. Furthermore, if we perform the analysis
with the top four strategies, the set of Nash equilibria is the same. Since we have
multiple equilibria, we can consider the size of the basin of attraction of each equilibria.
With either AgentLG or TheNegotiator Reloaded present, IAMhaggler has the largest
basin of attraction. When AgentLG is present, the IAMhaggler2012 equilibrium’s basin
of attraction represents 92% of the possible tournaments. When TheNegotiator Reloaded
is present instead, this figure is reduced to 53%. In either case, from any tournament
in which at least 3 of the 8 agents use IAMhaggler2012’s strategy, the only path of best
single-agent deviations leads to the Nash equilibrium containing only that strategy.
With low discounting (δ = 0.75), we find a single Nash equilibrium (Figure 4.7(c)) in
which all agents use the AgentLG strategy. With no discounting (δ = 1.00), we again find
a single Nash equilibrium (Figure 4.7(d)), in which half of the agents use TheNegotiator
Reloaded’s strategy and the other half use AgentLG’s strategy.
In the highly uncompetitive scenarios (C(O) ≤ 0.22), we find a single Nash equilibrium
(Figure 4.7(e)) in which all three strategies are present, with 4 agents using TheNego-
tiator Reloaded’s strategy, 3 using AgentLG’s and 1 using CUHKAgent’s. In the highly
competitive scenarios (0.3 < C(O)), we find two Nash equilibria (Figure 4.7(f)), each
with a mixture of strategies. The one with a basin of attraction of 80% of the tourna-
ments consists of 6 agents using the IAMhaggler2012 strategy, while the remaining 2 use
AgentLG’s. The other equilibrium consists of 5 agents using AgentLG’s strategy, whilst
the remaining 3 use OMACagent’s.
Overall, our empirical game theoretic analysis shows that, whilst in some sub-tournaments,
there exists an equilibrium in which all agents use the strategy with the highest tour-
nament score, there are others where such an equilibrium does not exist. Instead, in
these sub-tournaments, we find equilibria consisting of multiple different strategies. The
analysis also highlights the strength of IAMhaggler2012 in highly discounted scenarios
in that the equilibrium containing only our strategy also have a large basin of attrac-
tion. Specifically, provided at least 3 out of the 8 participants in the tournament use
our strategy, the rest of them also have an incentive to use that strategy.
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(a) δ = 0.50, IAMhaggler2012 (I), CUHKAgent (C) and AgentLG (L)
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(b) δ = 0.50, IAMhaggler2012 (I), CUHKAgent (C) and TheNegotiator Reloaded (N)
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(c) δ = 0.75, AgentLG (L), OMACagent (O) and CUHKAgent (C)
Figure 4.7: Deviation in a range of tournaments (with different subsets of scenarios)
for the top three strategies in the respective tournament. The shaded strategies are the
ones which achieve the highest scores.
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(d) δ = 1.00, TheNegotiator Reloaded (N), AgentLG (L) and OMACagent (O)
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(e) C(O) ≤ 0.22, CUHKAgent (C), TheNegotiator Reloaded (N) and AgentLG (L)
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(f) 0.3 < C(O), OMACAgent (O), AgentLG (L) and IAMhaggler2012 (I)
Figure 4.7: Deviation in a range of tournaments (with different subsets of scenarios)
for the top three strategies in the respective tournament. The shaded strategies are the
ones which achieve the highest scores. (continued)
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4.8 Summary
In this chapter we have shown the performance of our agent against a number of other
state-of-the-art agents across a wide range of scenarios. Specifically, in Section 4.1, we
introduced the scenarios that are used throughout our evaluation. Then, in Section 4.2
we determined how to set our spitefulness parameter, showing the benefits of being
spiteful in negotiation tournaments with only 2 players, but also showing how spiteful
behaviour is detrimental in larger tournaments. Next, in Section 4.3 we briefly presented
the results of the Automated Negotiating Agents Competitions, showing that IAMhag-
gler2012 finished in fifth place in the most recent competition. Then, in Section 4.4,
by considering the behaviour of the strategies in self-play, we have demonstrated the
extreme sensitivity of our fixed strategy (IAMcrazyHaggler) to its acceptance threshold.
Furthermore, we have shown that our adaptive strategy, IAMhaggler2012, outperforms
the other strategies in self-play in many of the domains. In Section 4.5, we considered
the results in negotiations against a range of state-of-the-art agents from the earlier
competition, in order to demonstrate the performance of our agents against unknown
opponents (Requirement 3). In terms of the average utility levels achieved by the agents,
our agent generally performed well by adopting a concession strategy that adapts to the
behaviour of the opponent. In particular, in scenarios where discounting had a signif-
icant effect, its average utility in a tournament setting was shown to be 2.3% higher
than the agent with the second highest average utility. Furthermore, we have shown
that all of the agents, including our own, tend to reach agreements that are Pareto
efficient, and therefore meet Requirement 2. We also show that IAMcrazyHaggler and
IAMhaggler2012 fully meet our requirement for reaching agreements in domains where
the ordering of each issue is unknown (Requirement 5). In Section 4.6, we showed that,
in all of the scenarios that we tested, our agent was able to make a reasonable number
of offers, and its offer rate was not significantly reduced in the scenarios with larger
outcome spaces, showing that its approach is computationally tractable and therefore
meets Requirement 7. By presenting an empirical game theoretic analysis of the top
strategies from a number of different sub-tournaments, in Section 4.7 we have shown
how, in a tournament setting consisting of scenarios where discounting has a significant
effect, where all agents can choose one of the top three strategies in that tournament,
there is a strong incentive for all agents to use our strategy. This result suggests that,
for certain types of scenario, (in particular those with significant discounting) even when
the negotiation environment contains other high performing agents, it is still appropriate
to use the one we have developed.
Chapter 5
Design of Many-to-Many
Negotiation Agents
In the previous two chapters, we have presented the design (Chapter 3) and evalua-
tion (Chapter 4) of our one-to-one negotiation agents. In this chapter, we extend that
work to consider negotiation environments which contain more than two parties. Such
environments contain additional challenges over those present in the two-party ones.
Specifically, each agent needs to carefully coordinate their behaviour against each op-
ponent (Requirement 8). The opponents may vary, in terms of either their preferences
or their behaviour. Furthermore, in some concurrent negotiation settings, it may be
possible for one party to decommit from an existing agreement, subject to payment of
a penalty (Requirement 9).
In the remainder of this chapter, we introduce the problem of concurrent negotiation
that we consider in this work (Section 5.1). We then discuss the approach that we have
developed for coordinating concurrent negotiation with a range of opponents, which
we divide into two major components (Sections 5.2 and 5.3). Then, we discuss how
to handle decommitment (Section 5.4). Finally, we describe the concurrent negotiation
agent that we have formed from these strategies (Section 5.5). We summarise the chapter
in Section 5.6.
5.1 Overview
Many-to-many negotiation, in which a set of parties negotiate with each other is more
complex than a one-to-one negotiation. Specifically, a more advanced negotiation proto-
col is required in order to control the actions of the various parties. The many-to-many
99
100 Chapter 5 Design of Many-to-Many Negotiation Agents
Offerp→q
Offerp→q
Offerq→p
Acceptp→qAcceptq→p
Confirmp→q
Conflict
α
Agreement
α
Awaiting
Confirm
Awaiting
Offer
or Accept
Process
Offer
Process
Accept
Generate
initial
Offer
Confirmq→p
Endp→q
OR
Endq→p
Endp→q
OR
Endq→p
Endp→q
OR
Endq→p
Endp→q
OR
Endq→p
Endp→q
OR
Endq→p
Figure 5.1: State diagram showing the concurrent negotiation protocol, from the
perspective of a single negotiation thread of agent p.
negotiation protocol we consider in this work is similar to the ones described in An et al.
(2009) and in Nguyen and Jennings (2005). Furthermore, as in Nguyen and Jennings
(2005) we allow for decommitment, subject to a penalty, to allow for more flexibility and
a fair comparison with the benchmark strategy.
In more detail, the negotiation considered in this chapter takes place in multiple, con-
current threads, between pairs of agents. In each of these threads, the agents use an
alternating offers protocol, similar to the one used in the one-to-one negotiations in
Chapter 3. As before, each offer represents a complete package, specifying the values for
all negotiable issues, but with in our concurrent protocol, additional actions are possible.
Specifically, the possible actions are Offer, Accept, Confirm, End and Decommit.
The negotiation begins with the agents exchanging Offer messages. Sending an Of-
fer message in response to an Offer from the opponent constitutes a counteroffer and
implicitly a rejection of the previous offer. If an agent is satisfied with the most recent
Offer it received, it can send an Accept message in order to indicate that it wishes to
form an agreement. Following an Accept message being sent in a negotiation thread,
no further Offer messages can be sent. Figure 5.1 is a state diagram from the per-
spective of a single negotiation thread, showing the messages exchanged and the various
states of the thread.
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In the standard alternating offers protocol, used in Chapter 3, the Accept message
resulted in the formation of an agreement, and marked the end of the negotiation.
In contrast, under the protocol used in this chapter, the Accept message does not
necessarily result in an agreement. Instead, the negotiation moves into a new phase, in
which the only messages allowed are Confirm and End. The Confirm message is used
to indicate that the agent confirms that a binding agreement has been formed, whereas
the End message will abort the negotiation thread.
The reason for including a Confirm message is as follows. Under this protocol, an
agent is allowed to send offers to multiple opponents at once. Therefore, it may find
that, while waiting for a response from them, more than one of these offers are accepted.
If the Accept messages were to form a binding agreement at this point, the agent
may inadvertently reach more than one agreement, and it would need to decommit
from all but one of them, thereby incurring decommitment penalties. In this case, the
Confirm and End messages can be used to select only one of them. Note that an agent
could use this strategically by delaying sending the Confirm message. However, the
agent is expected to confirm the acceptance within a short period of time (at most few
seconds, depending on communication delays), otherwise it becomes invalid. Moreover,
the opponent who sent the acceptance is still free to abort the agreement without penalty
by using the End message. Provided that an agent does not Accept an opponent’s offer
whilst it is waiting for another agent to Confirm an acceptance (or End a negotiation),
the agent can avoid reaching multiple agreements.
In a negotiation where there are multiple opponents, it is possible that, after a binding
agreement is reached, one of the remaining opponents makes (or accepts) an offer that
has a greater utility than that of the existing agreement. In such a situation, it may be
beneficial to accept the new offer, and, at the same time, Decommit from the existing
agreement. In order to discourage the agents from decommiting unnecessarily, we intro-
duce a decommitment penalty, which is paid by the agent that chooses to decommit from
a binding agreement. Without such a penalty, all agreements would essentially become
non-binding, leading to a potentially unstable system. Note that, before a Confirm
message has been sent within a thread, the agreement is not yet binding and so it is
possible for either agent to send an End message to retract the offer without penalty.
In common with the work presented in the previous chapters, in our many-to-many
negotiation scenarios, we also use a deadline and a discounting factor, which are both
common to and known by all agents. As before, they are both measured in real time.
Figure 5.2 shows an example negotiation trace with three agents, where agent a nego-
tiates concurrently with agents b and c. After a sends an offer to b, agent b accepts a’s
offer. Agent a then confirms and an agreement is reached. Agents a and c continue to
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Concurrent Agent a Agent bAgent c
Offera→c
Offera→c
Offera→c
Confirma→c
Offerc→a
Offerc→a
Acceptc→a
Agreement 1
Agreement 2
Decommita→b
Figure 5.2: Sequence diagram showing a simplified negotiation trace between three
agents, including two agreements and a decommitment.
negotiate, aiming to find an agreement that is better than the existing one (taking into
account the decommitment penalty). After a total of five offers have been exchanged,
agent c accepts a’s offer. Agent a then confirms this agreement, and simultaneously
decommits from the worse agreement with agent b. In practice, negotiation traces are
likely to be considerably longer.
Having defined a protocol for concurrent negotiation, we now describe the strategy that
we have developed for negotiating under such a protocol. Our strategy can broadly be
split into two major components: the negotiation thread managers which handle the
negotiation with a single opponent (Section 5.2) and the coordinator, which coordinates
the behaviour of the set of negotiation thread managers (Section 5.3), which we now
discuss in turn.
5.2 The Negotiation Thread Managers
The strategy of each negotiation thread manager is an extension of the one-to-one nego-
tiation strategy detailed in Section 3.2.2. In more detail, each thread manager performs
Gaussian process regression in order to predict the future concession of its opponent, i.
The prediction is based on the offers received so far by this opponent, and is updated as
more offers are received. The Gaussian process enables the prediction to be captured in
the form of a probability distribution over the utility, p(u;µi,t, σi,t), for all future time
points, t ∈ [tc, 1] (here, as before, time is normalised such that t = 0 represents the start
of the negotiation and t = 1 represents the deadline). These probability distributions
are then passed on to the coordinator, which uses them (along with those from other
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thread managers) to determine, for each opponent i, the best time, t∗i , at which to reach
an agreement, and the best utility, u∗i , at which the thread manager should aim to reach
the agreement. The way in which the coordinator calculates these values forms a core
part of the negotiation strategy, and is discussed in detail in Section 5.3. For now, we
will simply take these two values as given.
Given its target time, t∗i , and target utility, u
∗
i , a negotiation thread manager needs to: i)
determine the target utility at which to generate offers and to accept incoming offers right
now and, ii) generate multi-issue offers at the current target utility. Now, to determine
the target utility, uτ , at the current time, tc, each thread manager uses polynomial time-
dependent concession, where the concession rate is set such that the target utility level
reaches u∗i at time t
∗
i . The time-dependent concession function taken by our many-to-
many negotiation strategy mirrors the one used by our one-to-one negotiation strategies
(described fully in Section 3.2.1). In summary, the target utility is given by:
uτ = U0 − (Umin − U0) ·

tc if 0 ≤ tc < 0.1(
tc(tc − 0.1) + t1/β
′
c (0.2− tc)
0.1
)
if 0.1 ≤ tc < 0.2
t
1/β′
c otherwise
(5.1)
where U0 is the utility of the initial offer, Umin is the agent’s reservation utility (deter-
mined depending on the scenario using the approach described in Section 3.6) and tc is
the current time. β′ is the constrained value of β, given by:
β′ = max (βmin,min (βmax, β)) (5.2)
where βmin and βmax are respectively the minimum and maximum values for β
′. In
our agent, we set βmin = 0.01 and βmax = 2.0. The reasons for constraining β in this
way, and for the choice of βmin and βmax are the same as in Section 3.2.1. That is, the
choice of the values themselves are somewhat arbitrary, but the aim is to avoid extreme
behaviour whilst allowing flexibility. Finally, β is given by:
β =
log(t∗i )
log
(
1− u∗i
1− Umin
) (5.3)
where u∗i and t
∗
i are the target time and utility provided to the negotiation thread
manager.
Finally, since we are concerned with multi-issue negotiation, it is necessary to generate
a multi-issue offer, o, such that U(o) ≈ uτ . To do so, we use the approach described in
Section 3.3.1 which is to generate random offers until one is found which has a utility,
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U(o) ∈ [uτ−0.025, uτ +0.025]. If an offer cannot be found within this range, the range is
expanded, until a solution is found. Furthermore, if the target drops below the highest
value of the offers made by the opponent, we instead propose the package with that
utility that was offered by the opponent, as described in Section 3.3.2. This is since we
assume that, for a set of possible offers with utility greater than uτ , the one which is
most likely to be accepted is the one which has previously been offered by the opponent.
It may be possible to improve the selection of offers by modelling the preferences of
the opponents (specifically, their utility functions over the multiple negotiation issues).
However, due to the real-time aspect to the negotiations we consider, we found that
using this simple, fast approach to selecting an offer produced very good results.
5.3 The Coordinator
The role of the coordinator is to calculate the best time, t∗i , and utility value, u
∗
i , at
that time, for each thread manager. To do so, it uses the probability distributions re-
ceived from the individual thread managers, which predict future utilities offered by the
opponents. In the following, we use P (u;µi,t, σi,t) to denote the cumulative probability
distribution function, which is the (predicted) probability that the utility of an offer by
opponent i will be at least u at time t, and p(u;µi,t, σi,t) is the corresponding density
function. In addition, recall that the negotiations are many-to-many, and so the op-
ponents may exit the negotiations prematurely if they reach an agreement elsewhere.
Since these values cannot be learned during a single negotiation (but can be learned by
experimentation from repeated negotiations), we assume that the coordinator has prior
knowledge of Pc,i(t, tc), which denotes the probability that opponent i will still be in the
negotiation at time t > tc, given that it is in the negotiation at the current time, tc .
Our approach is based on the one described in Section 3.2.2, but here it has been
extended for negotiations with more than one opponent. In more detail, to find the
optimal strategy, we begin by computing the best time to reach agreement, and then
consider the best utility (or utilities), to offer at that time. We do the first part by
computing the expected utility of an agreement at a given time, and choose the time
with the highest expected utility. Although the protocol allows for decommitment,
when we compute the expected utility, we simplify the equations by implicitly assuming
that we terminate all other threads once an agreement is reached.1 As a result, a single
1In practice, we do continue to negotiate (as explained in Section 5.4) but this is not captured by the
expected utility. In principle, the equations can be extended to include the additional expected utility
from decommitment, but this can become computationally intensive to compute, and we leave this for
future work.
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best time, t∗ ∈ [tc, 1], is computed for all negotiation threads, as follows:
t∗ = argmaxt∈[tc,1]EUrec(t) (5.4)
where EUrec(t) is the expected utility when reaching an agreement at time t, given by:
EUrec(t) =
1
|A|
∑
i∈A
Pc,i(t, tc)
∫ 1
0
p[0,1](u;µi,t, σi,t)D(u, t)du (5.5)
where A is the set of remaining negotiation threads (i.e. those that have not terminated),
and Pc,i(t, tc) is as defined above. Note that the expected utility is computed as the
average expected utility for each thread. This is because, since we implicitly assume no
decommitment, the expected utility assumes we are committed to the first thread that
gives us an agreement. Thus, if multiple opponents were to reach agreements at roughly
the same time, there is an equal probability that any one of those agreements will be
reached.
Given the target agreement time, t∗, we would like to find the optimal utility level for
each thread at which to produce offers. By varying the level in each thread, it is possi-
ble for an agent to concede more towards a specific opponent with which an agreement
seems likely, whilst taking a less concessive approach against other opponents in the
hope that an agreement with a higher utility may be achieved. To this end, we first
specify the expected utility for a given vector of utility levels, one for each (remain-
ing) opponent. We calculate this by assuming that the probability distributions from
the various threads are independently sampled2. Furthermore, as before, we implicitly
assume that no decommitment is allowed.
Given this, the expected utility of proposing offers at utility levels ~u at time t can be
expressed as:
EUoffer(~u, t) =
∑
A′∈P(A)
f(~u,A′) ∏
i∈A′
P (ui;µi,t, σi,t)
∏
i∈A\A′
(1− P (ui;µi,t, σi,t))
 (5.6)
where A is the set of remaining opponents, ui is the utility of the offer made to opponent
i, P(A) is the powerset of A, P (ui;µi,t, σi,t) is the probability that opponent i will
accept an offer of utility ui at time t. Note that the right part of the equation denotes
the probability of reaching an agreement with exactly the agents in the set A′ at time
t. Then, f(~u,A′) is the utility obtained if this occurs. For the same reasons as given
above, since we implicitly assume no decommitment, the utility of this event is given
2Note that this is a simplifying assumption and applies to settings where the opponents have widely
different strategies and/or preferences. In domains where opponents are similar, these distributions tend
to be more correlated.
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by the average of each ui, i ∈ A′ (since, given that all opponents in A′ will accept the
offer, the order in which the opponents accept them is equally likely) written formally
as f(~u,A′) =
∑
i∈A′
ui
|A′| .
Given this, we find the set of best values, ~u∗, to offer to the opponents by maximising
the expected utility. Formally:
~u∗ = argmax~u∈[0,1]|A|EUoffer(~u, t
∗) (5.7)
Since the EUoffer function is nonlinear, we use a nonlinear optimisation package (specif-
ically, the Ipopt interior point optimizer (Wa¨chter and Biegler, 2006), using the HSL
mathematical library (HSL, 2011)) to find the solution to Equation 5.7.
5.4 Handling Decommitment
The scenario that we introduced in Chapter 1 allowed a negotiating party to decommit
from an agreement that they have previously formed, by paying a decommitment penalty.
Therefore, our agent needs a method to decide when to decommit from such agreements.
In order for the agent to benefit from a decommitment, the value of the new agreement
needs to be greater than that of the currently held agreement, plus the decommitment
penalty. Formally:
unew > uexisting + ρ (5.8)
where unew is the utility of the new agreement, uexisting is the utility of the existing
agreement, and ρ is the decommitment penalty.
The benefit b can then be defined as:
b = unew − uexisting − ρ (5.9)
However, if the benefit obtained by accepting the new offer over the existing agreement
is very small, it may not be rational for the agent to accept it. In more detail, the
acceptance of an offer from an opponent leads to the termination of agreements with
that opponent. Therefore, the number of negotiation partners is reduced by one, and
a potential opportunity to reach an even better agreement is lost. Consequently, our
agent will only accept a subsequent agreement if the benefit b is reasonably large.
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Specifically, our agent only accepts subsequent agreements if:
b > (uexisting + ρ) · ι (5.10)
where ι > 0 is a factor which affects the size of the desired benefit. The value of ι should
be small enough such that there can be offers which satisfy the above equation. For
example, if ι = 0.2, ρ = 0.1 and there is an existing agreement with utility uexisting = 0.8,
the agent will only accept subsequent agreements if they have a utility greater than 1.08
(which of course, is not possible). Therefore, if ι is set to a value which is too large, there
may be no possible subsequent agreements, and consequently, no decommitment would
occur. We set ι = 0.1 such that our agent has a desired benefit of at least 10% of the
value of the existing offer plus the decommitment penalty. This means that only when
uexisting > 0.81 (and ρ = 0.1) will our agent no longer be able to accept any subsequent
agreements.3
5.5 Our Many-to-Many Negotiation Agent
We have developed a negotiating agent for use in concurrent negotiation settings, using
the strategies described in Sections 5.2 to 5.4. We refer to this strategy as IAMconcur-
rentHaggler.
In common with our one-to-one negotiation agents, IAMconcurrentHaggler is imple-
mented using the Java programming language, under the framework provided by the
Genius platform. It extends the IAMhaggler2012 agent and therefore uses Commons-
Math: The Apache Commons Mathematics Library4, JAMA, A Java Matrix Package5
and the Gaussian Process Regression for Java library6. Furthermore, as a solver, it uses
the Ipopt interior point optimizer (Wa¨chter and Biegler, 2006), using the HSL mathe-
matical library (HSL, 2011).
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have described the negotiating agent that we have designed for use
in concurrent negotiation environments.
3Note that the actual value of ι = 0.1 is somewhat arbitrary and other similar values do not signifi-
cantly affect the performance from our agent.
4http://commons.apache.org/math/
5http://math.nist.gov/javanumerics/jama/
6https://forge.ecs.soton.ac.uk/projects/gp4j/
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Specifically, we have contributed the following to the literature on automated negotia-
tion:
• We have extended our one-to-one negotiation strategy to support the coordination
of multiple, concurrent negotiations (Requirement 8) in which each participant
aims to reach a single agreement, and decommitment of agreements is allowed,
through payment of a penalty (Requirement 9).
Furthermore, against the requirements set out in Section 1.2, we have designed an agent
which, in addition to meeting the same requirements as the agents detailed in Chapter 3,
also:
• is able to effectively coordinate multiple concurrent negotiations with a range of
opponents in order to reach effective outcomes. (Requirement 8)
• will decommit from agreements when it is beneficial for them to do so in order
to improve their utility, considering the benefit of the new agreement over the
decommitment penalty. (Requirement 9)
In the following chapter, we will evaluate the performance of our agent in order to
show that it outperforms an existing state-of-the-art strategy for coordinating multiple
negotiation threads (Nguyen and Jennings, 2005), in a range of scenarios.
Chapter 6
Evaluation of Many-to-Many
Negotiation Agents
This chapter evaluates the performance of our many-to-many negotiation agent, which
is designed to coordinate multiple concurrent negotiations (Requirement 8) in settings
where decommitment is allowed (Requirement 9). We begin by introducing the scenarios
(Section 6.1) and strategies (Section 6.2) that we consider in the evaluation. In a many-
to-many negotiation, each party can have a different preference profile and use a different
strategy. In order to reduce the amount of computation required to complete the eval-
uation, whilst continuing to evaluate a variety of settings, we analyse negotiations in
which all opponents have the same preferences but use different strategies (Section 6.3)
and then we analyse negotiations in which each opponent has different preferences but
uses the same strategy (Section 6.4). Finally, we summarise the chapter (Section 6.5).
6.1 Evaluation Scenarios
In a many-to-many negotiation between |A| parties, a scenario consists of |A| preference
profiles, each of which may be different. Furthermore, in the many-to-many negotiations
that we consider, each party belongs to one of two classes, with each party aiming to
reach an agreement with one member of the other class. For example, in the car sales
scenario introduced in Chapter 1, the two classes represent the buyers and the sellers.
The buyers are able to negotiate with all of the sellers, and vice-versa, but no agent
negotiates with another agent of the same class.
Due to the many-to-many nature of these negotiation environments, to fully simulate
them in our experiments requires considerable computation. In more detail, if there are
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a total of |A| parties, with half of them in each class, there will be a total of |A|2 agents,
each negotiating with |A|2 opponents, leading to
( |A|
2
)2
negotiation pairs. However, to
complete our analysis, we only require the utility of one of the |A| negotiation parties.
Therefore, we use the following approach in order to reduce the amount of computation
required, without significantly changing the nature of the negotiation environment.
In our experiments, rather than simulating the competitors (i.e. those agents which
belong to the same class) of our agent (or the alternatives that we introduce in Sec-
tion 6.2.1), we represent them by a break-off function which affects our opponents.
Taking this approach removes the need to simulate agents which do not have a direct
effect on the performance of the agents we wish to compare. In more detail, if we are
testing the performance of agent p which is in class 1, the only agents that it negotiates
with are its opponents in class 2. The most significant effect that the competitors (who
are in class 1 and do not negotiate directly with agent p) can have on agent p is to
reach agreement with one of the opponents, thereby causing the opponent to leave the
negotiation. From the perspective of agent p, this can be approximated by introducing
a break-off function to the opponents in class 2, representing the agreement between
an opponent and a competitor. In more detail, we model the probability of break-off
using a time-invariant function. That is, at any time in the negotiation, the break-off
probability during a future time period is given by a function which depends only on the
length of that future period. We achieve this by using an exponential function to calcu-
late the probability that an opponent continues to negotiate. Furthermore, we assume
that all opponents have the same probability. Specifically, the continuation probability
for a given period is given by:
∀i ∈ Q,Pc,i(ta, tb) = αtb−ta (6.1)
where ta, tb > ta are respectively the start and end of the period, and α is a constant
which determines the rate of break-off. In our experiments, we set α = 1/|Q|, where |Q|
is the total number of opponents. This ensures that, on average, there will be one agent
remaining in the negotiation by the deadline, and is representative of an environment in
which the number of negotiation parties in each class is equal.
By using the above approach to reduce the number of negotiation parties which need to
be simulated, our negotiations contain |Q| + 1 agents which need to be simulated and
therefore require preference profiles. Since one-to-one negotiations contain only 2 parties
(and therefore 2 preference profiles), the scenarios used in Section 4.1 are unsuitable for
a full evaluation of many-to-many negotiations. Therefore, we propose some additional
scenarios, as follows.
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Name
Number of
issues
Number of values
for each issue
Number of
potential outcomes
Camera 6 3,3,4,4,5,5 3,600
ADG 6 5,5,5,5,5,5 15,625
Travel 7 4,4,5,6,7,7,8 188,160
Table 6.1: Characteristics of different scenario types.
Many of these scenarios used for one-to-one negotiation are not very competitive, and it
is often easy for the agents to reach agreements with a high utility (for both sides), even
when using a very simple strategy. In a many-to-many negotiation setting, reaching
agreements with a high utility becomes even easier since, with a range of opponents,
it only takes one weak (concessive) opponent to allow any strategy to reach a good
agreement. As a result, such scenarios fail to offer sufficient challenge in a concurrent
negotiation setting. To address this shortcoming, we generate a range of strictly opposing
preference profiles. That is, the utility functions of any pair of negotiating agents, a and
b (where a and b come from different classes), are such that:
∀i ∈ I, ∀vi,x, vi,y ∈ Vi, Ua,i(vi,x) ≤ Ua,i(vi,y)⇔ Ub,i(vi,x) ≥ Ub,i(vi,y) (6.2)
where vi,x and vi,y are a pair of values allowed for issue i, Ua,i(·) is agent a’s utility
function for issue i, and Ub,i(·) is agent b’s utility function for issue i.
To generate a variety of scenarios, we choose the values for each issue by sampling
from a uniform distribution, and sort them such that the strict opposition constraint in
Equation 6.2 is satisfied. We then normalise the values by dividing each one by the value
of the greatest value, such that the greatest value is normalised to 1. Furthermore, the
weights for each issue are also sampled from a uniform distribution, normalised such that
they sum to one. Since we can generate any number of scenarios using this approach, we
refer to the underlying characteristics (the number of issues and the number of values
taken by those issues) as the scenario type. We consider three scenario types with large
outcome spaces, based on those used in the competition. Specifically they are based on
the Camera, ADG and Travel scenarios. The details of the scenario types are given in
Table 6.1.
To ensure that we tested with a range of preference profile pairs with different levels of
competitiveness, for each scenario type, we generated a single profile for one class and
over 100 profiles for the opposing class. We then ranked these profile pairs according to
their competitiveness, and we selected 7 pairs spread evenly throughout this sequence
of profile pairs.
The competitiveness of each of these pairings, including the plots of their outcome spaces
are shown in Table 6.2. The Camera scenario type is the least competitive, due to it
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having the lowest number of values for each issue, combined with the approach we
use to generate the utility functions. Specifically, if issue 1 takes one of 3 values, and
Ua,1(v1,x) = 1, on average Ub,1(v1,x) =
1
3 . In contrast, if issue 1 takes one of 8 values,
Ua,1(v1,x) = 1, on average Ub,1(v1,x) =
1
8 , resulting in a much more competitive outcome
space. At the other end of the scale, the ADG scenario type is the most competitive
(but only slightly more so than the Travel scenario type).
Finally, in order to ensure that decommitment is a viable option for the participants,
but is not completely free, we set D = 0.1. Moreover, as in the one-to-one negotiations
we have considered in previous chapters, in each negotiation, there is a deadline of 3
minutes, which is common to all participants.
6.2 Evaluation Strategies
We now consider the strategies that are used in our experiments, in addition to our own
strategy, IAMconcurrentHaggler2012. In Section 6.2.1 we detail two alternative strate-
gies that can be used in place of ours. We use these two strategies as benchmarks, and
therefore we compare their performance against the performance of IAMconcurrentHag-
gler2012. In our experiments, from the perspective of an agent using one of those three
strategies, each of their opponents use one of the strategies detailed in Section 6.2.2.
6.2.1 Benchmark Strategies
We test our agent by comparing it against a state-of-the-art agent, designed for multiple
concurrent negotiations (described in Section 6.2.1.1) and a very simple agent (described
in Section 6.2.1.2) as benchmarks.
6.2.1.1 NguyenAgent
As the state-of-the-art benchmark agent, we use the strategy developed by Nguyen and
Jennings (2005), which we introduced in Section 2.4.1. A limitation of this strategy,
which we refer to as NguyenAgent, is that it requires prior knowledge about the payoffs
of various strategies against different opponent classes (i.e., tough, linear, and conceder).
To determine these values in a principled manner, we used the results from a set of nego-
tiations between simple time-dependent strategies, in a bi-lateral negotiation setting. In
more detail, we ran one-to-one negotiations between variants of a simple time-dependent
conceder agent (either, tough (β = 0.5), linear (β = 1.0) or conceder (β = 2.0)), in all
ANAC2011 scenarios, averaging the results across those scenarios in order to produce
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Table 6.2: Competitiveness, C(O) of different pairs of preference profile for each
scenario, ordered from least to most competitive, showing outcome spaces. C(O) is
defined as the minimum distance from a point in the outcome space, O, to the point
which represents complete satisfaction (that is, the point at which each agent achieves
a utility of 1). The Pareto frontier of each profile pair is displayed as a solid line.
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β
Opponent
Conceder Non-conceder
2.0 0.366 0.130
1.0 0.510 0.120
0.5 0.525 0.111
Table 6.3: Payoff matrix used by NguyenAgent against 7 opponents, including effect
of break-off.
the payoff matrices required by Nguyen’s strategy. Specifically, the payoff matrix shows
the utility that NguyenAgent will expect to achieve against a specific opponent if it
chooses a tough, linear or conceder approach, depending on whether that opponent is
a conceder or a non-conceder. Included in the payoff matrix is the effect of break-off,
and therefore a matrix is produced for each different number of opponents (given that
this number affects the average time of break-off and therefore the expected payoff).
Table 6.3 shows the payoff matrix for NguyenAgent against a single opponent when the
negotiation consists of a total of 7 opponents. Unsurprisingly, it shows that the expected
utility is likely to be considerably higher if the opponent is a conceder than if it is a
non-conceder. In terms of the response that NguyenAgent should take, it shows that the
best response to a conceder is to use the tough (β = 0.5) approach, whereas against a
non-conceder, the best response is to use the conceder (β = 2.0) approach.
We use the ‘greedy’ version of Nguyen’s strategy, which, once an agreement has been
reached, forms subsequent agreements which lead to an increase in the utility after
considering the decommitment penalty. That is:
unew > uexisting + ρ (6.3)
where unew is the utility of the new agreement, uexisting is the utility of the existing
agreement, and ρ is the decommitment penalty.
6.2.1.2 RandomAgent
As an additional benchmark, we developed a simple agent, which we refer to as Ran-
domAgent. This agent makes random offers above a fixed threshold which is chosen
randomly from a uniform distribution over the range [0, 1] in each negotiation session.
After an agreement has been reached, this threshold is increased to the value of that
agreement, plus the decommitment penalty. This ensures that any subsequent agree-
ments lead to an improvement in the utility after considering the decommitment penalty.
Having introduced the agents which we compare our agent to, we now consider the
strategies that their negotiation opponents use.
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6.2.2 Opponent Strategies
As introduced in Section 6.1, in our experiments, we do not simulate the competitors
(i.e. those agents which belong to the same class) of our agent (or the alternatives that
we introduce in Section 6.2.1), but rather, we represent those competitors by a break-off
function which affects our opponents. The main reason for this is as an approxima-
tion, in order to reduce the amount of computation required to perform the evaluation.
However, it also provides us with a further advantage, as follows. Since the opponents
negotiate with only one strategy, we can generate opponent strategies by making some
minor adaptations to each of the large set of state-of-the-art, independently developed
negotiation agents designed for one-to-one negotiation (as used in our evaluation in
Chapter 4).
Specifically, in order to adapt these existing agents for the many-to-many protocol, they
need to be capable of sending Confirm messages, and they need to represent agreement
with a competitor through break-off. Since the only rational reason not to confirm an
acceptance is if the agent has already reached another agreement, it is straightforward
to add Confirm message functionality to the existing agents. Furthermore, the break-
off is modelled by setting a time of break-off according to the probability of break-off
function in Equation 6.1. Specifically, the time of break-off, tb, is set as:
tb =
log(x)
log
(
1
|Q|
) (6.4)
where x is a random variable drawn from a uniform distribution, U(0, 1) over the range
[0, 1], and |Q| is the number of opponents.
Therefore, in this evaluation, we use all of the strategies in Section 4.5 (excluding our
own) as opponent strategies, adapting them for our many-to-many setting by adding
the break-off and confirmation of agreement features discussed above.
6.3 All Opponents have the Same Preferences
In this section, we consider negotiations in which all opponents have the same preference
profile, but with each opponent using a different strategy (from the set of opponent
strategies used in Chapter 4). We repeat the negotiations for each of the seven preference
profile pairs in each scenario.
For each of the three agents (IAMconcurrentHaggler, NguyenAgent, and RandomAgent),
we run experiments with different numbers of opponents. Each experiment consists
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Figure 6.1: Average utility of the concurrent negotiation strategies in negotiations
where each opponent uses the same preferences, but a different strategy, according to
the number of opponents, averaged over all scenario types. Error bars show the 95%
confidence intervals.
of up to 35 different negotiations per scenario type. In each negotiation, any opponent
strategy from the ANAC competition appears at most once. At the same time, we select
the set of opponent strategies in a particular negotiation such that each combination
is equally represented within the experiment. For example, since we have 7 different
opponents, if |Q| = 4, there are 35 different combinations, each run 4 times (in order
to obtain statistically significant results). If |Q| = 7, then each opponent appears in all
negotiations, and we repeat the negotiation 84 times.
The results of these experiments are shown in Figure 6.1, averaged over all scenarios.
It shows that, for |Q| ∈ {4, 5}, IAMconcurrentHaggler2012 significantly outperforms
NguyenAgent, and for |Q| ∈ {6, 7} the performance of the two agents are not signifi-
cantly different to each other. Overall, on average IAMconcurrentHaggler2012 outper-
forms NguyenAgent by 2.8%. Furthermore, for all values of |Q| ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}, IAMcon-
currentHaggler2012 significantly outperforms the random benchmark (by an average of
11%).
We now consider each individual scenario type: Camera, ADG and Travel. In the small-
est, and least competitive scenario type (Camera) (Figure 6.2(a)), we observe that, in
general, the performances of NguyenAgent and IAMconcurrentHaggler2012 are so similar
that the difference between them is not statistically significant, although they both sig-
nificantly outperform RandomAgent (each by 15%). The reason that the performance
of the two more advanced strategies is so similar is that, in such an uncompetitive
scenario type, it is easy for any well designed agent to reach good agreements. In
the most competitive scenario type (ADG) (Figure 6.2(b)), IAMconcurrentHaggler2012
significantly outperforms NguyenAgent, achieving an average utility 29% higher. In the
largest scenario type (Travel) (Figure 6.2(c)), IAMconcurrentHaggler2012 is significantly
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(a) Camera scenario type.
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(b) ADG scenario type.
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(c) Travel scenario type.
Figure 6.2: Average utility of the concurrent negotiation strategies in negotiations
where each opponent uses the same preferences but a different strategy, according to the
number of opponents, in individual scenario types. Error bars show the 95% confidence
intervals.
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outperformed by NguyenAgent, which achieves an average utility 7% higher, with the
difference being greatest for larger values of |Q|. It should be noted that, as the number
of opponents increases, there is more opportunity for agreement, particularly when those
opponents are all using a different strategy (as is the case in these experiments). In more
detail, each agent is only aiming to reach agreement with a single opponent, and if just
one of those opponents is particularly concessive it is very easy for an agent to obtain a
high utility. If the opponents are all using different strategies, the more opponents there
are, the higher the probability of encountering such a concessive opponent and therefore,
it becomes easier to obtain a higher utility. NguyenAgent takes more of an advantage of
this (compared to IAMconcurrentHaggler2012) by using a less concessive strategy.
6.4 Each Opponent has Different Preferences
In this section, we consider negotiations in which each opponent has a different preference
profile, but each opponent uses the same strategy. Therefore, we repeat the negotiations
for each of the 7 opponent strategies.
For each of the three agents (IAMconcurrentHaggler2012, NguyenAgent, and Rando-
mAgent), we run experiments with different numbers of opponents. Each experiment
consists of up to 35 different negotiations per scenario type. In each negotiation, only
one of the opponent strategies from the ANAC competition appears. At the same time,
we select the set of preference profiles in a particular negotiation such that each com-
bination is equally represented within the experiment. For example, since we have 7
different profiles, if |Q| = 4, there are 35 different combinations, each run 4 times (in
order to obtain statistically significant results). If |Q| = 7, then each profile appears in
all negotiations, and we repeat the negotiation 84 times.
The results of these experiments are shown in Figure 6.3, averaged over all scenarios.
It shows that, for |Q| ∈ {4, 5}, IAMconcurrentHaggler2012 significantly outperforms
NguyenAgent, and for |Q| ∈ {6, 7} the performance of the two agents are not signifi-
cantly different to each other. As the number of opponents increases, the probability of
an individual opponent breaking off the negotiation increases and therefore IAMconcur-
rentHagger2012 tends to become more concessive against each opponent. Overall, on
average IAMconcurrentHaggler2012 outperforms NguyenAgent by 6.6%. Furthermore,
for all values of |Q| ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}, IAMconcurrentHaggler2012 significantly outperforms
the random benchmark (by an average of 6.5%).
We now consider each individual scenario type: Camera, ADG and Travel. In the small-
est, and least competitive scenario type (Camera) (Figure 6.2(a)), we see that, in general
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Figure 6.3: Average utility of the concurrent negotiation strategies in negotiations
where each opponent uses different preferences, but the same strategy, according to
the number of opponents, averaged over all scenario types. Error bars show the 95%
confidence intervals.
NguyenAgent achieves a higher average utility than that of IAMconcurrentHaggler (by
13%). In the most competitive scenario type (ADG) (Figure 6.2(b)), IAMconcurren-
tHaggler2012 significantly outperforms NguyenAgent, for all values of |Q|, achieving an
average utility 45% higher. In the largest scenario type (Travel) (Figure 6.2(c)), IAM-
concurrentHaggler2012 also significantly outperforms NguyenAgent, for all values of |Q|,
achieving an average utility 30% higher. Increasing the number of opponents causes the
expected break-off time for a single opponent to be earlier. As a result, IAMconcur-
rentHaggler2012 takes a more concessive approach. Although the preferences differed in
these experiments, the difference between them was relatively small. Since the strate-
gies used by the opponents were identical, it is likely that similar behaviour would have
been observed despite the difference in preferences. Therefore, our agent has conceded
more than necessary, as |Q| increases, resulting in a slight decreasing trend in the utility
achieved, where an increasing one would otherwise have been expected.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we have shown the performance of our many-to-many negotiation agent
compared to that of two benchmark strategies. Specifically, we have shown that our
strategy is effective at coordinating multiple concurrent negotiations (Requirement 8)
in settings where decommitment is allowed (Requirement 9), outperforming the state-
of-the-art benchmark across a range of different scenario types (on average, by 4.7%).
It is a particularly strong strategy for highly competitive scenario types, such as the
ADG and Travel types, where, in some cases (ADG scenario type with 4 opponents each
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(a) Camera scenario type.
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Figure 6.4: Average utility of the concurrent negotiation strategies in negotiations
where each opponent uses different preferences, but the same strategy, according to the
number of opponents, in individual scenario types. Error bars show the 95% confidence
intervals.
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having a different profile), it outperforms NguyenAgent by as much as 61%. In other
cases, it is not much better, or even may be worse than the state-of-the-art benchmark.

Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis begins by introducing the challenges associated with automated negotiation
in complex environments (in Chapter 1) along with related work (in Chapter 2). It then
describes (in Chapter 3) the negotiating agents that we have developed, which address
some of the limitations of the existing approaches, and meet the research requirements
that we set out in Chapter 1. Specifically, the agents use a decentralised approach
(Requirement 1) to negotiate over multiple issues (Requirement 4) with an unknown
ordering (Requirement 5). Furthermore, in our environment, negotiation occurs in real
time (Requirement 6), with a real-time deadline and discounting factor, as opposed to
much of the literature on bilateral negotiation, where the time constraints depend on the
number of interactions, not the actual elapsed time, and therefore any deliberation time
by the agent is not taken into account. In terms of performance, the main challenge was
to design a strategy that could achieve a high utility in negotiations where the preferences
and the behaviour of the opponents are unknown (Requirement 3). Furthermore, the
strategy that we designed needed to reach efficient agreements (Requirement 2), and be
computationally tractable (Requirement 7). To this end, we developed two concession
strategies as follows. The first uses a fast, least squares regression approach to predict
the future concession of the opponent, which can be repeated after each offer. The
second, more advanced strategy uses a slower, Gaussian process regression technique,
which, in addition to the prediction, also provides a measure of the confidence in that
prediction. It then uses this information in order to set its concession as a best response
to the opponent’s behaviour.
As part of our evaluation (Chapter 4), we have compared the performance of our agents
against the performance of those used in the Automated Negotiation Agent Competitions
(ANAC). Furthermore, we also use the scenarios from ANAC 2012 in our evaluation.
These scenarios and agents are a good representation of the state-of-the-art, and they
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form an independently developed, varied set of opponents and settings which are ideal
for benchmarking our strategies against. Overall, in a tournament consisting of the top
8 strategies from ANAC 2012, taking the scores averaged over all scenarios, our most
advanced one-to-one negotiation agent, IAMhaggler2012 finishes in 5th place. Despite
this relatively low ranking, the utility it achieves is still very close to that of the winning
agent. Specifically, its utility is 96% of that of the winning agent, AgentLG, whereas
the lowest scoring agent, AgentMR only achieves 52%. However, there are a number of
situations in which IAMhaggler2012 outperforms all of the other strategies. In more de-
tail, in the largest scenario, with discounting, its average utility in a tournament setting
was 33% higher than the agent with the second highest average utility. Furthermore,
IAMhaggler2012 achieves the highest self-play utility (that is, when both parties use
the same strategy). We have also shown that the agreements which are reached are ap-
proximately Pareto efficient (Requirement 2), and that our strategy is computationally
tractable (Requirement 7). Additionally, we have applied an empirical game theoretic
technique to analyse the results of a set of negotiation tournaments. By using this tech-
nique, we have shown that, in certain scenarios (particularly those in which are highly
discounted (δ = 0.5)), for the best performing subset of the strategies of the agents
present in the ANAC 2012 final, there is no incentive for any of the agents to switch
from using our IAMhaggler2012 strategy, to using another of those strategies.
Furthermore, in order to address our requirements for a strategy which can coordinate
multiple concurrent negotiations with a range of opponents (Requirement 8) in an envi-
ronment where decommitment is allowed (Requirement 9), we develop a further strategy
(Chapter 5). Specifically, this agent, IAMconcurrentHaggler2012, uses Gaussian process
regression to predict the future concession of each opponent. It uses these predictions
to coordinate the concession against all of its opponents. Once an agreement has been
reached, the agent continues negotiating in an attempt to reach a better agreement (after
payment of a decommitment penalty) with a different opponent.
Finally, in our evaluation of IAMconcurrentHaggler (Chapter 6), we have shown how, in
negotiations with only a small number of opponents (4 or 5), our agent achieves, on av-
erage, higher utilities than both the state-of-the-art and random benchmarks. Although
in the least competitive scenario type, IAMconcurrentHaggler is slightly outperformed
by the state-of-the-art benchmark, in the highly competitive scenario types, our strategy
achieves a substantially higher average utility than both the state-of-the-art (by up to
45%) and random (by up to 29%) benchmarks.
Overall, the work in this thesis advances the state-of-the-art by proposing a novel, prin-
cipled approach to concession in complex one-to-one negotiations. Whilst the strategy
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does not outperform all of the other strategies in all scenarios, it shows strong perfor-
mance in highly discounted scenarios, in which it is desirable to reach outcomes without
significant delay. Our extended strategy for many-to-many negotiation is one of the first
to coordinate concession against a range of opponents, in such a complex environment.
Our evaluation of this strategy shows that it outperforms an existing state-of-the-art
many-to-many negotiation strategy in the most competitive scenarios. Furthermore,
our evaluation shows how empirical game theoretic analysis can be used to consider the
robustness of a strategy in a tournament setting, against a range of different opponents.
7.1 Future Work
While we have advanced the state-of-the-art in the development of our negotiation strat-
egy, there are a number of ways in which this work could be extended. Therefore we now
introduce some ideas for future work, beginning with a set of possible improvements to
our model and concluding with more general ideas which address the interaction between
negotiation agents and humans.
Consider Influence on Adaptive Opponents: In all of our strategies, the approach
that our agent takes is to optimise its response to the behaviour of any opponents,
assuming that those opponents use a fixed strategy which does not respond to our own
behaviour. In practice this may not always be the case, since many of the strategies
(including our own) adapt to the behaviour of the opponent. If our strategy can be
extended to consider the effect that it can have on an opponent which adapts to our
offers, then it can potentially be less adaptive, instead relying on the adaptiveness of its
opponents, in order to reduce its concession and achieve a greater utility.
Consider Dependency between Similar Points in Time: Once our agent has
determined the time, t∗, at which it expects the discounted utility of the opponent to be
maximised, it aims to maximise its expected utility by considering only agreements that
can be made at that time. In order to produce a computationally tractable approach,
this possibility of reaching an agreement at times other than t∗ is not included in our
current model. However, in practice, if the agent fails to reach an agreement at that
time, it will continue to negotiate and is still likely to be able to reach some form of
agreement. Consequently, our strategy may be taking a more concessionary approach
than necessary as it focuses on the need to reach agreement at t∗. In terms of addressing
this limitation, it would be necessary to consider that the discounting factor will have
a greater effect on any later agreement. Furthermore, the probability of acceptance at
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time t+  is very similar to the probability of acceptance at time t, and this correlation
would also need to be considered in an enhanced model. As part of this enhancement,
the rate of offers need to be considered, as this rate gives an indication of the number
of remaining offers before the deadline and therefore the number of opportunities for
agreement.
Consider Dependency between Behaviour of Opponents in Many-to-Many
Negotiations: Another assumption which is implicit in the design of our many-to-
many negotiation strategy is that the behaviour of each opponent is independent of
each other. However, if any of the opponents use similar strategies or preferences (as
is the case in the negotiations we consider in Chapter 6), then there is likely to be
a correlation between the behaviour observed from those opponents, which should be
considered in order to more accurately predict the future concession of the opponents.
Applying Our Strategies to Negotiations against Humans: Another direction
which could be taken in order to extend this work is to consider how our strategy could
be adapted for use in negotiations where some of the opponents are human. In such
a setting, any agreement with these human opponents would need to be made after
much fewer rounds than is common in a set of negotiations where all participants are
represented by agents. Furthermore, due to this limitation on the number of rounds,
caused by to the increased time taken by a human opponent, the agent may also benefit
by spending more time in computing each offer. Currently, our strategies take advantage
of the high number of offers which can be made in an agent-only negotiation environment.
As the number of offers becomes more limited, it becomes more important, at a given
utility level, for the agent to propose the offers that are most likely to be accepted by
the opponent. One way in which our strategy could be adapted to achieve this is to
use a technique based on the one proposed by Hindriks and Tykhonov (2008), which
uses Bayesian learning in order to model the utility functions of the opponents, and uses
this model to search for Pareto-optimal offers. Lin and Kraus (2010) review a range
of agents specifically designed for negotiations involving agents and humans, and their
work provides important insights into the considerations necessary for such negotiation.
Communication between Agents and the Humans they Represent: Even in
a negotiation environment where all of the negotiators are represented by agents, there
are still a number of aspects to be considered regarding the interaction between each
agent and the human it represents. These include the need for humans to express their
preferences in the form of a utility function. Pommeranz et al. (2008) evaluate a range
of different techniques for elicitation of preferences for use with automated negotiation.
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It may also be desirable for the agent to provide feedback to the human to indicate why
it behaves in a particular way, and to provide assurances that the agent is performing
the best it can.

Appendix A
Scenarios
This appendix details all of the scenarios that were used in the evaluation sections.
These scenarios were gathered from the 2010, 2011 and 2012 editions of the Automated
Negotiating Agents Competition. In 2010, the scenarios were selected by the organisers.
In 2011 and 2012, the scenarios were designed by the participants.
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A.1 Airport Site Selection Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Cost w1,1 = 0.5 w2,1 = 0.25
V1,1 = GreaterThanOrEqual5.2bn U1,1(V1,1) = 0.1 U2,1(V1,1) = 0.111
V1,2 = 5.0bn U1,1(V1,2) = 0.2 U2,1(V1,2) = 1
V1,3 = 4.8bn U1,1(V1,3) = 0.3 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.889
V1,4 = 4.6bn U1,1(V1,4) = 0.4 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.778
V1,5 = 4.4bn U1,1(V1,5) = 0.5 U2,1(V1,5) = 0.667
V1,6 = 4.2bn U1,1(V1,6) = 0.6 U2,1(V1,6) = 0.556
V1,7 = 4.0bn U1,1(V1,7) = 0.7 U2,1(V1,7) = 0.444
V1,8 = 3.8bn U1,1(V1,8) = 0.8 U2,1(V1,8) = 0.333
V1,9 = 3.6bn U1,1(V1,9) = 0.9 U2,1(V1,9) = 0.222
V1,10 = LessThanOrEqual3.4bn U1,1(V1,10) = 1 U2,1(V1,10) = 0.111
Issue 2: Noise w1,2 = 0.25 w2,2 = 0.25
V2,1 = LessThan10000 U1,2(V2,1) = 0.286 U2,2(V2,1) = 1
V2,2 = 10000 U1,2(V2,2) = 0.429 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.857
V2,3 = 20000 U1,2(V2,3) = 0.571 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.714
V2,4 = 30000 U1,2(V2,4) = 1 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.571
V2,5 = 40000 U1,2(V2,5) = 0.571 U2,2(V2,5) = 0.429
V2,6 = 50000 U1,2(V2,6) = 0.429 U2,2(V2,6) = 0.286
V2,7 = GreaterThan50000 U1,2(V2,7) = 0.286 U2,2(V2,7) = 0.143
Issue 3: AccidentLevelPerMillionPassengerMiles w1,3 = 0.25 w2,3 = 0.5
V3,1 = GreaterThanOrEqual0.1 U1,3(V3,1) = 0 U2,3(V3,1) = 0
V3,2 = 0.08 U1,3(V3,2) = 0.2 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.2
V3,3 = 0.06 U1,3(V3,3) = 0.4 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.4
V3,4 = 0.04 U1,3(V3,4) = 0.6 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.6
V3,5 = 0.02 U1,3(V3,5) = 0.8 U2,3(V3,5) = 0.8
V3,6 = LessThan0.02 U1,3(V3,6) = 1 U2,3(V3,6) = 1
Table A.1: Airport Site Selection scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-2 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.623 ±0.002
2-4 IAMhaggler2012 0.617 ±0.002
2-4 OMACagent 0.617 ±0.003
1-6 CUHKAgent 0.613 ±0.013
4-5 AgentLG 0.604 ±0.005
5-6 Meta-Agent 0.593 ±0.007
7 BRAMAgent2 0.572 ±0.009
8 AgentMR 0.388 ±0.002
Table A.2: Scores in the Airport Site Selection scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
U1
U
2
Figure A.1: Airport Site Selection scenario outcome space.
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A.2 Barbecue Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Meat w1,1 = 0.3 w2,1 = 0.3
V1,1 = Burgers and chicken U1,1(V1,1) = 0.6 U2,1(V1,1) = 0.01
V1,2 = Fish U1,1(V1,2) = 0.5 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.8
V1,3 = Luxury meats U1,1(V1,3) = 1 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.3
V1,4 = Biological U1,1(V1,4) = 0.7 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.5
V1,5 = Vegetarian U1,1(V1,5) = 0.1 U2,1(V1,5) = 1
V1,6 = None U1,1(V1,6) = 0.01 U2,1(V1,6) = 1
Issue 2: Drinks w1,2 = 0.25 w2,2 = 0.1
V2,1 = Non-Alcoholic U1,2(V2,1) = 0.1 U2,2(V2,1) = 0.6
V2,2 = Beer plus U1,2(V2,2) = 0.7 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.7
V2,3 = Bio-beer U1,2(V2,3) = 0.1 U2,2(V2,3) = 1
V2,4 = Luxury alcoholic U1,2(V2,4) = 1 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.9
Issue 3: Location w1,3 = 0.25 w2,3 = 0.2
V3,1 = Balcony U1,3(V3,1) = 0.3 U2,3(V3,1) = 0.3
V3,2 = Woods U1,3(V3,2) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,2) = 1
V3,3 = Park U1,3(V3,3) = 0.7 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.4
V3,4 = Beach U1,3(V3,4) = 1 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.7
Issue 4: Vegetables w1,4 = 0.1 w2,4 = 0.3
V4,1 = None U1,4(V4,1) = 0.8 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.01
V4,2 = Cheap veggies U1,4(V4,2) = 1 U2,4(V4,2) = 0.2
V4,3 = Good veggies U1,4(V4,3) = 0.4 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.7
V4,4 = Prepared veggies U1,4(V4,4) = 0.6 U2,4(V4,4) = 0.6
V4,5 = Superveggies U1,4(V4,5) = 0.7 U2,4(V4,5) = 1
Issue 5: BBQ type w1,5 = 0.1 w2,5 = 0.1
V5,1 = Disposable U1,5(V5,1) = 0.9 U2,5(V5,1) = 0.1
V5,2 = Normal U1,5(V5,2) = 1 U2,5(V5,2) = 0.6
V5,3 = Gas U1,5(V5,3) = 0.8 U2,5(V5,3) = 1
Table A.3: Barbecue scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1 AgentLG 0.644 ±0.004
2 OMACagent 0.636 ±0.004
3-4 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.626 ±0.004
3-4 CUHKAgent 0.622 ±0.003
5-7 IAMhaggler2012 0.596 ±0.008
5-7 BRAMAgent2 0.593 ±0.008
5-7 Meta-Agent 0.593 ±0.010
8 AgentMR 0.188 ±0.000
Table A.4: Scores in the Barbecue scenario (averaged over δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈
{0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.2: Barbecue scenario outcome space.
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A.3 Barter Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: price w1,1 = 0.36 w2,1 = 0.4
V1,1 = 3gm U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 0.25
V1,2 = 4gm U1,1(V1,2) = 0.75 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.5
V1,3 = 5gm U1,1(V1,3) = 0.5 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.75
V1,4 = 6gm U1,1(V1,4) = 0.25 U2,1(V1,4) = 1
Issue 2: CookingOil w1,2 = 0.32 w2,2 = 0.4
V2,1 = 4ml U1,2(V2,1) = 1 U2,2(V2,1) = 0.2
V2,2 = 5ml U1,2(V2,2) = 0.8 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.4
V2,3 = 6ml U1,2(V2,3) = 0.6 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.6
V2,4 = 7ml U1,2(V2,4) = 0.4 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.8
V2,5 = 8ml U1,2(V2,5) = 0.2 U2,2(V2,5) = 1
Issue 3: Sugar w1,3 = 0.32 w2,3 = 0.2
V3,1 = 4gm U1,3(V3,1) = 1 U2,3(V3,1) = 0.25
V3,2 = 6gm U1,3(V3,2) = 0.75 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.5
V3,3 = 8gm U1,3(V3,3) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.75
V3,4 = 10gm U1,3(V3,4) = 0.25 U2,3(V3,4) = 1
Table A.5: Barter scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-2 OMACagent 0.503 ±0.009
1-2 AgentLG 0.492 ±0.004
3 IAMhaggler2012 0.483 ±0.006
4-5 BRAMAgent2 0.471 ±0.004
4-5 CUHKAgent 0.468 ±0.001
6-7 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.429 ±0.001
6-7 Meta-Agent 0.426 ±0.006
8 AgentMR 0.300 ±0.001
Table A.6: Scores in the Barter scenario (averaged over δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈
{0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.3: Barter scenario outcome space.
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A.4 Camera (2012) Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Maker w1,1 = 0.34 w2,1 = 0.08
V1,1 = Canon U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 0.01
V1,2 = Nikon U1,1(V1,2) = 0.938 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.14
V1,3 = Pentax U1,1(V1,3) = 0.031 U2,1(V1,3) = 1
V1,4 = Sony U1,1(V1,4) = 0.078 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.6
V1,5 = Panasonic U1,1(V1,5) = 0.094 U2,1(V1,5) = 0.04
Issue 2: Body w1,2 = 0.06 w2,2 = 0.09
V2,1 = Full size U1,2(V2,1) = 1 U2,2(V2,1) = 0.095
V2,2 = APS-C U1,2(V2,2) = 0.333 U2,2(V2,2) = 1
V2,3 = Micro Four Thirds U1,2(V2,3) = 0.133 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.381
V2,4 = compact U1,2(V2,4) = 0.067 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.032
Issue 3: Lens w1,3 = 0.13 w2,3 = 0.34
V3,1 = High end model U1,3(V3,1) = 1 U2,3(V3,1) = 1
V3,2 = Middle range model U1,3(V3,2) = 0.286 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.5
V3,3 = Entry model U1,3(V3,3) = 0.086 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.04
Issue 4: Tripod w1,4 = 0.09 w2,4 = 0.26
V4,1 = GITZO U1,4(V4,1) = 1 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.313
V4,2 = Manfrotto U1,4(V4,2) = 0.476 U2,4(V4,2) = 1
V4,3 = Induro U1,4(V4,3) = 0.048 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.125
Issue 5: Bag w1,5 = 0.11 w2,5 = 0.17
V5,1 = Domke U1,5(V5,1) = 1 U2,5(V5,1) = 0.2
V5,2 = Lowepro U1,5(V5,2) = 0.162 U2,5(V5,2) = 1
V5,3 = Tamrac U1,5(V5,3) = 0.103 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.1
V5,4 = National Geographic U1,5(V5,4) = 0.132 U2,5(V5,4) = 0.3
V5,5 = Artizan&Artist U1,5(V5,5) = 0.044 U2,5(V5,5) = 0.4
Issue 6: Accessory w1,6 = 0.26 w2,6 = 0.07
V6,1 = Electronic Flash U1,6(V6,1) = 0.182 U2,6(V6,1) = 1
V6,2 = Battery Grip U1,6(V6,2) = 1 U2,6(V6,2) = 0.429
V6,3 = Memory U1,6(V6,3) = 0.045 U2,6(V6,3) = 0.571
V6,4 = Strap U1,6(V6,4) = 0.023 U2,6(V6,4) = 0.143
Table A.7: Camera (2012) scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-2 AgentLG 0.704 ±0.003
1-3 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.694 ±0.007
2-3 CUHKAgent 0.690 ±0.002
4 OMACagent 0.680 ±0.003
5 Meta-Agent 0.661 ±0.004
6-7 IAMhaggler2012 0.643 ±0.005
6-7 BRAMAgent2 0.640 ±0.011
8 AgentMR 0.444 ±0.005
Table A.8: Scores in the Travel scenario (averaged over δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈
{0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.4: Camera (2012) scenario outcome space.
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A.5 Energy (2012 small) Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: 0000-0400 w1,1 = 0.264 w2,1 = 0.046
V1,1 = 0 kW U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 0
V1,2 = 25 kW U1,1(V1,2) = 0.814 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.014
V1,3 = 50 kW U1,1(V1,3) = 0.777 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.277
V1,4 = 75 kW U1,1(V1,4) = 0.185 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.883
V1,5 = 100 kW U1,1(V1,5) = 0 U2,1(V1,5) = 1
Issue 2: 0400-0800 w1,2 = 0.163 w2,2 = 0.253
V2,1 = 0 kW U1,2(V2,1) = 1 U2,2(V2,1) = 0
V2,2 = 25 kW U1,2(V2,2) = 0.959 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.019
V2,3 = 50 kW U1,2(V2,3) = 0.947 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.344
V2,4 = 75 kW U1,2(V2,4) = 0.084 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.895
V2,5 = 100 kW U1,2(V2,5) = 0 U2,2(V2,5) = 1
Issue 3: 0800-1200 w1,3 = 0.176 w2,3 = 0.273
V3,1 = 0 kW U1,3(V3,1) = 1 U2,3(V3,1) = 0
V3,2 = 25 kW U1,3(V3,2) = 0.839 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.243
V3,3 = 50 kW U1,3(V3,3) = 0.55 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.413
V3,4 = 75 kW U1,3(V3,4) = 0.482 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.713
V3,5 = 100 kW U1,3(V3,5) = 0 U2,3(V3,5) = 1
Issue 4: 1200-1600 w1,4 = 0.051 w2,4 = 0.215
V4,1 = 0 kW U1,4(V4,1) = 1 U2,4(V4,1) = 0
V4,2 = 25 kW U1,4(V4,2) = 0.905 U2,4(V4,2) = 0.354
V4,3 = 50 kW U1,4(V4,3) = 0.386 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.51
V4,4 = 75 kW U1,4(V4,4) = 0.265 U2,4(V4,4) = 0.555
V4,5 = 100 kW U1,4(V4,5) = 0 U2,4(V4,5) = 1
Issue 5: 1600-2000 w1,5 = 0.322 w2,5 = 0.155
V5,1 = 0 kW U1,5(V5,1) = 1 U2,5(V5,1) = 0
V5,2 = 25 kW U1,5(V5,2) = 0.659 U2,5(V5,2) = 0.022
V5,3 = 50 kW U1,5(V5,3) = 0.394 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.107
V5,4 = 75 kW U1,5(V5,4) = 0.192 U2,5(V5,4) = 0.749
V5,5 = 100 kW U1,5(V5,5) = 0 U2,5(V5,5) = 1
Issue 6: 2000-0000 w1,6 = 0.025 w2,6 = 0.059
V6,1 = 0 kW U1,6(V6,1) = 1 U2,6(V6,1) = 0
V6,2 = 25 kW U1,6(V6,2) = 0.714 U2,6(V6,2) = 0.671
V6,3 = 50 kW U1,6(V6,3) = 0.675 U2,6(V6,3) = 0.741
V6,4 = 75 kW U1,6(V6,4) = 0.527 U2,6(V6,4) = 0.807
V6,5 = 100 kW U1,6(V6,5) = 0 U2,6(V6,5) = 1
Table A.9: Energy (2012 small) scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1 OMACagent 0.512 ±0.006
2-3 AgentLG 0.486 ±0.004
2-3 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.480 ±0.005
4-6 IAMhaggler2012 0.451 ±0.006
4-6 CUHKAgent 0.446 ±0.006
6-7 BRAMAgent2 0.425 ±0.011
4-7 Meta-Agent 0.424 ±0.017
8 AgentMR 0.188 ±0.000
Table A.10: Scores in the Energy (2012 small) scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.5: Energy (2012 small) scenario outcome space.
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A.6 Energy (2012) Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: 0000-0300 w1,1 = 0.16 w2,1 = 0.21
V1,1 = 0 kW U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 0
V1,2 = 25 kW U1,1(V1,2) = 0.861 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.173
V1,3 = 50 kW U1,1(V1,3) = 0.824 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.388
V1,4 = 75 kW U1,1(V1,4) = 0.044 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.63
V1,5 = 100 kW U1,1(V1,5) = 0 U2,1(V1,5) = 1
Issue 2: 0300-0600 w1,2 = 0.154 w2,2 = 0.144
V2,1 = 0 kW U1,2(V2,1) = 1 U2,2(V2,1) = 0
V2,2 = 25 kW U1,2(V2,2) = 0.443 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.064
V2,3 = 50 kW U1,2(V2,3) = 0.414 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.291
V2,4 = 75 kW U1,2(V2,4) = 0.248 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.592
V2,5 = 100 kW U1,2(V2,5) = 0 U2,2(V2,5) = 1
Issue 3: 0600-0900 w1,3 = 0.097 w2,3 = 0.054
V3,1 = 0 kW U1,3(V3,1) = 1 U2,3(V3,1) = 0
V3,2 = 25 kW U1,3(V3,2) = 0.854 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.262
V3,3 = 50 kW U1,3(V3,3) = 0.604 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.277
V3,4 = 75 kW U1,3(V3,4) = 0.41 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.822
V3,5 = 100 kW U1,3(V3,5) = 0 U2,3(V3,5) = 1
Issue 4: 0900-1200 w1,4 = 0.114 w2,4 = 0.113
V4,1 = 0 kW U1,4(V4,1) = 1 U2,4(V4,1) = 0
V4,2 = 25 kW U1,4(V4,2) = 0.749 U2,4(V4,2) = 0.461
V4,3 = 50 kW U1,4(V4,3) = 0.447 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.476
V4,4 = 75 kW U1,4(V4,4) = 0.056 U2,4(V4,4) = 0.537
V4,5 = 100 kW U1,4(V4,5) = 0 U2,4(V4,5) = 1
Issue 5: 1200-1500 w1,5 = 0.104 w2,5 = 0.111
V5,1 = 0 kW U1,5(V5,1) = 1 U2,5(V5,1) = 0
V5,2 = 25 kW U1,5(V5,2) = 0.914 U2,5(V5,2) = 0.34
V5,3 = 50 kW U1,5(V5,3) = 0.66 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.359
V5,4 = 75 kW U1,5(V5,4) = 0.285 U2,5(V5,4) = 0.461
V5,5 = 100 kW U1,5(V5,5) = 0 U2,5(V5,5) = 1
Issue 6: 1500-1800 w1,6 = 0.068 w2,6 = 0.139
V6,1 = 0 kW U1,6(V6,1) = 1 U2,6(V6,1) = 0
V6,2 = 25 kW U1,6(V6,2) = 0.67 U2,6(V6,2) = 0.392
V6,3 = 50 kW U1,6(V6,3) = 0.507 U2,6(V6,3) = 0.797
V6,4 = 75 kW U1,6(V6,4) = 0.147 U2,6(V6,4) = 0.93
V6,5 = 100 kW U1,6(V6,5) = 0 U2,6(V6,5) = 1
Issue 7: 1800-2100 w1,7 = 0.126 w2,7 = 0.188
V7,1 = 0 kW U1,7(V7,1) = 1 U2,7(V7,1) = 0
V7,2 = 25 kW U1,7(V7,2) = 0.505 U2,7(V7,2) = 0.16
V7,3 = 50 kW U1,7(V7,3) = 0.223 U2,7(V7,3) = 0.527
V7,4 = 75 kW U1,7(V7,4) = 0.188 U2,7(V7,4) = 0.972
V7,5 = 100 kW U1,7(V7,5) = 0 U2,7(V7,5) = 1
Issue 8: 2100-0000 w1,8 = 0.176 w2,8 = 0.041
V8,1 = 0 kW U1,8(V8,1) = 1 U2,8(V8,1) = 0
V8,2 = 25 kW U1,8(V8,2) = 0.942 U2,8(V8,2) = 0.232
V8,3 = 50 kW U1,8(V8,3) = 0.471 U2,8(V8,3) = 0.289
V8,4 = 75 kW U1,8(V8,4) = 0.33 U2,8(V8,4) = 0.846
V8,5 = 100 kW U1,8(V8,5) = 0 U2,8(V8,5) = 1
Table A.11: Energy (2012) scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1 OMACagent 0.457 ±0.003
2 AgentLG 0.435 ±0.008
3-4 BRAMAgent2 0.411 ±0.005
3-4 IAMhaggler2012 0.409 ±0.004
5-6 CUHKAgent 0.389 ±0.006
5-7 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.378 ±0.013
6-7 Meta-Agent 0.361 ±0.002
8 AgentMR 0.221 ±0.002
Table A.12: Scores in the Energy (2012) scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.6: Energy (2012) scenario outcome space.
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A.7 England vs Zimbabwe (2012) Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Size of Fund w1,1 = 0.303 w2,1 = 0.197
V1,1 = $100 Billion U1,1(V1,1) = 0.556 U2,1(V1,1) = 1
V1,2 = $50 Billion U1,1(V1,2) = 0.778 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.778
V1,3 = $10 billion U1,1(V1,3) = 1 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.556
V1,4 = No agreement U1,1(V1,4) = 0.111 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.111
Issue 2: Impact on Other Aid w1,2 = 0.303 w2,2 = 0.201
V2,1 = No reduction U1,2(V2,1) = 0.375 U2,2(V2,1) = 1
V2,2 = Reduction equal to half of fund size U1,2(V2,2) = 0.75 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.625
V2,3 = Reduction equal to fund size U1,2(V2,3) = 1 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.375
V2,4 = No agreement U1,2(V2,4) = 0.125 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.125
Issue 3: Zimbabwe Trade Policy w1,3 = 0.049 w2,3 = 0.154
V3,1 = Zimbabwe will reduce tariffs on imports U1,3(V3,1) = 1 U2,3(V3,1) = 0.111
V3,2 = Zimbabwe will increase tariffs on imports U1,3(V3,2) = 0.083 U2,3(V3,2) = 1
V3,3 = No agreement U1,3(V3,3) = 0.583 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.556
Issue 4: England Trade Policy w1,4 = 0.049 w2,4 = 0.154
V4,1 = England will reduce imports U1,4(V4,1) = 1 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.053
V4,2 = England will increase imports U1,4(V4,2) = 0.1 U2,4(V4,2) = 1
V4,3 = No agreement U1,4(V4,3) = 0.6 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.474
Issue 5: Forum on Other Health Issues w1,5 = 0.295 w2,5 = 0.293
V5,1 = Creation of fund U1,5(V5,1) = 0.7 U2,5(V5,1) = 1
V5,2 = Creation of committee to discuss creation of fund U1,5(V5,2) = 1 U2,5(V5,2) = 0.818
V5,3 = Creation of committee to develop agenda U1,5(V5,3) = 0.4 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.636
V5,4 = No U1,5(V5,4) = 0.1 U2,5(V5,4) = 0.091
Table A.13: England vs Zimbabwe (2012) scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-2 AgentLG 0.664 ±0.004
1-4 CUHKAgent 0.650 ±0.008
2-4 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.648 ±0.005
2-4 OMACagent 0.647 ±0.001
5-6 IAMhaggler2012 0.624 ±0.005
5-6 Meta-Agent 0.616 ±0.006
7 BRAMAgent2 0.600 ±0.005
8 AgentMR 0.410 ±0.006
Table A.14: Scores in the England vs Zimbabwe (2012) scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.7: England vs Zimbabwe (2012) scenario outcome space.
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A.8 Fifty fifty Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Fifty Fifty w1,1 = 1 w2,1 = 1
V1,1 = 100 0 U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 0
V1,2 = 90 10 U1,1(V1,2) = 0.9 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.1
V1,3 = 80 20 U1,1(V1,3) = 0.8 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.2
V1,4 = 70 30 U1,1(V1,4) = 0.7 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.3
V1,5 = 60 40 U1,1(V1,5) = 0.6 U2,1(V1,5) = 0.4
V1,6 = 50 50 U1,1(V1,6) = 0.5 U2,1(V1,6) = 0.5
V1,7 = 40 60 U1,1(V1,7) = 0.4 U2,1(V1,7) = 0.6
V1,8 = 30 70 U1,1(V1,8) = 0.3 U2,1(V1,8) = 0.7
V1,9 = 20 80 U1,1(V1,9) = 0.2 U2,1(V1,9) = 0.8
V1,10 = 10 90 U1,1(V1,10) = 0.1 U2,1(V1,10) = 0.9
V1,11 = 0 100 U1,1(V1,11) = 0 U2,1(V1,11) = 1
Table A.15: Fifty fifty scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-3 IAMhaggler2012 0.376 ±0.018
1-2 CUHKAgent 0.371 ±0.005
2-3 OMACagent 0.361 ±0.006
4-6 AgentLG 0.343 ±0.012
4-6 BRAMAgent2 0.341 ±0.008
4-7 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.329 ±0.008
6-7 Meta-Agent 0.318 ±0.013
8 AgentMR 0.235 ±0.007
Table A.16: Scores in the Fifty fifty scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.8: Fifty fifty scenario outcome space.
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A.9 Fitness Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: kind of fitness w1,1 = 0.154 w2,1 = 0.304
V1,1 = swimming U1,1(V1,1) = 0.6 U2,1(V1,1) = 1
V1,2 = yoga U1,1(V1,2) = 0.8 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.6
V1,3 = aerobics U1,1(V1,3) = 0.4 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.4
V1,4 = running U1,1(V1,4) = 0.2 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.2
V1,5 = tennis U1,1(V1,5) = 1 U2,1(V1,5) = 0.8
Issue 2: time to do w1,2 = 0.045 w2,2 = 0.098
V2,1 = 30minutes U1,2(V2,1) = 0.75 U2,2(V2,1) = 0.25
V2,2 = 1hour U1,2(V2,2) = 1 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.75
V2,3 = 3hour U1,2(V2,3) = 0.5 U2,2(V2,3) = 1
V2,4 = 5hour U1,2(V2,4) = 0.25 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.5
Issue 3: distance w1,3 = 0.298 w2,3 = 0.201
V3,1 = 0km U1,3(V3,1) = 0.75 U2,3(V3,1) = 1
V3,2 = 1km U1,3(V3,2) = 1 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.75
V3,3 = 40km U1,3(V3,3) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.5
V3,4 = 80km U1,3(V3,4) = 0.25 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.25
Issue 4: intensity w1,4 = 0.299 w2,4 = 0.098
V4,1 = light U1,4(V4,1) = 0.5 U2,4(V4,1) = 1
V4,2 = moderate U1,4(V4,2) = 0.75 U2,4(V4,2) = 0.75
V4,3 = as training U1,4(V4,3) = 1 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.5
V4,4 = as boot-camp U1,4(V4,4) = 0.25 U2,4(V4,4) = 0.25
Issue 5: Price($) w1,5 = 0.204 w2,5 = 0.299
V5,1 = 0 U1,5(V5,1) = 1 U2,5(V5,1) = 0
V5,2 = 1 U1,5(V5,2) = 0.9 U2,5(V5,2) = 0.1
V5,3 = 2 U1,5(V5,3) = 0.8 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.2
V5,4 = 3 U1,5(V5,4) = 0.7 U2,5(V5,4) = 0.3
V5,5 = 4 U1,5(V5,5) = 0.6 U2,5(V5,5) = 0.4
V5,6 = 5 U1,5(V5,6) = 0.5 U2,5(V5,6) = 0.5
V5,7 = 6 U1,5(V5,7) = 0.4 U2,5(V5,7) = 0.6
V5,8 = 7 U1,5(V5,8) = 0.3 U2,5(V5,8) = 0.7
V5,9 = 8 U1,5(V5,9) = 0.2 U2,5(V5,9) = 0.8
V5,10 = 9 U1,5(V5,10) = 0.1 U2,5(V5,10) = 0.9
V5,11 = 10 U1,5(V5,11) = 0 U2,5(V5,11) = 1
Table A.17: Fitness scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1 AgentLG 0.654 ±0.006
2-3 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.623 ±0.004
2-4 CUHKAgent 0.620 ±0.006
3-5 OMACagent 0.611 ±0.002
4-6 IAMhaggler2012 0.591 ±0.015
5-6 Meta-Agent 0.578 ±0.008
7 BRAMAgent2 0.562 ±0.010
8 AgentMR 0.284 ±0.009
Table A.18: Scores in the Fitness scenario (averaged over δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈
{0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.9: Fitness scenario outcome space.
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A.10 Flight Booking Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: price w1,1 = 0.35 w2,1 = 0.7
V1,1 = 150000yen U1,1(V1,1) = 0.25 U2,1(V1,1) = 1
V1,2 = 200000yen U1,1(V1,2) = 0.5 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.75
V1,3 = 250000yen U1,1(V1,3) = 0.75 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.5
V1,4 = 300000yen U1,1(V1,4) = 1 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.25
Issue 2: DepartureAirPort w1,2 = 0.35 w2,2 = 0.15
V2,1 = CentrAir U1,2(V2,1) = 0.667 U2,2(V2,1) = 0.333
V2,2 = Narita U1,2(V2,2) = 1 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.667
V2,3 = Kansai U1,2(V2,3) = 0.333 U2,2(V2,3) = 1
Issue 3: DepartureDate w1,3 = 0.3 w2,3 = 0.15
V3,1 = Sep2 2011 U1,3(V3,1) = 0.333 U2,3(V3,1) = 1
V3,2 = Sep3 2011 U1,3(V3,2) = 1 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.667
V3,3 = Sep4 2011 U1,3(V3,3) = 0.667 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.333
Table A.19: Flight Booking scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-4 CUHKAgent 0.625 ±0.006
1-3 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.622 ±0.001
1-4 BRAMAgent2 0.620 ±0.003
2-4 OMACagent 0.617 ±0.003
5 Meta-Agent 0.605 ±0.000
6 IAMhaggler2012 0.599 ±0.000
7 AgentLG 0.581 ±0.003
8 AgentMR 0.412 ±0.001
Table A.20: Scores in the Flight Booking scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.10: Flight Booking scenario outcome space.
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A.11 Housekeeping Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Floor Mopping w1,1 = 0.3 w2,1 = 0.1
V1,1 = Husband U1,1(V1,1) = 0.1 U2,1(V1,1) = 1
V1,2 = Wife U1,1(V1,2) = 1 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.5
V1,3 = Both U1,1(V1,3) = 0.3 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.8
V1,4 = Maid U1,1(V1,4) = 0.7 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.3
Issue 2: Dishes Cleaning w1,2 = 0.1 w2,2 = 0.4
V2,1 = Husband U1,2(V2,1) = 0.4 U2,2(V2,1) = 1
V2,2 = Wife U1,2(V2,2) = 1 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.1
V2,3 = Both U1,2(V2,3) = 0.85 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.3
Issue 3: Laundry w1,3 = 0.2 w2,3 = 0.2
V3,1 = Husband U1,3(V3,1) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,1) = 1
V3,2 = Wife U1,3(V3,2) = 1 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.6
Issue 4: Cooking w1,4 = 0.2 w2,4 = 0.15
V4,1 = Husband U1,4(V4,1) = 0.1 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.8
V4,2 = Wife U1,4(V4,2) = 0.7 U2,4(V4,2) = 0.7
V4,3 = Both U1,4(V4,3) = 0.4 U2,4(V4,3) = 1
V4,4 = Take-away food U1,4(V4,4) = 1 U2,4(V4,4) = 0.4
Issue 5: Gardening w1,5 = 0.2 w2,5 = 0.15
V5,1 = Husband U1,5(V5,1) = 0.5 U2,5(V5,1) = 1
V5,2 = Wife U1,5(V5,2) = 0.7 U2,5(V5,2) = 0.1
V5,3 = Both U1,5(V5,3) = 1 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.4
V5,4 = Gardener U1,5(V5,4) = 0.1 U2,5(V5,4) = 0.9
Table A.21: Housekeeping scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-3 AgentLG 0.615 ±0.008
1-3 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.613 ±0.005
1-4 OMACagent 0.613 ±0.007
3-5 CUHKAgent 0.603 ±0.006
4-5 BRAMAgent2 0.595 ±0.004
6 IAMhaggler2012 0.586 ±0.004
7 Meta-Agent 0.576 ±0.005
8 AgentMR 0.201 ±0.000
Table A.22: Scores in the Housekeeping scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.11: Housekeeping scenario outcome space.
152 Appendix A Scenarios
A.12 IS BT Acquisition (2012) Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Price w1,1 = 0.3 w2,1 = 0.5
V1,1 = 1 million $ U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 0.8
V1,2 = 2.5 million $ U1,1(V1,2) = 0.9 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.8
V1,3 = 5 million $ U1,1(V1,3) = 0.8 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.9
V1,4 = 8 million $ U1,1(V1,4) = 0.8 U2,1(V1,4) = 1
Issue 2: IP w1,2 = 0.3 w2,2 = 0.04
V2,1 = IS receives all of the IP U1,2(V2,1) = 1 U2,2(V2,1) = 0.6
V2,2 = IS receives most of the IP U1,2(V2,2) = 0.4 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.7
V2,3 = BI-Tech founders maintain all IP U1,2(V2,3) = 0.9 U2,2(V2,3) = 1
Issue 3: Stocks w1,3 = 0.15 w2,3 = 0.2
V3,1 = BI-Tech founders get 2% U1,3(V3,1) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,1) = 0.5
V3,2 = BI-Tech founders get 2% + jobs at IS U1,3(V3,2) = 1 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.9
V3,3 = BI-Tech founders get 5% U1,3(V3,3) = 0.4 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.6
V3,4 = BI-Tech founders get 5% + jobs U1,3(V3,4) = 0.7 U2,3(V3,4) = 1
Issue 4: EmployeeAgreements w1,4 = 0.05 w2,4 = 0.06
V4,1 = salary raise of 15% U1,4(V4,1) = 0.857 U2,4(V4,1) = 1
V4,2 = same conditions U1,4(V4,2) = 0.857 U2,4(V4,2) = 0.778
V4,3 = private contracts U1,4(V4,3) = 1 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.889
V4,4 = half fired and half private contracts U1,4(V4,4) = 0.429 U2,4(V4,4) = 0.444
Issue 5: Legal Liability w1,5 = 0.2 w2,5 = 0.2
V5,1 = past activities remains with Bi-Tech U1,5(V5,1) = 1 U2,5(V5,1) = 0.7
V5,2 = IS liable for all activities U1,5(V5,2) = 0.7 U2,5(V5,2) = 1
Table A.23: IS BT Acquisition (2012) scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-2 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.786 ±0.000
1-3 CUHKAgent 0.776 ±0.011
2-3 AgentLG 0.772 ±0.007
4-6 IAMhaggler2012 0.758 ±0.007
4-7 OMACagent 0.749 ±0.003
4-7 BRAMAgent2 0.744 ±0.016
5-7 Meta-Agent 0.733 ±0.014
8 AgentMR 0.529 ±0.017
Table A.24: Scores in the IS BT Acquisition (2012) scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.12: IS BT Acquisition (2012) scenario outcome space.
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A.13 Music Collection Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Classical w1,1 = 0.055 w2,1 = 0.299
V1,1 = Bach U1,1(V1,1) = 0.25 U2,1(V1,1) = 1
V1,2 = Mozart U1,1(V1,2) = 0.75 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.5
V1,3 = Beethoven U1,1(V1,3) = 0.5 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.25
V1,4 = Prokofiev U1,1(V1,4) = 1 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.75
Issue 2: Rock w1,2 = 0.204 w2,2 = 0.233
V2,1 = Chuck Berry U1,2(V2,1) = 0.4 U2,2(V2,1) = 1
V2,2 = The Beatles U1,2(V2,2) = 0.2 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.2
V2,3 = The Doors U1,2(V2,3) = 0.6 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.6
V2,4 = Camel U1,2(V2,4) = 1 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.8
V2,5 = Nirvana U1,2(V2,5) = 0.4 U2,2(V2,5) = 0.4
Issue 3: Jazz w1,3 = 0.352 w2,3 = 0.085
V3,1 = Louie Armstrong U1,3(V3,1) = 0.833 U2,3(V3,1) = 1
V3,2 = Charlie Parker U1,3(V3,2) = 1 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.833
V3,3 = Miles Davis U1,3(V3,3) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.667
V3,4 = John Coltrane U1,3(V3,4) = 0.333 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.5
V3,5 = Herbie Hancock U1,3(V3,5) = 0.167 U2,3(V3,5) = 0.167
V3,6 = Cal Tjader U1,3(V3,6) = 0.667 U2,3(V3,6) = 0.333
Issue 4: Pop w1,4 = 0.065 w2,4 = 0.173
V4,1 = Michael Jackson U1,4(V4,1) = 0.333 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.333
V4,2 = Madonna U1,4(V4,2) = 1 U2,4(V4,2) = 0.667
V4,3 = Elton John U1,4(V4,3) = 0.667 U2,4(V4,3) = 1
Issue 5: Brazil w1,5 = 0.124 w2,5 = 0.109
V5,1 = Gilberto Gil U1,5(V5,1) = 0.333 U2,5(V5,1) = 0.667
V5,2 = Antonio Carlos Jobim U1,5(V5,2) = 1 U2,5(V5,2) = 1
V5,3 = Astrud Gilberto U1,5(V5,3) = 0.667 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.333
Issue 6: Latin w1,6 = 0.2 w2,6 = 0.1
V6,1 = Eddie Palmieri U1,6(V6,1) = 1 U2,6(V6,1) = 0.25
V6,2 = Maraca U1,6(V6,2) = 0.75 U2,6(V6,2) = 0.5
V6,3 = Gypsy Kings U1,6(V6,3) = 0.25 U2,6(V6,3) = 1
V6,4 = Tito Puente U1,6(V6,4) = 0.5 U2,6(V6,4) = 0.75
Table A.25: Music Collection scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1 CUHKAgent 0.767 ±0.004
2-3 AgentLG 0.759 ±0.004
2-3 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.756 ±0.003
4 OMACagent 0.745 ±0.004
5 IAMhaggler2012 0.735 ±0.002
6 BRAMAgent2 0.725 ±0.002
7 Meta-Agent 0.701 ±0.006
8 AgentMR 0.511 ±0.002
Table A.26: Scores in the Music Collection scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
U1
U
2
Figure A.13: Music Collection scenario outcome space.
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A.14 Outfit Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: shirts w1,1 = 0.147 w2,1 = 0.379
V1,1 = T-shirt U1,1(V1,1) = 0.2 U2,1(V1,1) = 1
V1,2 = Blouse U1,1(V1,2) = 1 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.2
V1,3 = Polo shirt U1,1(V1,3) = 0.4 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.6
V1,4 = sweaters U1,1(V1,4) = 0.6 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.8
Issue 2: pants w1,2 = 0.204 w2,2 = 0.318
V2,1 = Denim U1,2(V2,1) = 0.3 U2,2(V2,1) = 1
V2,2 = leather pants U1,2(V2,2) = 1 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.1
V2,3 = classic pants U1,2(V2,3) = 0.6 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.8
V2,4 = bermuda shorts U1,2(V2,4) = 0.4 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.5
Issue 3: shoes w1,3 = 0.55 w2,3 = 0.102
V3,1 = sneakers U1,3(V3,1) = 1 U2,3(V3,1) = 1
V3,2 = boots U1,3(V3,2) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.833
V3,3 = slippers U1,3(V3,3) = 0.033 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.333
V3,4 = sandals U1,3(V3,4) = 0.667 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.667
Issue 4: accessories w1,4 = 0.099 w2,4 = 0.201
V4,1 = hat U1,4(V4,1) = 0.5 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.125
V4,2 = sunglasses U1,4(V4,2) = 1 U2,4(V4,2) = 1
Table A.27: Outfit scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-2 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.668 ±0.004
1-2 CUHKAgent 0.668 ±0.005
3-4 OMACagent 0.651 ±0.007
3-7 IAMhaggler2012 0.643 ±0.007
4-7 AgentLG 0.641 ±0.004
4-7 Meta-Agent 0.635 ±0.003
4-7 BRAMAgent2 0.634 ±0.004
8 AgentMR 0.327 ±0.003
Table A.28: Scores in the Outfit scenario (averaged over δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈
{0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
U1
U
2
Figure A.14: Outfit scenario outcome space.
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A.15 Phone Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Brand w1,1 = 0.302 w2,1 = 0.198
V1,1 = HP U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 1
V1,2 = Motorola U1,1(V1,2) = 0.2 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.5
V1,3 = Nokia U1,1(V1,3) = 0.1 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.2
V1,4 = Apple U1,1(V1,4) = 0.5 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.1
Issue 2: Color w1,2 = 0.204 w2,2 = 0.046
V2,1 = White U1,2(V2,1) = 0.1 U2,2(V2,1) = 1
V2,2 = Grey U1,2(V2,2) = 0.5 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.3
V2,3 = Black U1,2(V2,3) = 0.3 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.1
V2,4 = Silver U1,2(V2,4) = 0.3 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.2
V2,5 = Red U1,2(V2,5) = 1 U2,2(V2,5) = 0.5
Issue 3: Operating System w1,3 = 0.053 w2,3 = 0.497
V3,1 = Windows Mobile U1,3(V3,1) = 0.1 U2,3(V3,1) = 0.2
V3,2 = Android U1,3(V3,2) = 0.2 U2,3(V3,2) = 1
V3,3 = Apple U1,3(V3,3) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.1
V3,4 = BlackBerry U1,3(V3,4) = 1 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.5
Issue 4: Memory w1,4 = 0.153 w2,4 = 0.152
V4,1 = 510M U1,4(V4,1) = 0.1 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.1
V4,2 = 1G U1,4(V4,2) = 0.2 U2,4(V4,2) = 1
V4,3 = 2G U1,4(V4,3) = 1 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.2
V4,4 = 4G U1,4(V4,4) = 0.5 U2,4(V4,4) = 0.5
Issue 5: Screen Resolution w1,5 = 0.3 w2,5 = 0.1
V5,1 = 240*400 U1,5(V5,1) = 0.1 U2,5(V5,1) = 0.1
V5,2 = 480*800 U1,5(V5,2) = 0.2 U2,5(V5,2) = 0.3
V5,3 = 600*1024 U1,5(V5,3) = 0.5 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.5
V5,4 = 800*1280 U1,5(V5,4) = 0.3 U2,5(V5,4) = 1
V5,5 = 1280*1280 U1,5(V5,5) = 1 U2,5(V5,5) = 0.2
Table A.29: Phone scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1 CUHKAgent 0.717 ±0.002
2 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.704 ±0.003
3-5 AgentLG 0.689 ±0.004
3-5 OMACagent 0.688 ±0.000
3-5 IAMhaggler2012 0.683 ±0.004
6 Meta-Agent 0.674 ±0.002
7 BRAMAgent2 0.663 ±0.004
8 AgentMR 0.341 ±0.002
Table A.30: Scores in the Phone scenario (averaged over δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈
{0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.15: Phone scenario outcome space.
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A.16 Rental House Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: price w1,1 = 0.25 w2,1 = 0.4
V1,1 = 40000yen U1,1(V1,1) = 0.2 U2,1(V1,1) = 1
V1,2 = 45000yen U1,1(V1,2) = 0.4 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.8
V1,3 = 50000yen U1,1(V1,3) = 0.6 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.6
V1,4 = 55000yen U1,1(V1,4) = 0.8 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.4
V1,5 = 60000yen U1,1(V1,5) = 1 U2,1(V1,5) = 0.2
Issue 2: Style w1,2 = 0.25 w2,2 = 0.25
V2,1 = Japanese U1,2(V2,1) = 1 U2,2(V2,1) = 0.5
V2,2 = Western U1,2(V2,2) = 0.5 U2,2(V2,2) = 1
Issue 3: AcceptableLocations w1,3 = 0.25 w2,3 = 0.25
V3,1 = Near To Fukiage Station U1,3(V3,1) = 0.333 U2,3(V3,1) = 1
V3,2 = Near To Tsrumai Station U1,3(V3,2) = 1 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.667
V3,3 = Near To Gokiso Station U1,3(V3,3) = 0.667 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.333
Issue 4: WaterHeaterType w1,4 = 0.25 w2,4 = 0.1
V4,1 = Electric U1,4(V4,1) = 1 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.5
V4,2 = Gas U1,4(V4,2) = 0.5 U2,4(V4,2) = 1
Table A.31: Rental House scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-2 AgentLG 0.581 ±0.006
1-3 OMACagent 0.575 ±0.003
2-3 Meta-Agent 0.572 ±0.005
4-5 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.564 ±0.001
4-7 CUHKAgent 0.557 ±0.005
5-7 IAMhaggler2012 0.552 ±0.001
5-7 BRAMAgent2 0.551 ±0.004
8 AgentMR 0.343 ±0.001
Table A.32: Scores in the Rental House scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.16: Rental House scenario outcome space.
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A.17 Supermarket Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Bread type w1,1 = 0.3 w2,1 = 0.25
V1,1 = Baguette U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 0.5
V1,2 = Crackers U1,1(V1,2) = 0.2 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.1
V1,3 = Croissants U1,1(V1,3) = 0.1 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.2
V1,4 = Plain bread U1,1(V1,4) = 0.5 U2,1(V1,4) = 1
Issue 2: Fruit w1,2 = 0.2 w2,2 = 0.2
V2,1 = Apples U1,2(V2,1) = 0.1 U2,2(V2,1) = 1
V2,2 = Bananas U1,2(V2,2) = 0.5 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.3
V2,3 = Cherries U1,2(V2,3) = 0.3 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.3
V2,4 = Grapes U1,2(V2,4) = 0.3 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.5
V2,5 = Oranges U1,2(V2,5) = 0.3 U2,2(V2,5) = 0.4
V2,6 = Melons U1,2(V2,6) = 0.8 U2,2(V2,6) = 0.4
V2,7 = Strawberries U1,2(V2,7) = 0.9 U2,2(V2,7) = 0.7
Issue 3: Snacks w1,3 = 0.05 w2,3 = 0.05
V3,1 = Chocolate bars U1,3(V3,1) = 0.1 U2,3(V3,1) = 1
V3,2 = Doughnuts U1,3(V3,2) = 0.2 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.5
V3,3 = Nachos U1,3(V3,3) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.2
V3,4 = Popcorn U1,3(V3,4) = 1 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.1
V3,5 = Potato Chips U1,3(V3,5) = 0.1 U2,3(V3,5) = 0.7
V3,6 = Candy U1,3(V3,6) = 0.7 U2,3(V3,6) = 0.3
V3,7 = Cookies U1,3(V3,7) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,7) = 0.4
Issue 4: Spreads w1,4 = 0.15 w2,4 = 0.15
V4,1 = Cheese U1,4(V4,1) = 0.1 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.5
V4,2 = Jam U1,4(V4,2) = 0.2 U2,4(V4,2) = 1
V4,3 = Peanut butter U1,4(V4,3) = 1 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.2
V4,4 = Sandwich spread U1,4(V4,4) = 0.5 U2,4(V4,4) = 0.1
V4,5 = Chocolate U1,4(V4,5) = 0.8 U2,4(V4,5) = 0.3
V4,6 = Ham U1,4(V4,6) = 0.9 U2,4(V4,6) = 0.5
V4,7 = Salami U1,4(V4,7) = 0.6 U2,4(V4,7) = 0.7
V4,8 = Egg Salad U1,4(V4,8) = 0.8 U2,4(V4,8) = 0.6
Issue 5: Vegetables w1,5 = 0.25 w2,5 = 0.25
V5,1 = Beans U1,5(V5,1) = 0.1 U2,5(V5,1) = 1
V5,2 = Broccoli U1,5(V5,2) = 0.2 U2,5(V5,2) = 0.3
V5,3 = Leek U1,5(V5,3) = 0.5 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.5
V5,4 = Potatoes U1,5(V5,4) = 0.3 U2,5(V5,4) = 0.2
V5,5 = Spinach U1,5(V5,5) = 1 U2,5(V5,5) = 0.1
V5,6 = Carrots U1,5(V5,6) = 0.3 U2,5(V5,6) = 0.5
V5,7 = Tomatoes U1,5(V5,7) = 0.8 U2,5(V5,7) = 0.7
Issue 6: Drinks w1,6 = 0.05 w2,6 = 0.1
V6,1 = Energy Drinks U1,6(V6,1) = 1 U2,6(V6,1) = 1
V6,2 = Milk U1,6(V6,2) = 0.7 U2,6(V6,2) = 0.3
V6,3 = Tea U1,6(V6,3) = 0.2 U2,6(V6,3) = 0.5
V6,4 = Coffee U1,6(V6,4) = 0.4 U2,6(V6,4) = 0.2
V6,5 = Juice U1,6(V6,5) = 0.7 U2,6(V6,5) = 0.1
V6,6 = Coca Cola U1,6(V6,6) = 0.8 U2,6(V6,6) = 0.6
V6,7 = Fanta U1,6(V6,7) = 0.7 U2,6(V6,7) = 0.8
V6,8 = Beer U1,6(V6,8) = 0.7 U2,6(V6,8) = 0.7
V6,9 = Wine U1,6(V6,9) = 0.5 U2,6(V6,9) = 0.5
Table A.33: Supermarket scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1 AgentLG 0.565 ±0.007
2 OMACagent 0.550 ±0.003
3-4 IAMhaggler2012 0.528 ±0.004
3-4 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.527 ±0.002
5 CUHKAgent 0.519 ±0.004
6-7 BRAMAgent2 0.472 ±0.010
6-7 Meta-Agent 0.460 ±0.013
8 AgentMR 0.223 ±0.004
Table A.34: Scores in the Supermarket scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.17: Supermarket scenario outcome space.
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A.18 ADG Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: CD player w1,1 = 0.16 w2,1 = 0.36
V1,1 = good U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 0
V1,2 = fairly good U1,1(V1,2) = 0.98 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.85
V1,3 = standard U1,1(V1,3) = 0.92 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.91
V1,4 = meagre U1,1(V1,4) = 0.75 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.98
V1,5 = none U1,1(V1,5) = 0 U2,1(V1,5) = 1
Issue 2: Extra speakers w1,2 = 0.16 w2,2 = 0.2
V2,1 = good U1,2(V2,1) = 1 U2,2(V2,1) = 0
V2,2 = fairly good U1,2(V2,2) = 0.99 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.8
V2,3 = standard U1,2(V2,3) = 0.93 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.96
V2,4 = meagre U1,2(V2,4) = 0.8 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.93
V2,5 = none U1,2(V2,5) = 0 U2,2(V2,5) = 1
Issue 3: Air conditioning w1,3 = 0.17 w2,3 = 0.2
V3,1 = good U1,3(V3,1) = 1 U2,3(V3,1) = 0
V3,2 = fairly good U1,3(V3,2) = 0.99 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.8
V3,3 = standard U1,3(V3,3) = 0.96 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.91
V3,4 = meagre U1,3(V3,4) = 0.83 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.99
V3,5 = none U1,3(V3,5) = 0 U2,3(V3,5) = 1
Issue 4: Tow hedge w1,4 = 0.17 w2,4 = 0.2
V4,1 = good U1,4(V4,1) = 1 U2,4(V4,1) = 0
V4,2 = fairly good U1,4(V4,2) = 0.99 U2,4(V4,2) = 0.8
V4,3 = standard U1,4(V4,3) = 0.93 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.9
V4,4 = meagre U1,4(V4,4) = 0.85 U2,4(V4,4) = 0.98
V4,5 = none U1,4(V4,5) = 0 U2,4(V4,5) = 1
Issue 5: Tow hedge2 w1,5 = 0.17 w2,5 = 0.02
V5,1 = good U1,5(V5,1) = 1 U2,5(V5,1) = 0
V5,2 = fairly good U1,5(V5,2) = 0.99 U2,5(V5,2) = 0.8
V5,3 = standard U1,5(V5,3) = 0.95 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.9
V5,4 = meagre U1,5(V5,4) = 0.8 U2,5(V5,4) = 0.95
V5,5 = none U1,5(V5,5) = 0 U2,5(V5,5) = 1
Issue 6: Tow hedge3 w1,6 = 0.17 w2,6 = 0.02
V6,1 = good U1,6(V6,1) = 1 U2,6(V6,1) = 0
V6,2 = fairly good U1,6(V6,2) = 0.99 U2,6(V6,2) = 0.8
V6,3 = standard U1,6(V6,3) = 0.95 U2,6(V6,3) = 0.9
V6,4 = meagre U1,6(V6,4) = 0.8 U2,6(V6,4) = 0.95
V6,5 = none U1,6(V6,5) = 0 U2,6(V6,5) = 1
Table A.35: ADG scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1 AgentLG 0.775 ±0.002
2-3 CUHKAgent 0.764 ±0.006
2-3 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.759 ±0.003
4 BRAMAgent2 0.751 ±0.002
5 IAMhaggler2012 0.733 ±0.003
6 Meta-Agent 0.721 ±0.002
7 OMACagent 0.710 ±0.005
8 AgentMR 0.188 ±0.000
Table A.36: Scores in the ADG scenario (averaged over δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈
{0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.18: ADG scenario outcome space.
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A.19 Amsterdam Party Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Venue w1,1 = 0.18 w2,1 = 0.15
V1,1 = Shopping U1,1(V1,1) = 0.5 U2,1(V1,1) = 1
V1,2 = Museum U1,1(V1,2) = 1 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.25
V1,3 = Dancing U1,1(V1,3) = 0.5 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.5
V1,4 = Diner U1,1(V1,4) = 0.25 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.75
Issue 2: Time of arrival w1,2 = 0.22 w2,2 = 0.12
V2,1 = Morning U1,2(V2,1) = 0.333 U2,2(V2,1) = 0.333
V2,2 = Afternoon U1,2(V2,2) = 1 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.667
V2,3 = Evening U1,2(V2,3) = 0.333 U2,2(V2,3) = 1
Issue 3: Day of the week w1,3 = 0.13 w2,3 = 0.21
V3,1 = Monday U1,3(V3,1) = 1 U2,3(V3,1) = 0.167
V3,2 = Tuesday U1,3(V3,2) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.333
V3,3 = Wednesday U1,3(V3,3) = 0.667 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.5
V3,4 = Thursday U1,3(V3,4) = 0.833 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.667
V3,5 = Friday U1,3(V3,5) = 0.167 U2,3(V3,5) = 0.667
V3,6 = Saturday U1,3(V3,6) = 0.167 U2,3(V3,6) = 1
V3,7 = Sunday U1,3(V3,7) = 1 U2,3(V3,7) = 1
Issue 4: Duration w1,4 = 0.12 w2,4 = 0.32
V4,1 = One day U1,4(V4,1) = 1 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.333
V4,2 = One night U1,4(V4,2) = 0.667 U2,4(V4,2) = 0.667
V4,3 = One week U1,4(V4,3) = 0.333 U2,4(V4,3) = 1
Issue 5: Transportation w1,5 = 0.23 w2,5 = 0.13
V5,1 = Public transport U1,5(V5,1) = 1 U2,5(V5,1) = 0.333
V5,2 = Car U1,5(V5,2) = 0.333 U2,5(V5,2) = 1
V5,3 = Combination U1,5(V5,3) = 0.667 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.667
Issue 6: Souvenirs w1,6 = 0.12 w2,6 = 0.07
V6,1 = None U1,6(V6,1) = 0.75 U2,6(V6,1) = 0.25
V6,2 = Tulips U1,6(V6,2) = 1 U2,6(V6,2) = 0.75
V6,3 = Cheese U1,6(V6,3) = 0.25 U2,6(V6,3) = 0
V6,4 = Waterpipe U1,6(V6,4) = 0.25 U2,6(V6,4) = 1
Table A.37: Amsterdam Party scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1 CUHKAgent 0.654 ±0.002
2-3 AgentLG 0.643 ±0.002
2-4 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.631 ±0.009
3-4 OMACagent 0.628 ±0.003
5-6 BRAMAgent2 0.600 ±0.002
5-6 Meta-Agent 0.599 ±0.004
7 IAMhaggler2012 0.577 ±0.004
8 AgentMR 0.188 ±0.000
Table A.38: Scores in the Amsterdam Party scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.19: Amsterdam Party scenario outcome space.
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A.20 Grocery Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Bread type w1,1 = 0.3 w2,1 = 0.2
V1,1 = Baguette U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 1
V1,2 = Crackers U1,1(V1,2) = 0.2 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.5
V1,3 = Croissants U1,1(V1,3) = 0.1 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.2
V1,4 = Plain bread U1,1(V1,4) = 0.5 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.1
Issue 2: Fruit w1,2 = 0.2 w2,2 = 0.05
V2,1 = Apples U1,2(V2,1) = 0.1 U2,2(V2,1) = 1
V2,2 = Bananas U1,2(V2,2) = 0.5 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.3
V2,3 = Cherries U1,2(V2,3) = 0.3 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.1
V2,4 = Grapes U1,2(V2,4) = 0.3 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.2
V2,5 = Pears U1,2(V2,5) = 1 U2,2(V2,5) = 0.5
Issue 3: Snacks w1,3 = 0.05 w2,3 = 0.5
V3,1 = Chocolate bars U1,3(V3,1) = 0.1 U2,3(V3,1) = 0.2
V3,2 = Doughnuts U1,3(V3,2) = 0.2 U2,3(V3,2) = 1
V3,3 = Nachos U1,3(V3,3) = 0.5 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.1
V3,4 = Popcorn U1,3(V3,4) = 1 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.5
Issue 4: Spreads w1,4 = 0.15 w2,4 = 0.15
V4,1 = Cheese U1,4(V4,1) = 0.1 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.1
V4,2 = Jam U1,4(V4,2) = 0.2 U2,4(V4,2) = 1
V4,3 = Peanut butter U1,4(V4,3) = 1 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.2
V4,4 = Sandwich spread U1,4(V4,4) = 0.5 U2,4(V4,4) = 0.5
Issue 5: Vegetables w1,5 = 0.3 w2,5 = 0.1
V5,1 = Beans U1,5(V5,1) = 0.1 U2,5(V5,1) = 0.1
V5,2 = Broccoli U1,5(V5,2) = 0.2 U2,5(V5,2) = 0.3
V5,3 = Leek U1,5(V5,3) = 0.5 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.5
V5,4 = Potatoes U1,5(V5,4) = 0.3 U2,5(V5,4) = 1
V5,5 = Spinach U1,5(V5,5) = 1 U2,5(V5,5) = 0.2
Table A.39: Grocery scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-2 CUHKAgent 0.723 ±0.002
1-3 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.720 ±0.006
2-3 AgentLG 0.712 ±0.007
4-6 OMACagent 0.692 ±0.006
4-7 BRAMAgent2 0.690 ±0.004
4-7 Meta-Agent 0.685 ±0.006
5-7 IAMhaggler2012 0.679 ±0.008
8 AgentMR 0.458 ±0.002
Table A.40: Scores in the Grocery scenario (averaged over δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈
{0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.20: Grocery scenario outcome space.
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A.21 Laptop Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Laptop w1,1 = 0.445 w2,1 = 0.378
V1,1 = Dell U1,1(V1,1) = 0.4 U2,1(V1,1) = 0.4
V1,2 = Macintosh U1,1(V1,2) = 0.667 U2,1(V1,2) = 1
V1,3 = HP U1,1(V1,3) = 1 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.667
Issue 2: Harddisk w1,2 = 0.378 w2,2 = 0.177
V2,1 = 60 Gb U1,2(V2,1) = 1 U2,2(V2,1) = 0.667
V2,2 = 80 Gb U1,2(V2,2) = 0.667 U2,2(V2,2) = 1
V2,3 = 120 Gb U1,2(V2,3) = 0.3 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.3
Issue 3: External Monitor w1,3 = 0.177 w2,3 = 0.445
V3,1 = 19 LCD U1,3(V3,1) = 1 U2,3(V3,1) = 1
V3,2 = 20 LCD U1,3(V3,2) = 0.333 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.667
V3,3 = 23 LCD U1,3(V3,3) = 0.667 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.333
Table A.41: Laptop scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-2 CUHKAgent 0.775 ±0.007
1-2 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.773 ±0.001
3-4 IAMhaggler2012 0.760 ±0.008
3-5 Meta-Agent 0.751 ±0.002
4-5 OMACagent 0.749 ±0.004
6 AgentLG 0.732 ±0.001
7 BRAMAgent2 0.720 ±0.002
8 AgentMR 0.532 ±0.005
Table A.42: Scores in the Laptop scenario (averaged over δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈
{0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.21: Laptop scenario outcome space.
172 Appendix A Scenarios
A.22 NiceOrDie Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: NiceOrDie w1,1 = 1 w2,1 = 1
V1,1 = 100 16 U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 0.16
V1,2 = 16 100 U1,1(V1,2) = 0.16 U2,1(V1,2) = 1
V1,3 = 29 29 U1,1(V1,3) = 0.299 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.299
Table A.43: NiceOrDie scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1-3 BRAMAgent2 0.398 ±0.000
1-3 OMACagent 0.396 ±0.006
1-4 AgentLG 0.391 ±0.006
3-4 IAMhaggler2012 0.386 ±0.000
5 CUHKAgent 0.364 ±0.006
6 Meta-Agent 0.315 ±0.000
7 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.264 ±0.000
8 AgentMR 0.157 ±0.000
Table A.44: Scores in the NiceOrDie scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.22: NiceOrDie scenario outcome space.
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A.23 Itex vs Cypress Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Price w1,1 = 0.288 w2,1 = 0.47
V1,1 = $4.37 U1,1(V1,1) = 1 U2,1(V1,1) = 0.025
V1,2 = $4.12 U1,1(V1,2) = 0.667 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.25
V1,3 = $3.98 U1,1(V1,3) = 0.333 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.625
V1,4 = $3.71 U1,1(V1,4) = 0.167 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.825
V1,5 = $3.47 U1,1(V1,5) = 0.033 U2,1(V1,5) = 1
Issue 2: Delivery w1,2 = 0.192 w2,2 = 0.122
V2,1 = 60 days U1,2(V2,1) = 0.05 U2,2(V2,1) = 0.04
V2,2 = 45 days U1,2(V2,2) = 1 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.4
V2,3 = 30 days U1,2(V2,3) = 0.5 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.76
V2,4 = 20 days U1,2(V2,4) = 0.25 U2,2(V2,4) = 1
Issue 3: Payment w1,3 = 0.242 w2,3 = 0.177
V3,1 = Upon delivery U1,3(V3,1) = 0.4 U2,3(V3,1) = 1
V3,2 = 30 days after delivery U1,3(V3,2) = 1 U2,3(V3,2) = 0.4
V3,3 = 60 days after delivery U1,3(V3,3) = 0.04 U2,3(V3,3) = 0.067
Issue 4: Returns w1,4 = 0.278 w2,4 = 0.231
V4,1 = Full price U1,4(V4,1) = 0.033 U2,4(V4,1) = 1
V4,2 = 5% spoilage allowed U1,4(V4,2) = 1 U2,4(V4,2) = 0.35
V4,3 = 10% spoilage allowed U1,4(V4,3) = 0.167 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.05
Table A.45: Itex vs Cypress scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1 OMACagent 0.521 ±0.002
2 AgentLG 0.515 ±0.004
3 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.486 ±0.002
4-5 IAMhaggler2012 0.481 ±0.003
4-7 CUHKAgent 0.475 ±0.006
5-7 BRAMAgent2 0.473 ±0.004
5-7 Meta-Agent 0.471 ±0.002
8 AgentMR 0.306 ±0.003
Table A.46: Scores in the Itex vs Cypress scenario (averaged over δ ∈
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈ {0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.23: Itex vs Cypress scenario outcome space.
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A.24 Travel Scenario
Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Atmosphere w1,1 = 0.37 w2,1 = 0.212
V1,1 = Cultural heritage U1,1(V1,1) = 0.111 U2,1(V1,1) = 0.109
V1,2 = Local traditions U1,1(V1,2) = 0.089 U2,1(V1,2) = 0.109
V1,3 = Political stability U1,1(V1,3) = 0.576 U2,1(V1,3) = 0.088
V1,4 = Security (personal) U1,1(V1,4) = 0.708 U2,1(V1,4) = 0.088
V1,5 = Liveliness U1,1(V1,5) = 0.122 U2,1(V1,5) = 0.121
V1,6 = Touristic activities U1,1(V1,6) = 0.1 U2,1(V1,6) = 1
V1,7 = Hospitality U1,1(V1,7) = 1 U2,1(V1,7) = 0.577
Issue 2: Amusement w1,2 = 0.043 w2,2 = 0.037
V2,1 = Nightlife and entertainment U1,2(V2,1) = 1 U2,2(V2,1) = 1
V2,2 = Nightclubs U1,2(V2,2) = 0.089 U2,2(V2,2) = 0.576
V2,3 = Excursion U1,2(V2,3) = 0.1 U2,2(V2,3) = 0.087
V2,4 = Casinos U1,2(V2,4) = 0.122 U2,2(V2,4) = 0.098
V2,5 = Zoo U1,2(V2,5) = 0.708 U2,2(V2,5) = 0.111
V2,6 = Festivals U1,2(V2,6) = 0.111 U2,2(V2,6) = 0.576
V2,7 = Amusement park U1,2(V2,7) = 0.576 U2,2(V2,7) = 0.121
Issue 3: Culinary w1,3 = 0.208 w2,3 = 0.261
V3,1 = Local cuisine U1,3(V3,1) = 1 U2,3(V3,1) = 0.708
V3,2 = Lunch facilities U1,3(V3,2) = 0.138 U2,3(V3,2) = 1
V3,3 = International cuisine U1,3(V3,3) = 0.709 U2,3(V3,3) = 1
V3,4 = Cooking workshops U1,3(V3,4) = 0.122 U2,3(V3,4) = 0.119
Issue 4: Shopping w1,4 = 0.043 w2,4 = 0.043
V4,1 = Shopping malls U1,4(V4,1) = 0.12 U2,4(V4,1) = 0.709
V4,2 = Markets U1,4(V4,2) = 0.138 U2,4(V4,2) = 1
V4,3 = Streets U1,4(V4,3) = 0.709 U2,4(V4,3) = 0.12
V4,4 = Small boutiques U1,4(V4,4) = 1 U2,4(V4,4) = 0.138
Issue 5: Culture w1,5 = 0.047 w2,5 = 0.047
V5,1 = Museum U1,5(V5,1) = 0.709 U2,5(V5,1) = 0.12
V5,2 = Music hall U1,5(V5,2) = 0.12 U2,5(V5,2) = 0.709
V5,3 = Theater U1,5(V5,3) = 1 U2,5(V5,3) = 0.11
V5,4 = Art gallery U1,5(V5,4) = 0.099 U2,5(V5,4) = 0.579
V5,5 = Cinema U1,5(V5,5) = 0.579 U2,5(V5,5) = 1
V5,6 = Congress center U1,5(V5,6) = 0.11 U2,5(V5,6) = 0.099
Issue 6: Sport w1,6 = 0.033 w2,6 = 0.028
V6,1 = Bike tours U1,6(V6,1) = 1 U2,6(V6,1) = 1
V6,2 = Hiking U1,6(V6,2) = 0.709 U2,6(V6,2) = 0.11
V6,3 = Indoor activities U1,6(V6,3) = 0.11 U2,6(V6,3) = 0.137
V6,4 = Outdoor activities U1,6(V6,4) = 0.121 U2,6(V6,4) = 0.709
V6,5 = Adventure U1,6(V6,5) = 0.137 U2,6(V6,5) = 0.121
Issue 7: Environment w1,7 = 0.255 w2,7 = 0.371
V7,1 = Parks and Gardens U1,7(V7,1) = 0.5 U2,7(V7,1) = 0.098
V7,2 = Square U1,7(V7,2) = 0.089 U2,7(V7,2) = 1
V7,3 = Historical places U1,7(V7,3) = 0.098 U2,7(V7,3) = 0.708
V7,4 = See, river, etc. U1,7(V7,4) = 0.082 U2,7(V7,4) = 0.576
V7,5 = Monuments U1,7(V7,5) = 1 U2,7(V7,5) = 0.708
V7,6 = Special streets U1,7(V7,6) = 0.576 U2,7(V7,6) = 0.083
V7,7 = Palace U1,7(V7,7) = 0.709 U2,7(V7,7) = 0.11
V7,8 = Landscape and nature U1,7(V7,8) = 0.111 U2,7(V7,8) = 0.5
Table A.47: Travel scenario specification.
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Rank Agent Score
1 AgentLG 0.642 ±0.011
2-3 CUHKAgent 0.618 ±0.007
2-4 TheNegotiator Reloaded 0.613 ±0.008
3-5 OMACagent 0.601 ±0.009
4-5 IAMhaggler2012 0.600 ±0.006
6 BRAMAgent2 0.570 ±0.013
7 Meta-Agent 0.545 ±0.006
8 AgentMR 0.254 ±0.009
Table A.48: Scores in the Travel scenario (averaged over δ ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00}, uα ∈
{0.00, 0.25, 0.50}), with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.24: Travel scenario outcome space.

Appendix B
Pareto-Search Selection
In this appendix, we discuss an additional approach for selecting a multi-issue offer with
a given utility (other such approaches are described in Section 3.3). This particular
approach was designed for use in scenarios which contain issues with and without a
known, common ordering. Since this thesis focuses on issues which do not have a known,
common ordering, we omit this strategy from the body of the thesis.
The approach, known as Pareto-search, is to search for the offer with a given utility
that we consider to be closest to the best offer that we have seen from our opponents.
The rationale for this approach is that, if we can select an offer close to the best offer
(according to our utility function) seen from the opponent (rather than any of its other
offers) it can aid the opponent in learning our preferences. If the opponent uses a similar
search method, the agreement that is reached should be Pareto efficient. In what follows,
we begin by considering only scenarios where the issue values take a known, common
ordering (including continuous issues), before extending the approach to deal with issues
where the values do not have a known, common ordering.
B.1 Issues with a known, common ordering
In order to search for an offer, we consider our agent’s utility function to be a mapping
from a multi-dimensional space (in which there is a dimension representing each issue
with a known, common ordering, including continuous issues) to a real value which
represents the utility of the outcome. Our strategy treats integer based issues in the
same way as continuous issues, except when generating an offer, where it must round
the values for each integer based issue, to ensure that their values remain as integers in
the offer.
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Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 1: Price w1,1 = 0.3 w2,1 = 0.8
v1 ∈ Z, 5000 ≤ v1 ≤ 15000 U1,1(v1) = −0.0001 · v1+1.5 U2,1(v1) = 0.0001 · v1−0.5
Issue 2: Batt.Cap. w1,2 = 0.7 w2,2 = 0.2
v2 ∈ R, 5 ≤ v2 ≤ 20 U1,2(v2) =

0.1 · v2
−0.5 if v2 ≤ 15
−0.2 · v2
+4.0 otherwise
U2,2(v2) =

0.2 · v2
−1.0 if v2 ≤ 10
−0.1 · v2
+2.0 otherwise
Table B.1: Agent’s utilities for the ‘Price’ and ‘Battery Capacity’ issues in a modified
version of the car sales domain. wp,i is the weight of issue i to agent p and Up,i(vi) is
the utility to agent p of value vi for issue i.
Figure B.1: Multi-dimensional space representing the utility of outcomes in the mod-
ified car sales domain, with one continuous issue and one integer issue (as described in
Table B.1). Values v1 and v2 are the values of the two issues. U({v1, v2}) is the utility
of the offer represented by those values.
For example, for a modified version of the car sales domain (introduced in Chapter 1),
which consists of only two issues (one continuous, the other integer), as described in
Table B.1, this multi-dimensional utility space (the space of all possible outcomes) is
shown graphically in Figure B.1.
Here, the values v1 and v2 for the two issues are shown on the two horizontal axes. The
vertical axis represents the utility U({v1, v2}) of each possible offer.
Now, by taking a cross-section of the utility space, we can construct an iso-utility space,
which is a multi-dimensional space, with the number of dimensions equal to the number
of continuous or integer issues. This space consists of outcomes which result in the same
utility for our agent. To this end, Figure B.2 shows a number of iso-utility spaces in the
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Figure B.2: Iso-utility contours in a domain with one continuous issue and one integer
issue (as described in Table B.1). Values v1 and v2 are the values of the two issues.
The darker contours represent the higher utility values.
modified car sales domain. Each iso-utility space is shown as a contour line (the contour
lines are displayed at utility intervals of 0.1).
Moreover, the iso-utility space that is chosen at a particular time is the one which
represents our current desired utility level (as decided by our concession strategy, which
we detailed in Section 3.2). Furthermore, for a given desired utility level (in the following
example we choose a utility of 0.8), we can view the iso-utility space as in Figure B.3.
Based on the work of Somefun et al. (described in Section 2.3.2.3), we use projection
to find the point on our iso-utility space which is closest to the best offer received from
our opponent. We extend their work to deal with issues in which there is not a known,
common ordering, in Section B.2.
Specifically, in terms of closeness between two offers {v1, v2, ..., vn} and {v′1, v′2, ..., v′n},
we use the Euclidean distance, that is:√√√√ n∑
i=1
(
vi − v′i
rangei
)2
(B.1)
where rangei is the range of values allowed for issue i. The reason that we divide by
the range is to ensure that the scale of the issue’s values does not affect the distance
measurement. By performing this division, the value of each issue is normalised by its
range, to give it the same weight as all other issues. If this division was not performed,
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Figure B.3: Projection of a point representing an opponent’s offer ({11800, 8.24},
marked with a cross) onto an iso-utility space (at a utility of 0.8) for a domain with
two continuous issues (as described in Table B.1). The shaded region represents the
space in which the utility is greater than 0.8.
the issue with the larger range would contribute significantly more to the distance calcu-
lation. For example, in the modified car sales domain presented in Table B.1, the price
issue (with a range of 10000) would have a larger effect than the battery capacity (with
a range of 15).
B.2 Issues without a known, common ordering
The approach we have just introduced does not consider domains with discrete issues
which do not have a known, common ordering. In order to meet our requirement for
a strategy which can negotiate in domains with such issues (Requirement 5), we need
to make some modifications to our strategy. In particular, since they do not have a
common ordering, we cannot treat them as further dimensions in our space. To address
this problem, we first of all continue to create an iso-utility space to represent the issues
with a known, common ordering (including continuous issues). However, to handle the
additional complexity of discrete issues without a known, common ordering, we create
an iso-utility space for each combination of the values of the discrete issues without a
known, common ordering. As an example, consider the domain we used earlier, but add
a discrete issue Colour, as described in Table B.2 (we also reduce the weights of the
Price issue by 0.1, that is w1,1 = 0.2 and w2,1 = 0.8).
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Domain Profile 1 Profile 2
Issue 3: Colour w1,3 = 0.1 w2,3 = 0.1
V3 = { V3,Red = 1 U1,3(V3,Red) = 3 U2,3(V3,Red) = ,
V3,Green = 2 U1,3(V3,Green) = 2 U2,3(V3,Green) = ,
V3,Blue = 3 U1,3(V3,Blue) = 1 U2,3(V3,Blue) = }
Table B.2: Agent’s utilities for the ‘Colour’ issue.
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Figure B.4: Projection of a point representing an opponent’s offer (at {13500, 7, v3},
marked with a cross) onto an iso-utility space (at a utility of 0.8) for a domain with
two continuous issues and a discrete issue (as described in Tables B.1 and B.2). The
projections are shown for each of the three combinations of values for the issues without
a common ordering.
For each combination of the values for the issues without a common ordering, we cre-
ate a multi-dimensional space, and use the iso-utility projection method (described in
Section 3.3) to find a solution (where possible) for each of these combinations. We
demonstrate this projection in Figure B.4, where the opponent’s offer {13500, 7, v3}
(we write v3 to represent the value of issue 3, since it does not affect the projection)
is projected to give the solutions {11667, 15.0000,Red}, {12514, 14.7659,Green} and
{12572, 14.3063,Blue}. For some combinations, the maximum overall utility available
from the package with the best values for the other issues may be lower than our current
utility level. In this case, there will not be a solution which contains this combination
of values for the issues without a common ordering.
Once a solution has been found for each combination of the values, it is necessary for
our agent to choose one of these solutions as its offer. Our agent is indifferent between
each of these solutions, as they all belong to the same iso-utility space, resulting in them
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having an identical utility. However, their utility to the opponent may vary, and in order
to negotiate efficiently, we should choose the one which offers the highest utility to the
opponent.
Now, since we assume that the opponent’s utility function is unknown (Requirement 3),
we need a way to estimate it. This can be done using the approach taken by Hindriks and
Tykhonov (2008) and as described in Section 3.3, using Bayesian updating to learn the
preferences of the opponent. The agent then evaluates the solution for each combination
of values using our model of the opponent’s utility function, in order to obtain an
estimate of the utility of the offer to the opponent. The overall solution that is chosen
is then the one which maximises the opponent’s utility according to our model of its
utility function.
In order to ensure that this approach remains computationally tractable (Requirement 7)
even in domains with large outcome spaces, it may be necessary to limit the number of
combinations of values that we perform the iso-utility projection method for. A solution
to this is to choose a number of combinations (several hundred), by identifying those
which maximise the sum of our utility and our opponent’s utility (according to our model
of the opponent’s utility function).
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